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ABSTRACT
Living under Post-Democracy: Political Subjectivity in Fleetingly Democratic Times
by
Caleb R. Miller
This dissertation addresses the theoretical implications of contemporary obstacles to 
democratic practice for the political self-conceptions of ordinary citizens. It does so by 
adopting a post-democratic perspective, one which, while sympathetic to the values of 
popular sovereignty and political equality, recognizes the practical ways in which 
contemporary democracies depart from them. In it, I argue that other theorists of post-
democracy (including Jacques Ranciere, Colin Crouch, Richard Rorty, and Jurgen 
Habermas) haven’t sufficiently appreciated the radical consequences that follow from a 
post-democratic diagnosis, which include serious challenges to the conceptual categories 
(e.g., legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and culpability) that democratic theory tends to 
take for granted. In order to develop an approach to these categories that better comports 
with a less-than-democratic present, I build upon Thomas Hobbes’s conception of servitude 
to develop a new model of post-democratic subjectivity, one largely predicated on the 
experience of political domination. This model opens up the possibility for a therapeutic 
approach to political theory and (pseudo-)political activity that prioritizes a ‘care for the self’ 
over the question of political judgment, one which allows individuals to work through the 
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I. Introduction
At times, our political commitments encourage us to ignore or rationalize brute facts 
that would otherwise complicate or even challenge those commitments. For 
instance, we may look past a candidate’s moral failings because we value his 
integrity or ignore his corporate donors because we see him as the right choice for 
labor. When considering those commitments which go beyond our partisan 
differences, those ideals — freedom, justice, equality, etc. — reinforced by nearly 
every aspect of our socio-cultural experience and shared with the vast majority, we 
become more willing to accommodate contradiction. We may even speak 
paradoxically, simultaneously asserting the presence and absence of a particular 
ideal (i.e., “despite the rampant inequality, we live in an equal society,” “even with an 
unjust legal system, the courts are just,” etc.).  Still, we often choose to 
accommodate those contradictions precisely because they are so widely accepted; 
suggestions that the emperor wears no clothes are consistently met with hackneyed, 
often condescending defenses of his invisible attire. Our decision to do so, however, 
has profound consequences. By maintaining these sorts of fundamental 
contradictions, we not only lose sight of our collective, lived experience, but come to 
suffer the affective consequences of living a lie.
Our belief that ordinary people living in the United States, Canada, and 
Western Europe govern themselves, concurrent with our awareness that they do 
not, is one such contradiction. Specifically, despite all of our talk of democratic 
citizenship, we know that these individuals fail to exercise a non-negligible degree of 
political influence over sovereign decision-making. This is not to claim that most 
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individuals never serve as public officials or that citizens are not always able to 
realize their political preferences. The phrase 'non-negligible' is meant here in the 
barest sense: that their political power cannot easily be dismissed, that some 
mechanism exists by which citizens' preferences are constructively addressed, not 
simply ignored or symbolically patronized. This dissertation rests upon the 
observation that, for the vast majority of citizens in Western democracies, these 
mechanisms are absent, rendering “We, the people” politically insignificant.
Formally, we can gesture to a host of institutions and practices which are 
ostensibly intended to help realize popular preferences. Civic associations, electoral 
representation, and public discourse can all conceivably be employed for democratic 
ends, but are not intrinsically so. When, for instance, a multi-billion dollar company is 
able to hire private lobbying firms, make substantial campaign contributions, and 
dramatically outspend their opponents on advertising, it is difficult to characterize an 
individual's ability to canvass, vote, or speak as significant. Even when actively 
engaged with a host of like-minded citizens and forming a movement, these efforts 
can be instantly matched (or hijacked) by those with the requisite wealth. Moreover, 
even when the battle is 'won', well-funded interests can continue to chip away at any 
gains, watering down legislation or spoiling implementation, if not eventually 
reversing the decision. Under such conditions, the ordinary citizen is at an extreme 
disadvantage, to say nothing of the individuals not involved at all. Of course, this is 
not to suggest that all political contests are one-sided; even the wealthy disagree 
with one another at times in ways that can yield political change. Professional sports 
leagues may take issue with local laws concerning race, sexual orientation, or 
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gender identity. Ecologically-minded billionaires may challenge destructive drilling or 
mining practices. Excited entrepreneurs may take new opportunities to upset long-
standing prohibitions. However, it would be disingenuous to describe these as 
genuinely democratic efforts; they would, at most, be a form of pseudo-democracy 
by coincidence.
Despite being familiar with our predicament, most of us continue to think of 
ourselves as democratic citizens.  Politically, we still conceive of ourselves as 1
decision-makers. We either imagine that our preference plays some (almost 
mystical) role in sovereign decision-making or that it ought to, making its present 
relegation some kind of momentary glitch waiting to be fixed. We cling to the idea 
that our preferences matter or believe that the political system cannot long survive 
our exclusion. Most of all, we fail to consider the possibility that our political 
insignificance may persist, even outlast us, and that the democracy-to-come never 
will, or at best, will only be recognizable in retrospect through the ephemeral traces 
of a fugitive democracy neither predictable nor lasting. It may be simply because we 
have not had the conscious, collective opportunity to address our democratic 
failings. In ways palpable and explicit, our culture regularly reaffirms that vox populi 
will always win out in the end, even if sacrifices must be made along the way. More 
pessimistic diagnoses, such as George Orwell's 1984 or Terry Gilliam's Brazil, 
conclude with clear defeats that are mortal as well as political. In these works, no 
 As Jones et al. point out, 64% of Americans are at least aware that they play no role in 1
politics, believing that their votes do "not matter because of the influence that wealthy 
individuals and big corporations have over the electoral process” (Robert P. Jones, Daniel 
Cox, Betsy Cooper, and Rachel Lienesch, Anxiety, Nostalgia, and Mistrust: Findings from 
the 2015 American Values Survey (Washington, D.C.: Public Religion Research Institute, 
2015), 30).
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one is left alive without their democratic dignity, rendering the question of how to live 
without it irrelevant. When the only imagined alternative to democracy is the struggle 
for democracy, we lack a way of thinking about politics appropriate for a context 
persistently characterized by democracy’s absence. 
Ultimately, this dissertation aims to remedy that deficiency. It seeks to 
describe our political circumstances in less-than-democratic terms, not in order to 
make (yet) another pitch for democratic reform or revolution, but to better interpret 
the lived political experience of ordinary citizens. This is not an immanent critique of 
democratic thinking — like most, I am fairly sympathetic to democratic principles — 
but a challenge to its contemporary relevance. In doing so, this dissertation seeks to 
show that democratic theory is inadequate for orienting contemporary citizens of 
Western democracies. In other words, that the resources offered by democratic 
theory are unable to prepare individuals for their practical relationship to political 
activity and authority, at times even furthering feelings of frustration, anxiety, and 
alienation. Instead of a democratic orientation toward politics, we need a post-
democratic one.
What does it mean to be post-democratic? Distinct from being 'post-political,' 
which assumes that all questions of substance have already been foreclosed by 
hegemonic consensus, post-democracy doesn't necessarily signal the absence of 
politics.  Rather, it describes a context in which only a select range of actors 2
participate in political activity to any significant extent, despite the formal availability 
of mechanisms (e.g., voting, representation, etc.) for greater involvement. These 
 See, for instance, Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge Press, 2
2005), ch. 3.
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mechanisms, however, do not provide citizens the opportunity to autonomously 
influence political decision-making, but only the possibility of being activated or 
mobilized by other, authentic political actors.  Colin Crouch describes this ambiguity 3
further, writing "One cannot call this kind of politics non- or anti-democratic, because 
so much of it results from politicians' anxieties about their relations with citizens. At 
the same time it is difficult to dignify it as democracy itself, because so many citizens 
have been reduced to the role of manipulated, passive, rare participants."  Ordinary 4
citizens may still 'participate' in politics by consuming political news, holding political 
beliefs, and occasionally voting, but these actions offer only the most belabored, 
tenuous connections to the eventual political decisions they are intended to 
influence. Rather, effective political participation is limited to wealthy elites and 
dedicated activists (with the latter being at an absurd disadvantage), those with the 
time and resources to engage in the "slow, powerful  drilling through hard boards” 
described by Max Weber.  The vast majority of us, whether by conscious choice or 5
due to other responsibilities, largely restrict ourselves to the exercise of Benjamin 
Constant's modern liberty, leading the life of a private individual rather than a political 
 Steven Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and 3
Democracy in America (New York: Pearson, 2002); Steven Schier, By Invitation Only 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001).
 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 21. 4
 Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation," The Vocation Lectures (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 5
Publishing, 2004), 93.
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actor.  As such, we cannot properly be described as having any significant impact on 6
sovereign decision-making whatsoever. 
This argument is hardly unique. In addition to recent work on post-democracy, 
the tradition of democratic realism stretches back to E. E. Schattschneider, Joseph 
Schumpeter, and Weber.  Still, because of our overriding attention to the role of 7
political elites, we lack a satisfactory account of how ordinary citizens ought to 
approach political activity and authority under these conditions. In other words, we 
continue to attend to politics as a vocation, not to the alienated political existence 
with which so many of us are familiar. Most of ordinary citizens will not have to 
decide whether to go to war, how to apply a law, or if they can stomach the kinds of 
compromises necessary to legislate; they will, at best, decide whether to sacrifice for 
that war, respect that law, or consider that legislation beneficial. In conjunction with a 
more accurate appreciation of our post-democratic context, we need a new 
framework for interpreting the political experience of non-elites, one which focuses 
less on considerations relevant to political decision-making and more on the 
everyday experience of being governed. In short, an account not of political activity 
itself, but one which addresses how ordinary citizens can understand themselves in 
relation to it.   
 Benjamin Constant, "The liberty of the ancients compared with that of the 6
moderns," Political Writings (New York: Cambridge UP, 1988).
 E. E. Schattschnieder, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy 7
in America (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1960); Joseph Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Ruskin House, 1954); Max Weber 
"Suffrage and Democracy in Germany," Political Writings (New York: Cambridge UP, 
1994). 
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The value of a sincerely post-democratic political orientation lies in its 
capacity to provide a clearer sense of one's own political subjectivity in a way that 
can help citizens better address the frustration, anxiety, and alienation that result 
from a confused understanding of politics. In this sense, the aim is therapeutic, not 
normative. The intention is not to argue that a post-democratic context is ideal or 
even preferable, but to cultivate a way of thinking about our relationship to politics 
better able to prepare us for the kinds of worries ordinary citizens routinely share 
concerning politics; to develop a new non-political ethos toward politics, a way of 
approaching politics that doesn’t assume having a role in it. Part of this requires 
coming to terms with a persistent condition of political insignificance, one which 
shows no signs of abating, but it also requires a reevaluation of one's relationship to 
political activity and authority in light of that insignificance. Specifically, it 
necessitates a serious reconsideration of the legitimacy of one's political system, as 
well as one's membership in, responsibility to, and culpability for it. 
Generally, democratic theory relies upon the citizen's role as a decision-
maker as the definitive criterion for theorizing her relationship to political activity and 
authority. A political system is legitimate to the degree that ordinary citizens play a 
significant role in the decision-making process. A citizen is a member of a political 
community by virtue of her ability to participate. Because of the significance of the 
citizen's political practices, the citizen has an obligation to participate (e.g., vote, 
serve on a jury, protest injustice). Finally, the citizen will have to bear the guilt for the 
'crimes' of her political community; these transgressions may be excused by 
necessity (e.g., collateral damage, imminent domain), but they may also be 
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inexcusable (e.g., massacres, genocides). However, when ordinary citizens become 
unable to see themselves as decision-makers, this logic no longer makes sense. 
Instead, they need a new way to orient themselves consistent with their lived political 
experience, best characterized as a condition of being dominated.
This will necessarily involve exorcising some of the more persistent habits of 
democratic thought. For those invested, above all else, in pursuing spectres of 
democracy, embracing a post-democratic political orientation will appear defeatist, 
conservative, or even fascistic. Not much can be said to the captain and crew who 
choose to go down with the ship. Yet, for those committed to a level of political self-
understanding beyond what democratic theory can offer, those who value clarity 
over principle, post-democratic thinking may provide an opportunity to seriously re-
conceptualize the substance and consequences of a non-political — but not 
apolitical — subjectivity; one characterized not by a lack of interest, but by an 
inability to influence sovereign decision-making. 
However, prior to expanding upon a post-democratic orientation, we ought to 
establish a firmer foundation for our initial criticism. In other words, we need to 
clearly demonstrate the contemporary inadequacies of democratic theory. To do so, 
we must begin by being clear about what we mean when we say both 'democracy' 
and 'politics'; otherwise, our argument may become bogged down by challenges 
from non-democratic forms of 'democracy' or non-political exercises of power. After 
clarifying these terms, this chapter will conclude with a brief outline of the chapters to 
follow, detailing how they will contribute to the greater argument developed in this 
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dissertation: that a post-democratic political orientation offers an attractive, 
therapeutic alternative to its democratic counterpart. 
DEFINING DEMOCRACY
What do we mean when we describe something as democratic? With so many 
variants of democratic thought, including deliberative, agonistic, aversive, 
plebiscitarian, pragmatist, epistemic, fugitive, audience, and stealth democracy, not 
to mention eponymous models affiliated with Pericles, Machiavelli, Madison, 
Tocqueville, Emerson, Mill, Dewey and others, it may often be hard to tell.  However, 8
despite a host of principled and procedural disagreements, most are all committed to 
the idea at its etymological root: that a genuinely democratic practice involves 'rule 
by the people.' Obviously, how exactly the people rule is up for debate, but we can 
say a few things further about what a broad commitment to democracy necessarily 
entails. 
To begin, it requires that sovereignty be popularly exercised, that political 
decisions are made collectively rather than by a distinct subsection of that 
community. For instance, we distinguish between a monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy based upon who in that society — whether the king, nobles, or the 
 Respectively, see Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative 8
Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2004); Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic 
Paradox (New York: Verso, 2000); Aletta Norval, Aversive Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2007); Weber, "Suffrage and Democracy in Germany"; Christopher 
Ansell, Pragmatist Democracy (New York: Oxford UP, 2011); David Estlund, 
Democratic Authority (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2009); Sheldon Wolin, "Fugitive 
Democracy" in Constellations 1.1 (1994): 11-25; Bernard Manin, The Principles of 
Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987); and John Hibbing 
and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002). 
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demos — participates in political decision-making. Moreover, to rule is not simply to 
be an object of consideration, but to exercise an autonomous kind of power within 
society. While we can describe a king as ruling over subjects, we cannot similarly 
say that the king's subjects rule over him simply because he must consider their 
reactions to his decisions. To do so would be to recognize the king's consideration of 
his spatial or temporal context also as an instance of 'being ruled'.  Therefore, a 9
democratic decision can only be reached through a process that empowers the 
citizens of that society to autonomously contribute to political decision-making. 
These contributions may often, if not regularly, be reactive or guided, such as when 
one is asked to choose between a bounded (if not binary) set of options (e.g., voting 
'aye' or 'nay', selecting between candidates), but the opportunity to set the agenda 
and negotiate those eventual options must not itself be limited. In other words, 
citizens must have a functional mechanism for making active, unique contributions to 
political decision-making when presented with choices they find unnecessarily 
narrow. To only ever be in the position of responding to the alternatives arbitrarily 
decided upon by others only appears democratic as long as one of the alternatives 
presented is acceptable; being allowed to choose the manner of one's death when 
life is still possible can hardly be called governing oneself.
 Debates over the nature of consciousness and free will aside, the concept of rule 9
requires the possibility of noumenal freedom.
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In addition to popular sovereignty, democracy requires political equality.  In 10
order for the people to rule, all of the people must rule. Of course, who actually 
constitutes 'the people' is up for debate as well; we may wish to exclude children or 
mentally ill, felons or the undocumented, or even entire populations based upon 
race, gender, or class. Regardless of how the boundaries are drawn, all of those 
recognized as members of the demos must have roughly the same level of political 
influence. There will necessarily be a small subsection of public servants who will 
undoubtedly exercise a greater degree of political influence by nature of their 
position, but the opportunity to be a public servant must not be limited, save by 
ability (though, for advocates of democracy by lot, this too is debatable). However, 
there must not be additional subsections of the citizenry able to exercise a 
considerably greater degree of political power. For instance, if a particular family, 
association, or race were able to exercise a level of political influence 
disproportionately greater than their relative size, this would contribute to political 
inequality.  While some levels of political inequality are perhaps inevitable, dramatic, 11
 There are, of course, some models of 'democracy' that fail to honor the value of 10
political equality, of which Arendt's council democracy is a notable example (see 
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), Ch. 6). Yet, unless 
the decision not to participate is completely up to personal discretion, contributing to 
a voluntarily form of political inequality, then a limited democracy must either imply, 
as Aristotle does, that not all residents are citizens or instead constitute a disguised 
aristocracy. 
 One might challenge this point by referencing the democratic justifications behind 11
reserved forms of minority representation. In instances where historically-
disadvantaged minority groups have dedicated representative seats in order to 
combat systemic forms of exclusion, this would seem to be a corrective effort in 
service of political equality.
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systemic, and persistent, distinctions between the political power exercised by 
different groups must be taken as signs of democratic dysfunction.
When political decisions are made in a way that approximates the values of 
popular sovereignty and political equality, the practice democratically legitimates the 
resulting decisions and acts as the criterion for membership in a democratic political 
community; it also makes us responsible and perhaps culpable for the 
consequences of those decisions, should they yield negative outcomes. Broadly, this 
logic informs a democratic political orientation; without significant, equal 
participation, it is questionable as to whether our decisions are democratically 
legitimate, in particular because we are unsure if the decisions are actually ours. If 
we cannot point to the way in which we non-negligibly influence political decision-
making, we cannot reasonably hold that we govern ourselves; that we, in any way, 
rule. Any sincere claims to democracy without an explicit, functional mechanism for 
realizing popular sovereignty and political equality would be mere pretense, steeped 
in either a populist mysticism or a deep misunderstanding of the realities of 
contemporary political practice. 
What this definition leaves undetermined is the mechanism by which citizens 
actually exercise their political power. A democracy may be direct, requiring that all 
citizens exercise political power themselves, or indirect, allowing citizens to 
conditionally transfer their political power to representatives on the basis that they 
attempt to realize citizens' preferences. We can further distinguish between 
democracies of distinct character; for example, it could be deliberative, asking 
citizens to communicate with one another in hopes of reaching a consensus, or 
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agonistic, recognizing that conflicts between citizens are inescapable and should be 
tempered, not extinguished. Furthermore, our definition does not specify what kinds 
of decisions democracies make, which may prove unjust, immoral, short-sighted, 
prejudiced, ill-informed, disastrous, or downright malevolent. In this sense, it is 
procedural, but not comprehensively so, only specifying two broadly interpretable, 
necessary conditions: that decisions are made by all and in an egalitarian fashion. 
Could a particular practice or institution be democratic without satisfying these 
two conditions? In short, no. While such a system could be defended for non-
democratic reasons (e.g., it produces informed decisions, it guarantees our private 
liberty), it would be impossible to offer a democratic justification without appeal to 
both popular sovereignty and political equality. Rather, such a system would be only 
nominally democratic, designated as such due to the need to be understood by 
others and in the absence of an alternative signifier. To suggest otherwise, that 
genuine democracies need only pay lip-service to these values, would be to lose 
the normative force unique to democracy. In other words, qualifying a practice or 
institution as 'democratic' would cease to influence our perception of its legitimacy, 
reduced to merely a technical or academic distinction. Democracy, as a whole, 
would become empty.
This becomes evident when considering the model of democracy offered by 
the realist (or empiricist) tradition. Take, for instance, the work of Joseph 
Schumpeter. Schumpeter argues that the 'classical doctrine of democracy', which 
asserts that the demos rules in some way, is hopelessly flawed.  Rather, he 12
 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, ch. XXI.12
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proposes that we instead reimagine democracy as a model of party competition, one 
in which elites jockey for a popular majority and then rule as they see fit.  Famously, 13
citizen involvement in decision-making would be reduced to "the opportunity of 
accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them."  It could be argued that at 14
least this is an opportunity for some involvement, but to what end is unclear. 
Schumpeter doesn't entertain the illusion that the ballot will eventually translate into 
some kind of influence upon decision-making; he, like many realists, counts on the 
fact that it won't. "People," he writes, "cannot be carried up the ladder."  15
So why participate? Moreover, why consider the resulting political decisions 
legitimate? As Jurgen Habermas stresses in his own critique of empiricist 
democracy, "we can say that if rational citizens were to describe their practices in 
empiricist categories, they would not have sufficient reason to observe the 
democratic rules of the game."  In other words, realist democracy lacks any claim to 16
normativity from the citizen's perspective: citizens are unable to find the system 
legitimate simply because they have some involvement in an elite power struggle. It 
may still be legitimate because it alleviates political violence or produces competent 
officials, but these would be pacifist or technocratic justifications, not democratic 
ones. Ultimately, a democratic justification requires the ability to rule, not simply the 
ability to choose who will rule in a political context otherwise unresponsive to the 
 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, ch. XXII.13
 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 284-5.14
 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 264.15
 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 16
295.
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broader preferences of ordinary citizens.  We find a similar problem in Christopher 17
Achens and Larry Bartels's recent work, Democracy for Realists. While they 
acknowledge that ordinary citizens are unable to exercise any meaningful level of 
political influence, they argue that elections are still valuable for other reasons: 
namely, they contribute to legitimacy, allow for turnover, incentivize the toleration of 
opposition, morally educate citizens, and keep elites from violating ethical norms.  18
Like Schumpeter, they defend an ostensibly democratic practice for non-democratic 
reasons, raising the question of why we ought to appeal to democracy in the first 
place.
We see this further in Jeffrey Green's defense of a novel form of plebiscitary 
democracy. In his book, The Eyes of the People, Green argues that we move away 
from a 'vocal' model of democracy, one in which we express (and attempt to realize) 
political preferences, and towards an 'ocular' model, in which we recognize our role 
as passive spectators.  Similar to the project at hand, Green is interested in "the 19
way politics is experienced by most of the people most of the time and by the People 
itself (the mass of everyday, non-office-holding citizens in their collective capacity) all 
of the time."  By watching our leaders and subjecting them to our gaze, Green 20
argues, we can get a better sense of our leaders' candor, not in order to influence 
 As we'll explore further in Chapter 2, a representative democracy may involve 17
selecting representatives, but further requires that those representatives are broadly 
responsive to the preferences of their constituency, not just their donors. 
 Christopher Achens and Larry Bartels, Democracy for Realists (Princeton, NJ: 18
Princeton UP, 2016), 316-19.
 Jeffrey Green, The Eyes of the People (New York: Oxford UP, 2010), 3-4, 8.19
 Green, The Eyes of the People, 3-4.20
 15
their decision-making, but simply to see what kind of people they are. Beyond 
occasionally being able to witness an event, a moment where a leader is so candid 
that our perception of them might actually change, Green explains that we'll be able 
to burden the leaders with our gaze, subjecting them to a kind of punishment "for 
their never fully legitimate authority."  As such, Green's theory of democracy 21
suggests that our ability to revel in our leaders' gaffes should be taken as 
recompense for our lack of popular sovereignty. Instead of an ability to rule, we have 
opportunities for schadenfreude. While this justification may be compelling for some, 
especially those of a generation raised on reality television, it remains a stretch to 
describe it as democratic. It is, instead, an aesthetic defense of post-democratic 
politics, one which embraces spectacle as political activity's remaining popular 
contribution.
Despite the value of the broader descriptions they offer of modern political 
activity, Schumpeter and Green's respective attempts to redefine 'democracy' are 
unproductive. Intent on retaining the word itself, they render the concept beyond all 
recognition. In doing so, they further raise the question of why anyone would find the 
kind of democracy they describe attractive in the first place. As such, democracy 
becomes both overly ambiguous and underwhelming; it loses the ability to persuade 
us that the practices and institutions which bear its name are inherently legitimate. 
Instead of consistently altering the meaning of democracy in order to make it fit our 
present circumstances, we should invest in new terms able to capture the character, 
however diluted or disappointing, of our contemporary relation to politics. We should, 
 Green, The Eyes of the People, 20.21
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in other words, preserve democratic theory's internal validity, even at the expense of 
its external validity, lest we cede whatever normative force democracy has left.    22
DEFINING POLITICS
Similarly, an overly expansive definition of politics may ultimately make the 
distinction inconsequential. When everything is political, from our consumer choices 
to the messages we post on social media, we lose sight of what distinguishes 
genuinely political activity from everything else and, in turn, what makes political 
activity so significant. While all forms of social activity provide an opportunity for 
individuals to influence one another, either interpersonally or through the production 
of both formal and informal rules, political activity is unique to the extent that it can 
exercise influence through the threat or use of legitimate violence. This capacity for 
'acceptable' violence is precisely what distinguishes politics from other forms of 
social activity, rendering it a sort of higher, if not sacred, enterprise. This is not to say 
that all political activity is violent, at least not in the immediate sense, but it always 
concerns violence. Overall, politics is the practice of managing violence, of 
specifying when to abstain from violence, as well as the conditions under which an 
individual or group can become a target of legitimate violence. 
Often, when discussing politics, we do not explicitly refer to this capacity for 
violence, but instead to the idea of sovereign power, which Jean Bodin defines as 
 For those post-democratically oriented, this is less in the service of some promise 22
of democracy-to-come than its opposite: the belief that describing Western 
democracies as such will only continue to invite the values of popular sovereignty 
and political equality to inform our judgment, regardless of explicit, theoretical 
attempts to relegate their consideration.
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"the most high, absolute, and perpetuall power over the citisens and subiects in a 
Commonweale."  As Thomas Hobbes argues, the ability to exercise sovereign 23
power depends primarily upon having recourse to violence as a means of enforcing 
sovereign decisions. Without it, the sovereign would be unable to wield supreme 
power, its decisions no more than suggestions; only violence, or the threat thereof, 
has the ability to coerce otherwise unwilling citizens to abide by sovereign 
decisions.  Max Weber notes that "Violence is, of course, not the normal or sole 24
means used by the state... But it is the means specific to the state," further 
describing the state itself -- the political institution par excellence of our historical 
moment -- as a "human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly 
of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory."  Carl Schmitt too 25
emphasizes the ability to name public enemies, declaring war, "and thereby publicly 
disposing of the lives of men" as the essence of the political.  He, like Weber, allows 26
that other associations below the state might still exercise legitimate violence, 
making them "subordinate groupings of a secondary political nature," but the state is 
the decisive political entity to the extent that it is able to authoritatively legitimate or 
de-legitimate instances of violence.27
 Jean Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 23
1962), 84.
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994), XVII.4.24
 Weber, "Politics as Vocation," 33 italics in original.25
 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 26
2007), 33.
 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 47-8; Weber, "Politics as Vocation," 33.27
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What constitutes violence's legitimate exercise? Broadly speaking, an action 
is legitimate to the extent we find it 'rightful' or 'appropriate'; it is an action which, 
regardless of the impact it may have on our other immediate interests, carries with it 
a prima facie 'internal justification'.  For instance, Hobbes famously argues that we 28
give up the "right of governing" ourselves and authorize a sovereign for the sake of 
our "peace and common defense."  In other words, Hobbes considers the 29
sovereign's use of violence legitimate to the extent that it contributes to our 
security.  We could consider sovereignty legitimate for a host of other reasons as 30
well. Weber gives us three broad categories for classifying types of legitimation, 
distinguishing between traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal justifications for 
sovereign action; a sovereign power could be legitimate because of its long-standing 
history, a persuasive figurehead, or a set of agreed-upon rules, such as, for 
instance, a democratic decision-making procedure.  Beyond the ideal types offered 31
by Weber, Schmitt argues that essentially anything can function as a legitimation, 
assuming the population in question finds it persuasive.  As such, the question of 32
what constitutes a legitimate sovereign power is empirical. This isn't to say that any 
association able to achieve and maintain power is legitimate; it may have a kind of 
de facto sovereignty which results from the ability to dominate and terrify the 
 Weber, "Politics as Vocation," 34.28
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XVII.13.29
 However, what constitutes a threat to our security, as well as the best means of 30
dealing with that threat, remains entirely up to the judgment of the sovereign 
(Hobbes, Leviathan, XVIII.8).
 Weber, "Politics as Vocation," 34.31
 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27-9; 38.32
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citizenry, but legitimate sovereignty requires that individuals have an additional, self-
sufficient reason for adhering to sovereign decisions beyond the immediate threat of 
punishment. Though a state may able to rely on force alone, perhaps indefinitely, a 
political relationship requires further justification in order to distinguish it from mere 
slavery.  Even Hobbes's servant (discussed in more depth in Chapter Five), who 33
joins a polity under threat of violence, is presented as doing so in hopes of a better 
life, not just because the sword is at her throat.  34
The practices which satisfy this understanding of political activity, however 
technical it may seem, should hardly be unfamiliar to us. Most obvious would be the 
procedures for sovereign decision-making associated with the state: namely, 
passing legislation, issuing executive orders, and setting judicial precedent. In each 
of these activities, decisions are made that influence our perception of the legitimate 
exercise of violence.  Ideally, when a congressional body passes a law, state actors 35
are seen as justified in using violence (to a limited, prescribed extent) in enforcing 
that law; judicial re-interpretation has a similar effect. Further, when individuals 
attempt to obstruct an executive order, we accept the state's use of violence as 
legitimate. When, under mixed constitutions, different branches of government 
contend with one another, this too constitutes political activity, if not also a crisis of 
political authority. Other crises of political authority include revolution, civil war, and 
 See Bernard Williams, "Realism and Moralism in Political Theory," In the 33
Beginning was the Deed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2005).
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XX.10.34
 Declarations of war are unique in that they call both for the immediate use of 35
violence, as well as triggering a set of hypothetical conditions which may also call for 
violence (e.g., punishing treason, mutiny, draft-dodging, etc).
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influential instances of civil disobedience; all of which should be considered political 
activity insofar as they call into question the state's claim to legitimate violence, 
whether in entirety or, as in the case of civil disobedience, when enforcing a 
particular law or order. Finally, we should consider both a sovereign body's founding 
and its failure as instances of political activity, those which create or erase the very 
conditions for legitimacy in the first place. 
Still, there are forms of so-called 'political activity,’ best understood as 
(pseudo-)political activity, that fail to meet our definition. For example, there is a host 
of literature which now describes a movement away from electoral participation and 
toward more informal means of attempting to exert political influence, what Russell 
Dalton describes as the transition to 'engaged citizenship.'  A central figure in this 36
debate, Dalton argues that engaged citizens prefer direct, expressive forms of 
political action, and in this respect differ from older generations of citizens.  37
Consequently, his conception broadens the idea of political participation to include 
such diverse activities as signing petitions, protesting, boycotting, buycotting 
(deliberately purchasing a company’s products in support of their policies), and even 
visiting political websites or forwarding political emails.  38
 See Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, 36
and Political Change in 43 Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1997); W. Lance 
Bennett, "Changing Citizenship in the Digital Age" in Civic Life Online (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2008); Cliff Zukin et al., A New Engagement? Political Participation, 
Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen (New York: Oxford UP, 2006); and 
Russell Dalton, The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping 
American Politics (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2008).
 Russell Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation," 37
Political Studies vol. 56 (2008): 76-98, 85-86.
 Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation," 87.38
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However, when we entertain such a widely inclusive understanding of political 
activity, we tend to equate practices which otherwise vary significantly in aim and 
effect. On the one hand, selective consumer practices may force a company to 
change policy, but its unclear why we should place corporate policy in the same 
category as state law or judicial decision. Of course, both could have a tremendous 
impact upon our daily lives, especially if the corporate policy in question concerns 
labor or environmental policy, but then our only criterion for political activity would be 
having a significant effect on one's community. This definition would seemingly 
qualify a whole range of social, economic, and even private activity as political, as 
well as some forms of meteorological and zoological activity.  Life itself would 39
become political, not poetically, but literally in a way that dilutes the concept's 
meaning and utility. One may have a democratic workplace, social club, or even 
family, but this cannot substitute for a set of democratic political practices.  
On the other hand, though activities like signing a petition or protesting may 
have the intention of influencing sovereign decision-making, they are often so far 
removed as to render their contribution negligible. Of course, we are familiar with 
dedicated efforts which found success, such as the Suffragist, Temperance, and Civil 
Rights movements. However, sporadic, uncoordinated, or poorly-conceived actions 
that merely express dissatisfaction with a sovereign decision should hardly be 
considered the same. Without a coherent sense of how one's activity might 
significantly and uniquely contribute to sovereign decision-making (or its challenge), 
it is unclear how one can equate it to more effective political activities. It may be 
 On the latter, see Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things 39
(Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010).
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countered that citizens still inform sovereign decision-making just by having political 
preferences, that politicians are somehow beholden to public opinion. Though we 
may still factor into the political decisions made by others through contributing to 
census or polling data, this involvement, both passive and deeply objectifying, is 
neither decisive nor binding. To describe this as political participation would seem to 
imply that we engage in political activity simply by being ruled.
Thus, when arguing that democratic theory inadequately orients citizens 
toward politics, we mean that the practices which legitimate the exercise of violence 
within our society have little connection to either popular sovereignty or political 
equality. In short, that the ordinary citizen is not, by any means, a sovereign 
decision-maker. Society may still have a democratic ethos; generally, people may 
distrust unsubstantiated authority or title, instead putting faith in their earnest, 
hardworking fellow citizens. Additionally, citizens may still be satisfied with sovereign 
decisions in which they have no active part. Yet, under such conditions, to continue 
to rely on a democratic conceptual framework toward politics is to ignore the striking 
disconnect between sovereign decision-making and the ostensibly political actions of 
ordinary citizens. Ascribing a democratic character, even a nascent one, to our 
present political context only trivializes the very real obstacles now successfully 
frustrating attempts to realize genuinely democratic practices. Whether in hope of a 
democratic future or out of the recognition that it may not be so forthcoming, we 
should direct our efforts toward a clearer understanding of the present. 
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PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION
How, then, should we set about achieving this clearer understanding? The next 
chapter will begin by assessing three predominant models of democracy: republican, 
liberal, and deliberative. After first identifying the method, specific to each model, by 
which citizens influence sovereign decision-making, we will then examine whether 
that method functions satisfactorily. Ultimately, we will find that, whether through 
associational participation, political representation, or the availability of defendable 
discursive conditions, citizens are presently unable to effectively influence sovereign 
decision-making. In short, that they lack sufficiently democratic forms of political 
activity. As such, this chapter will conclude that democratic theory is ill-suited for 
conceptualizing the contemporary citizen's relationship to political activity and 
authority.
In its place, Chapter Three will introduce the idea of post-democracy as a way 
of theorizing the experience of living in societies which, despite professing 
democratic values, fail to realize either popular sovereignty or political equality. After 
further elaborating on the concept and distinguishing it from its close relative, 
democratic realism, we will distinguish a post-democratic orientation to post-
democracy from a democratic one. While the latter recognizes post-democratic 
conditions as a fixture of one’s political existence, the former treats post-democracy 
as something to be rectified, and thus exclusively attends to strategies for doing so. 
In addition to adopting unrealistic expectations about overcoming the present 
obstacles to democratic practice, this attachment to democratic ways of thinking — 
found in the work of Jacques Ranciere, Colin Crouch, Jurgen Habermas, and 
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Richard Rorty — leads us to ignore the need to rethink political subjectivity in the 
wake of post-democracy, specifically how this affects previously-held, democratic 
interpretations of political legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and culpability.
In Chapter Four, I will argue that post-democracy invites a distinctly 
therapeutic approach to the practice of political philosophy, one interested in 
clarifying one’s own political self-understanding, not out of consideration for how one 
exercises political influence, but in order to help overcome the sense of 
disorientation and worry that accompanies post-democratic life. After further 
describing this therapeutic approach as one which prioritizes individual well-being 
over the exercise of political influence, making particular use of Jonathan’s Lear’s 
account of the Crow nation, I will contrast my interpretation with that found in the 
recent work of Jeffrey Green, who offers an Epicurean defense of extrapoliticism. 
Ultimately, I will argue that post-democracy requires not a justification for avoiding 
politics, but a deeper engagement with the experience of political insignificance 
itself.
Through offering a post-democratic reading of Thomas Hobbes, Chapter Five 
will then model this therapeutic approach to political philosophy. After first 
characterizing post-democratic life as a unique form of political domination, I will 
employ Hobbes’s oft-ignored account of servitude to develop the first substantive 
model of post-democratic political subjectivity, one marked by a deep pessimism 
toward sovereign power. I will then explore the implications of this model of political 
subjectivity for one’s consideration of legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and 
culpability. Specifically, I will argue that a post-democratic orientation relegates the 
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question of legitimacy, highlight one’s lack of membership in a political community, 
makes one’s sense of responsibility to the state purely instrumental, and relieves 
one’s sense of culpability for its actions. While hardly a cause for celebration, 
adopting this sort of political self-understanding can help alleviate  the broader 
feelings of frustration, anxiety, and alienation that stem from the absence of 
democratic practice.  
Yet, as will be argued in Chapter Six, these Hobbesian insights are only 
therapeutically valuable to the extent they are applied. This requires using them to 
conceptualize one’s involvement in the many (pseudo-)political activities that make 
up post-democratic life. In particular, I will turn to an account of the Dark Mountain 
Project, a group of apocalyptic environmentalists who gather to mourn the 
destruction of the earth, as a way of imagining a therapeutic approach to 
(pseudo-)political activities like voting, protesting, and deliberating. After describing 
the ways in which a post-democratic appropriation of these activities can mitigate 
feelings of frustration, anxiety, and alienation, I will examine the greater political 
implications of adopting this self-conception. Finally, I will conclude by characterizing 
a post-democratic orientation as a form of political realism, sympathetic toward 
democratic values, but more deeply invested in realizing a coherent understanding 
of one’s relationship to political authority and activity. 
 To continue to speak of the availability of democratic practices and the 
exercise of popular sovereignty is to willfully ignore the political context we have 
inherited. The aim of this dissertation is not to normatively defend post-democracy, 
but to better acquaint ourselves with a political context that, despite its familiarity, is 
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in need of an elaborating discourse appropriate to it. It offers an initial jumping off 
point, one which hopes to inspire even more comprehensive treatments of the 
peculiar political position in which ordinary citizens now find themselves. Suspended 
between our democratic ethos and our less-than-democratic reality, it is time to 
rediscover how we relate to politics and why it is important.  
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II. The Empirical (Ir)Relevance of Democratic Theory
Democratic theory has not always had the hegemonic position it presently enjoys. 
Since the Greeks started using the word demokratia, most, save Pericles, have 
disparaged the idea, equating it with an impassioned, impulsive rule by the poor.  40
Though Rousseau made the case for popular sovereignty relatively early on, even 
most republican theorists, until the mid-19th century, found any possibility of 'rule by 
the demos' terrifying, preferring instead to empower a minority of noble, virtuous, 
and often wealthy citizens.  As late as 1787, James Madison advocated for 41
adopting the United States Constitution on the basis that it would prevent 
democracy, famously describing democratic governments as those which "have ever 
been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible 
with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in 
their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."  Across North America and 42
Europe, democracy represented a form of organized anarchy, a threat to both 
traditional institutions and the health of the polity at large. 
As it happens, it was also during the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debates that 
the idea of democracy began to gain popular currency. In their attempts to prevent 
the expansion of Federal power, Anti-Federalists made the case for a more politically 
 Thucydides, "Pericles Funeral Oration" History of the Peloponnesian War (New 40
York: Penguin, 1972), Book 2, 34-46; Plato, The Republic (New York: Cambridge UP, 
2012), Book VI, 448a-449c; Aristotle, Politics (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998), 
Book V, Ch. 5, 1304b19-1305a36.
 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and The First and Second 41
Discourses (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2002), Bk. I, Ch. VI and Bk II, Ch. I-II.
 James Madison, "Federalist 10" The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 42
2012), 29.
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empowered citizenry, one that would otherwise be neutered by the centralization of 
power called for by the Constitution.  As Russell Hanson observes, though they lost 43
the greater debate against ratification, "The Democratic-Republican Societies and 
the Jeffersonian Republicans succeeded in neutralizing the more odious 
connotations of 'mob rule'... They also initiated the process by which the rhetorical 
links between democracy and the ideas of popular sovereignty and political equality 
were forged."  The War of 1812 saw further use of the term to criticize perceived 44
aristocratic elements within American political culture as a means of distinguishing it 
from the British monarchy.  By the Jacksonian Era, the Democratic-Republicans 45
had become simply the Democratic Party, no longer emphasizing the aristocratic 
republicanism of its Adamsonian forbearers and now "committed to the proposition 
of vox populi, vox Dei."  The publication of Alexis de Tocqueville's two-volume 46
Democracy in America in 1840 and 1845, as well as the work of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson and, later, Walt Whitman, only further cemented the idea that the United 
States was, above all, a democratic nation. 
In conjunction with similar developments across Europe, democratic theory 
would soon come to dominate Western political thought. By the early 20th century, 
the idea of taking up a non-democratic position, much less an anti-democratic 
position, was reserved for a dying breed of philosophical aristocrats and all but 
 See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), Ch. 6. 43
 Russell Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 44
UP, 1985), 88.
 Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in America, Ch. 3.45
 Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in America, 131, 148.46
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totally abandoned by those engaged in political activity. As one observer noted, "no 
doctrines are advanced as antidemocratic. The accusation of antidemocratic action 
or attitude is frequently directed against others, but practical politicians and political 
theorists agree in stressing the democratic element in the institutions they defend 
and the theories they advocate."  The fascists claimed a popular mandate, as did 47
the Soviets; both, as well as the United States, justified their invasions of other 
countries on the principle that they were restoring popular sovereignty. As Wendy 
Brown recently pointed out, this pervasive commitment to democratic values has 
hardly changed. She writes,
We hail democracy to redress Marx's abandonment of the political after 
his turn from Hegelian thematics (or we say that radical democracy 
was what was meant by communism all along), we seek to capture 
democracy for yet-untried purposes and ethoi, we write of "democracy 
to come", "democracy of the uncounted", "democratizing sovereignty," 
"democracy workshops," "pluralizing democracy" and more. Berlusconi 
and Bush, Derrida and Balibar, Italian communists and Hamas-we are 
all democrats now.  48
Even those more inclined to recognize their government as a mixture of monarchic, 
aristocratic, and democratic elements do so while privileging the latter, emphasizing 
the state's ability to facilitate popular sovereignty and political equality over, for 
instance, a commitment to judicial acumen, expert decision-making, bureaucratic 
efficiency or other non-democratic criteria. In short, the West's contemporary idea of 
 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham 47
House Publishers, 1987), 3, itself quoting R. McKeon, ed., Democracy in a World of 
Tensions: A Symposium Prepared by UNESCO (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1951), 522.
 Wendy Brown, "We are All Democrats Now," Democracy in What State, (New 48
York: Columbia UP, 2012), 45.
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the 'good society' is the democratic society, with widespread agreement that 
legitimacy ultimately depends upon empowering citizens to exercise influence over 
sovereign decision-making.
Despite the near unanimous support for democracy, we are often still 
uncertain as to whether we actually live in a democratic state. While some may 
become incredulous only when their candidate loses or measure fails, there are 
those suspicious of political activity in general, believing that it consistently privileges 
some subsections of the population over others. Yet, these same skeptics may also 
point to other aspects of their political culture, such as the right to free speech or 
protest, to defend a kind of latent, democratic kernel within their society, one which 
either materializes when needed or persistently guides our politics in a subtle, if not 
mystical, fashion. As such, it's not uncommon to hear a society ambiguously 
described as 'somewhat democratic' or even both democratic and un-democratic at 
the same time. Moreover, thanks in no small part to our myopic focus on democratic 
theory, we often cannot avoid describing our society as democratic. Whether fixating 
on a democracy-to-come, putting stock in the power of social democracy, or 
defending realist democracy as an achievement in itself, our political context 
appears, conceptually speaking, inescapably tied to democratic theory, further 
making democratic theory  seem unfalsifiable as a whole. 
Thus, in order to answer the question, "Do I live in a democracy?", with any 
degree of precision, it's important to get clear to which theory of democracy one is 
referring. For instance, if we were to adopt Schumpeter's framework, we need only 
ask whether the state holds elections; if Green's, whether public officials are 
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sufficiently subject to the public's gaze. Yet, as argued in the previous chapter, 
neither of these conceptions place any stock in either popular sovereignty or political 
equality, troubling the authenticity of their democratic credentials. We may, just as 
well, judge a state's democratic character based upon whether it makes rhetorical 
appeals to the will of the people or simply if it calls itself thusly. In contrast, this 
chapter will focus on the three most preeminent traditions of democratic thought that 
do subscribe to these values, albeit in very different ways. Specifically, we'll address 
liberal democracy, republican democracy, and deliberative democracy.49
Perhaps most familiar to ordinary citizens, liberal democracy stipulates that 
popular sovereignty should be facilitated through the use of political representation. 
By means of regular elections and ongoing discussions with their constituents, 
representatives act as conduits through which citizens can realize their political 
preferences.  To the extent that these representatives are equally beholden to all of 50
their constituents, political representation constitutes a form of democratic practice. 
Alternatively, republican democracy emphasizes the role of civic virtue. 
Instead of relying upon one's elected representative, republican theorists argue that 
popular sovereignty is best realized when citizens actively engage in public life, 
making use of various civic and civil associations to exercise political influence. 
When these associations are sufficiently inclusive, allowing citizens to build 
 This distinction roughly parallels Habermas's own, offered in Between Facts and 49
Norms, 297-302.
 This contrasts with Edmund Burke's "trustee" model; however, it's unclear whether 50
that interpretation of political representation can be described as democratic. See 
Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" Selected Works of Edmund Burke Vol. 4 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1999), 3-14.
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relationships outside of their particular class, race, gender, sexual orientation, etc., 
these practices can contribute to a politically egalitarian society. 
Finally, deliberative democracy privileges the role of public discourse within 
political decision-making. Rather than focusing on the ways in which individuals 
exercise political influence, deliberativists attend to the quality of our political 
deliberations. They argue that the cultivation of inclusive, fair, dynamic, and 
justificatory deliberative conditions that advance, famously, the 'unforced force of the 
better argument' ultimately functions as a means of popular sovereignty, holding 
public officials accountable to the deliberative norms (presumably) held by ordinary 
citizens.  Assuming citizens broadly share and value the same discursive 51
institutions (e.g., the same newspapers, television programs, websites), deliberative 
processes can further realize political equality. However, in the event of a superficial, 
fractured, or polarized discursive field, this assumption becomes more dubious, as 
citizens may feel as if the dominant discourse either fails to adhere to deliberative 
norms or excludes relevant concerns.
All three of these frameworks not only commit to both popular sovereignty 
and political equality, but also provide mechanisms (intended to realize these values) 
that can be operationalized and tested. In other words, they can be employed to 
distinguish democracies from non-democracies. For the liberal model, we can 
examine whether representatives do, in fact, make decisions which broadly accord 
with their constituents' preferences; for the republican model, we can explore 
 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 51
306. For a critical take on this argument, see Amy Allen, "The Unforced Force of the 
Better Argument: Reason and Power in Habermas' Political Theory" Constellations 
19:3 (2002): 353-368.
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whether a given population exhibits a commitment to public life indicative of civic 
virtue; and for the deliberative model, we can determine if discursive conditions live 
up to deliberative norms. If any of the above thresholds are met, we can then 
establish the external validity of democratic theory's broader political logic; namely, 
the way in which a capacity to influence decision-making legitimates one's polity, 
makes one a member, and generates a responsibility to and culpability for the 
consequences of political activity. If not, however, we may find that democratic 
theory is no longer adequate for making sense of the ordinary citizen's relation to 
politics, at best, acting as a set of aspirational norms only tangentially connected to 
the present and, at worst, obscuring a political reality which otherwise alludes us.
Ultimately, this chapter will find the three democratic frameworks above 
unsatisfactory for describing our contemporary political moment. Through a survey of 
the relevant empirical literature, it will be shown that neither political representation, 
civic virtue, nor public discourse is able to facilitate the exercise of popular 
sovereignty. Rather, we'll argue that only the wealthy are able to make effective use 
of these ostensibly democratic practices, contributing to de facto oligarchic rule 
under de jure democratic conditions. In the final section, we'll discuss the nature of 
political involvement currently available to non-elites, best described as limited, 
passive, and perfunctory, before turning to a greater discussion of post-democracy in 
chapter three. 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
As previously noted, popular sovereignty and political equality weren't always 
considered so desirable. Yet, despite their ambivalence, some political philosophers 
 34
around the mid-19th century began to recognize the democratization of political 
practice as inevitable. Tocqueville famously notes that conditions "everywhere turn to 
the profit of democracy... The gradual development of the equality of conditions is 
thus a providential fact."  Rather than attempt to stem the tide, these thinkers began 52
to imagine how best to direct this democratic impulse in such a way as to avoid its 
worst excesses.  In particular, they were worried that politically empowering the 53
multitude would lead to an overzealous state, one willing to upset long-held 
traditions and practices for temporary gain or, worse, as a form of class warfare. One 
needed only to look to the French Revolution; in addition to widespread violence and 
terror, the popular government nationalized property, suppressed religious practices, 
and even tried to introduce a new calendar system. What was needed was a 
mechanism for mediating popular sovereignty, one which could allow citizens to 
exercise a low, but meaningful, level of political influence, while also ensuring that 
the state didn't become an instrument of the mob.
Benjamin Constant's 1819 lecture, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared 
with that of the Moderns," exemplifies both this anxiety with democracy and the 
solution that would come to distinguish the liberal democratic tradition: a 
commitment to representative democracy. For Constant, Rousseau's direct 
democracy no longer made sense in a modern context. On the one hand, citizens 
 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 52
2000), 5. 
 As Mill points out, "Man cannot turns back rivers to their source, but it rests with 53
himself whether they shall fertilize or lay waste to his fields." See The Collected 
Works of John Stuart Mill Vol. XVIII - Essays on Politics and Society Part One 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 158.
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are too preoccupied with work and leisure to participate in politics; even if they did, 
the sheer size of nation-state makes individuals feel as if their political contributions 
are meaningless.  On the other hand, because citizens feel largely detached from 54
political activity, they also tend to find state intervention "odious," preferring instead 
to be left alone to enjoy their private liberty.  Adopting an Athenian-style democracy 55
would not only require citizens to forgo their private lives in the service of greater 
political involvement, but would further subject them to a regime-type historically 
prone to abusing sovereign power. However, while Constant wanted to avoid popular 
'overpoliticization,' he needed to avoid 'overprivatization' as well.  Without some 56
ability to influence politics, the rights and liberties citizens enjoy would still be at 
risk.  57
In order to navigate between the Scylla of direct democracy and the 
Charybdis of private existence, Constant proposes the use of political 
representation. Though criticized by Rousseau as a form of alienated sovereignty, 
Constant argues that only representation can allow citizens to protect the individual 
liberties they cherish. By electing 'stewards' to ensure that the state never oversteps 
its bounds by violating their rights, citizens can continue to attend to private life 
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without putting themselves at risk of despotism or worse.  Additionally, the regular 58
opportunity to participate in politics through elections can have an edifying effect on 
the public as well, as it "enlarges their spirit, ennobles their thoughts, and 
establishes among them a kind of intellectual equality which forms the glory and the 
power of a people."  As such, political representation is intended to cultivate a 59
sufficiently democratic citizenry, one prepared for political activity but otherwise 
disposed to avoid it or, as Constant puts it, a citizenry which exercises sovereignty 
"always only to renounce it."  60
Still, liberal theorists following Constant continue to be weary of the threats 
posed by democratic practice. Mill suggests limiting the ability for the lower classes 
to vote, out of fear that they still might elect those interested in violating the right to 
property.  Isaiah Berlin points out that "democracy may disarm a given oligarchy, a 61
given privileged individual or set of individuals, but it can still crush individuals as 
mercilessly as any previous ruler."  Friedrich Hayek goes so far as to argue that 62
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democracy is valuable to the extent that it can peacefully resolve conflicts, protect 
individual liberty, and educate the public, not because it can realize popular 
sovereignty.  Yet, despite this uncertainty or, at times, outright hostility, most liberals 63
concede the need for some level of democratic practice. As Judith Shklar makes 
clear, "Without the institutions of representative democracy and an independent 
judiciary open to appeals, and in the absence of a multiplicity of politically active 
groups, liberalism is in jeopardy... liberalism is monogamously, faithfully, and 
permanently married to democracy-- but it is a marriage of convenience."  64
Despite liberal theory's instrumental commitment to democratic values, 
political representation can still satisfy the threshold for a genuinely democratic 
practice. When sovereignty activity is intended to be limited, constrained by 
procedure, countervailing influences, or a general sense of the proper ends of 
political power (i.e., the protection of private liberty), the popular, equal control of 
sovereign power constitutes a democratic regime. Therefore, the litmus test for 
recognizing a political system as a liberal democracy is that the preferences of 
ordinary citizens are pursued by their representatives. This is not to say that 
everything a majority of citizens desire has to come to fruition, but what the state 
does endeavor represents the will of people in general, not a particular subsection. 
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Without this kind of representation, it may still be a liberal society, but it would not be 
underwritten by democratic norms and practices.  65
Yet, regardless of universal suffrage and regular elections, ostensibly 
tethering our representatives to the general preferences held by their constituents, 
we find that wealthy Americans consistently exercise more political influence than 
other citizens, challenging the idea that our current political system is a vehicle for 
either popular sovereignty or political equality. Stretching from the 1950s, the 
American politics literature has consistently recognized a variety of ways in which 
the wealthy are better able to influence the state, not for the general defense of 
private liberty, but in order to realize particular class preferences.  Moreover, this 66
unequal distribution of political power isn't at odds with political representation, but is 
rather facilitated by it. Not only are representatives susceptible to being influenced 
by private citizens with the resources to take advantage of the process, but they are 
more generally responsive to the wealthy as well. As such, instead of democratizing 
sovereignty, political representation has empowered an elite minority, which, though 
not always in agreement with itself, cannot be effectively challenged from the 
outside.
While many are quick to note the recent changes brought about by the 
Citizens United decision, the extensive work of Kay Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and 
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Henry Brady demonstrates that better representation for the wealthy has been a 
characteristic of our political system for some time. Specifically, they argue that the 
wealthy are more apt to participate in politics, not only because they have the 
resources to do so, but because they consistently find their participation rewarded by 
the realization of their preferences. This contributes to a 'virtuous cycle' of 
participation, one which encourages further political participation by the wealthy 
based upon past successes, while also dissuading the non-wealthy from getting 
involved in the first place. As such, "political participation in America is highly 
stratified by social class, and that stratification has been a feature of political activity 
for as long as we have had surveys to measure it... which is the early 1950s... our 
major conclusion is the substantial and continuing participatory advantage enjoyed 
by the well-educated and affluent."  67
Still, greater participation by elites doesn't necessarily mean that they'll be 
better represented. We could imagine a situation in which this participation still 
contributes to broader forms of representation; elites may vote more, but the 
candidates they elect may still be beholden to the population at large. However, 
Martin Gillens's work finds an extreme representational disparity between wealthy 
elites and ordinary Americans. Through an analysis of nearly 2,000 policy questions 
between 1981-2002, he finds that non-wealthy Americans may only be coincidentally 
represented, specifically when they share preferences with wealthy Americans. He 
writes, 
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On the policy questions on which low- and middle-income respondents 
share the same preferences as those with high incomes, they are, of 
course, just as likely as high-income Americans to get what they want. 
But when their views differ from those of more affluent Americans, 
government policy appears to be fairly responsive to the well-off and 
virtually unrelated to the desires of the low- and middle-income 
citizens.68
Even when controlling for education, in order to see whether attentiveness to politics 
(as predicted by education) or wealth was a better predictor of representation, he 
finds that "the preferences of the highly educated show no independent impact on 
policy outcome."  In a later article with Benjamin Page using the same data set, 69
they would unequivocally assert that "When the preferences of economic elites and 
the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the 
average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-
significant impact upon public policy."  According to their work, it would seem as if 70
wealthy Americans are the only ones represented, agreeing with Schlozman, Verba, 
and Brady that "what is remarkable about political voice in American democracy is 
how unequal it has been for so long."71
While some may be tempted to argue that greater participation would 
ultimately correct this imbalance, it may not be enough. Rather, as Thomas Dye 
argues, it is not the level of participation that matters, but the kind of participation 
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available to elites. He writes, "The assertion that public policy reflects the 'demands 
of the people' expresses the myth rather than the reality of democracy. However 
widespread this myth is believed by the people, and however artfully this myth is 
defended by scholars, the reality is that public policy is made from the top down."  72
How is this possible? He observes that wealthy citizens and the institutions they 
head exercise political power over several dimensions of the political process to 
which ordinary American simply do not have access. This includes: policy 
formulation by think tanks and foundations; leadership selection through campaign 
donations; lobbying by interest groups; opinion-making through media enterprises; 
policy legitimation through entrenched institutions; policy implementation through 
bureaucratic offices; and, in the last instance, policy evaluation by regulatory 
boards.  At each of these levels, wealthy elites can make sure their preferences are 73
represented in a way that both conditions and evades the electoral power of non-
elites.
In their recent work, It's Even Worse Than It Looks, Thomas Mann and 
Norman Ornstein further explain how the wealthy exercise this influence. Quoting 
former lobbyist Jack Abramoff, they expose how those with financial resources can 
skillfully gain political access. 
When we would become friendly with an office and they were 
important to us, and the chief of staff was a competent person, I would 
say or my staff would say to him or her at some point, 'You know, when 
you're done working on the Hill, we'd very much like you to consider 
 Thomas Dye, Top Down Policymaking (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 72
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coming to work for us.' Now the moment I said that to them or any of 
our staff said that to 'em, that was it. We owned them. And what does 
that mean? Every request from our office, every request of our clients, 
everything that we want, they're gonna do. And not only that, they're 
gonna think of things we can't think of to do.74
Ironically, the same emphasis on private life, which should encourage us to limit our 
political action, allows the wealthy to manipulate public figures and offices through 
promises of future highly paid private employment in order to augment their own 
political influence. Still, even those committed to public life face electoral pressure to 
support the preferences of their wealthier constituents. Though money has always 
played a major role in politics, following the Citizens United decision in 2010, the 
wealthy are more able to spend freely in order to influence elections themselves.  75
As Mann and Ornstein discuss, 
We have had conversations with several incumbents in the Senate up 
for election in 2012. They say the same thing: they can handle any of 
the several prospective opponents they might face, but all of them fear 
a stealth campaign landing behind their lines and spending $20 million 
on 'independent' efforts designed to portray the incumbent as a 
miscreant and scoundrel who should be behind bars, not serving in the 
Senate. And, of course, the contributors to the campaign would be 
undisclosed.76
Thus, now more than ever, our representatives seem to be disproportionately 
influenced by the wealthy. 
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 Even if the wealthy can manipulate representatives during their terms in 
office, one may object that citizens can still take advantage of elections to punish 
unresponsive representatives, adopting a retrospective theory of voter behavior.  77
Thus, ordinary citizens, while unable to proactively pursue their interests, can 
reactively challenge affronts to popular sovereignty. Yet, as Christopher Achens and 
Larry Bartels have recently argued, citizens may not even be able to exercise this 
sort of power effectively, writing that "The conventional account of retrospective 
voting, minimalist as it is, fundamentally underestimates the limitations of democratic 
citizens and, as a result, the limitations of democratic accountability."  Specifically, 78
they argue that voter behavior is driven primarily by the contemporary state of the 
economy, often only in the last few weeks of the campaign. 
Like medical patients recalling colonoscopies, who forget all but the 
last few minutes, the voters' assessments of past pain and pleasure 
are significantly biased by 'duration neglect.' Their myopia makes 
retrospective judgments idiosyncratic and often arbitrary... The result of 
this kind of voter behavior is that election outcomes are, in an 
important sense, random.79
Perhaps a more informed, organized electorate could take greater advantages of 
electoral opportunities, but this would also seem to render retrospective voting 
unnecessary, as non-elites could then actually elect those committed to their 
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preference. Without it, however, ordinary citizens seem able to exercise political 
influence in a haphazard, if not purely superficial manner.
 As previously discussed, a liberal polity need not be a democratic one; to 
whatever degree we currently enjoy some exercise of private liberty, it would be 
difficult to describe how it's being guaranteed by a democratically representative 
political system. Of course citizens can vote, but when we acknowledge that political 
outcomes are influenced in a variety of non-electoral ways and that those outcomes 
invariably reflect the preferences of the wealthy, it's difficult to equate suffrage with 
the realization of either popular sovereignty or political equality, even under the 
terms set by a limited, liberal framework. As it stands now, our individual liberty 
seems to be correlative with elite domination, not with democracy. One could argue 
that the wealthy act as a better check on state power than ordinary citizens in mass; 
further, elite-driven conflicts can just as easily contribute to justice or 'progress' 
outcomes as they can reactionary ones. Nonetheless, the current practice of political 
representation constitute an exclusive, ultimately un-democratic political mechanism, 
making it problematic that contemporary thinkers have failed to justify an 
aristocratically-, oligarchically-, or plutocratically-guaranteed liberalism to ordinary 
citizens. If seeking to characterize the United States as a democracy, it's necessary 
to gesture to some other mechanism for democratic political practice.   
REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY
Barring brief moments of Progressivist optimism or revolutionary zeal, Americans 
have never really championed anything like direct democracy as imagined by 
Rousseau or Pericles. When arguing for more widespread political participation, we 
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typically do not mean that all decisions ought to be formally decided by every citizen, 
resulting in either endless referenda or the dedication of all our time to political 
forums, making us what Ralf Dahrendorf has called 'total citizens'.  Few of us have 80
a sense that our fellow citizens would ever want any arrangement like this, much 
less want to engage in it ourselves. Still, there are those who think that just electing 
a representative or president isn't enough to satisfy the demands of democratic 
governance, that an exercise of popular sovereignty requires something more. As 
such, republican theorists advocate for a greater commitment to civic virtue as a 
means democratizing political power, encouraging citizens to take an active role in 
public life through their participation in various community associations. Through 
involving themselves in these organizations, citizens can informally exercise political 
influence in a way that's both significant and egalitarian, as well as develop the 
interpersonal skills necessary to realize political preferences. 
Tocqueville's descriptions of early 19th century America have long inspired 
how republicans have imagined the democratic ideal.  He observes the way in 81
which Americans turn to each other, rather than the state, to pursue their collective 
goals, contributing to a greater culture of political equality based upon the need they 
had for one another.
 Ralf Dahrendorf, "Citizenship and Beyond: The Social Dynamics of an Idea" 80
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makes the case for considering Tocqueville's motivation for associationalism based 
on economic, rather than virtuous, grounds.
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Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all minds constantly unite 
together... The Americans form associations in order to hold holiday 
celebrations, found seminaries, build hostels, erect churches, 
disseminate books, and send missionaries to the ends of the earth, in 
this manner they create hospitals, prisons, and schools... Thus the 
most democratic country on earth is found to be out of all of them the 
one where men have most perfected, in our day, the art of pursuing in 
common the object of their common desires and have applied this new 
science to the greatest number of objects. Is this the result of some 
accident, or might it be that there exists in fact a necessary relation 
between associations and equality?82
By making a habit of dedicating our time and energy to public activities, prioritizing 
them above private pursuits (whether economic, familial, or recreational), we 
develop what Aristotle, Machiavelli, and others have called 'civic virtue,' what the 
Romans understood as a respect and love for the res publica, or the 'public thing.' 
When our neighbors all share a commitment to civic virtue, then we can call upon 
them to help us deal with problems besetting our political community. As Tocqueville 
notes, while aristocrats have the resources to effectively act politically without calling 
upon the efforts of others, "independent and weak" democratic citizens must 
necessarily rely on one another to exercise a comparable level of political power.  83
Hannah Arendt contrasts this understanding of political subjectivity with the French 
tendency to imagine power as emanating from 'le peuple' in the abstract: for the 
"men of the American Revolution... power came into being when and where people 
would get together and bind themselves through promises, covenants, and mutual 
pledges; only such power, when rested on reciprocity and mutuality, was real 
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power..."  Without these community bonds, citizens are only able to act as 84
individuals, severely hampering their ability to exert political influence. Accordingly, 
democratic power cannot exist by virtue of representation alone (or at all), but must 
be embodied through a robust public life in association with one's neighbors. 
John Dewey, writing a century after Tocqueville, would again emphasize the 
importance of associational life for democratic health, famously asserting that real 
value of democracy doesn't lie with what procedures we use (e.g., voting, 
representation), which are in some sense arbitrary, but as a social idea, which is "not 
an alternative to other principles of associated life..." but "the idea of community life 
itself."  For Dewey, beyond the obvious power inherent in people in mass, the great 85
strength of an active public sphere comes from our ability to communicate with one 
another and develop clearer perspectives on both the nature of our problems and 
how we can fix them, a point deliberativists would later emphasize.  Without our 86
participation in the kinds of associations which facilitate this communication, we 
have no means of actually knowing what we, as a political community, want. Despite 
the availability of ostensibly democratic procedures like elections, a fractured, 
isolated, and unaware public would be unable to make use of them, challenging the 
idea that they can be used to realize anything like popular sovereignty by 
themselves. For the republican model, the presence of a widespread commitment to 
public life is essential; as Dewey put it "there is no substitute for the vitality and 
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depth of close and direct intercourse and attachment... Democracy must begin at 
home, and its home is the neighborly community."87
Later theorists help us specify three additional benefits of an active public life: 
social capital, human capital, and citizen-state mediations.  First, as Robert Putnam 88
emphasizes, an active public life helps generate social capital, a feeling of trust and 
reciprocity among citizens he feels is essential for supporting civic virtue.  By 89
participating in a myriad of associations, we can feel as if we 'know' our community, 
making us more likely to reach out to others for support as well as lend our own 
when called upon, creating a 'virtuous circle' of participation. Second, through 
participation, we build 'human capital' or skill sets which can be utilized for political 
purposes. For instance, involvement in a neighborhood association can teach us 
how to resolve disputes, communicate effectively, manage resources, and mobilize 
our fellow citizens, all of which are general organizational skills and relevant for the 
exercise of political influence. Finally, through providing opportunities for ordinary 
citizens to socialize and develop relationships with elected officials and other political 
leaders, associational participation can provide non-electoral avenues for political 
activity. If we are able to know our leaders on a personal level through our 
involvement in church, a concerned citizens group, or even a lodge, then we will be 
in a better position to not only communicate our preferences but hold them 
accountable for realizing them. Of course, this relies on the availability of inclusive 
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associations; this kind of citizen-state mediation disappears when we segregate 
based on class, gender, race, etc. 
Without a strong, ubiquitous commitment to public life, republican theorists 
warn that citizens may become politically ineffective, which could further lead to a 
top-down political culture. Dewey contends that an isolated, non-associational public 
cannot "use the organs through which it is supposed to mediate political action and 
polity," putting it at the mercy of political bosses able to buy and sell votes.  90
Tocqueville fears that, without the habit of free association, democracy will inculcate 
a sense of 'individualism', understood as the total prioritization of private pursuits 
and the abandonment of public life.  This in turn, he asserts, creates conditions ripe 91
for despotism, a point Arendt picks up on as well.  When adopting a republican 92
framework, the presence of a robust associational life remains indispensable for 
qualifying a political system as democratic. As Dewey notes, there may be ostensibly 
democratic practices available, but they cannot realize popular sovereignty or 
political equality without an active, dedicated public to make use of them.93
Despite a historical attachment to, and perhaps even nostalgia for, 
associational life, it would be misleading to describe the American public as 
sufficiently civically virtuous for republican theory. Instead, Americans tend to 
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overwhelmingly commit themselves to their private, rather than public, concerns, 
giving little attention to the kinds of community-oriented, associational efforts this 
perspective champions and requires. Though, as we well know, there are many of us 
that do regularly participate in these sorts of activities, these individuals prove to be 
the exception rather than the norm; even if some of us, such as activists, lobbyists, 
or public figures, may be able to describe their political subjectivity along republican-
democratic lines, we cannot accurately describe our broader political context as 
such. Without a widespread embrace of civic virtue, republican theory is unable to 
account for either popular sovereignty or political equality.
In their exploration of the contemporary viability of the Tocquevillian ideal, 
Robert Bellah and his colleagues interviewed a diverse group of Americans about 
how they conceptualized public life, specifically whether they considered it a 
meaningful or important aspect of their own lives. Their sociological research lead 
them to conclude that Americans are inundated with a sense of ontological 
individualism: we tend to unthinkingly prioritize how something will effect us over 
how it will effect our greater community, if we even end up thinking about the 
community at all.  Even those who do get involved, what Bellah et al. call 94
'concerned citizens', differ from the similarly archetypal 'town fathers' in how they 
conceptualize their public involvement. Contrasting the two, Bellah et al. argue that 
Unlike the town father, they [concerned citizens] experience such 
participation not as the routine fulfillment of the duties of citizenship, 
but as a heroic enterprise.... They see their involvement in self-
 Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart (Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1985), 276.94
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sacrificial terms, as a giving up of the real joys of a good life-- the joys 
of staying at home, at peace with family, neighbors, and friends.95
These 'concerned citizens' do not value public life in itself, but treat it as an 
obligation that otherwise impedes their ability to fully embrace private life. They are 
distinguished, not by their civic virtue, but by a reluctant willingness to participate 
when deemed necessary. Because this involvement is both limited and sporadic, 
even those who do act fail to develop the networks, skills, and persistence 
indispensable for the effective exercise of political influence. Consequently, Bellah et 
al. turn to Tocqueville's idea of an administrative despotism to describe our political 
context, one in which "citizens quit their state of dependence just long enough to 
choose their masters and fall back into it."  The authors end by emphasizing that 96
"We have committed what to the republican founders of our nation was the cardinal 
sin: we have put our own good, as individuals, as groups, as a nation, ahead of the 
common good."  As such, we are no longer the nation of 'joiners' Tocqueville once 97
depicted, apt only to involve ourselves when we're able to realize some private 
benefit. 
Robert Reich offers us further insight into economic factors contributing to our 
general lack of public life. Just as Dewey observed in his own time, the opportunity 
for geographic mobility works to alienate individuals from communities, encouraging 
those who regularly move to abstain from making local relationships.  As Reich 98
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makes clear, those with professional skills in demand nationally or globally tend to 
move the most; these same highly talented and educated workers are also, 
unsurprisingly, the wealthiest. While they "are quietly seceding from the large and 
diverse publics of America into homogeneous enclaves," even those who persist in 
one place now live in communities inhospitable to the kind of deep attachments 
Dewey emphasizes.99
In real life, most Americans no longer live in traditional communities. 
The majority live in suburban subdivisions bordered by highways and 
punctuated by shopping malls, or in tony condominiums and housing 
projects. Most commute to work and socialize on some basis other 
than geographic proximity to where they sleep. And most pick up and 
move every five years or so to a different neighborhood.100
Thus, while the wealthy are barricading themselves in gated communities, 
disengaged from the community at large, ordinary citizens live under spatial and 
economic conditions that actively deter the necessary ingredients for nurturing civic 
virtue. Moreover, because wealthy elites are the only citizens able to exercise 
political influence via representation, they are now doing so in further isolation from 
the population at large. This not only contributes to political inequality, but also 
facilitates a diminished sense of the problems facing one's community, as well as 
one's duty to ameliorate them. As Reich warns, 
For without strong attachment and loyalties extending beyond family 
and friends, [the wealthy] may never develop the habits and attitudes 
of social responsibility. They will be world citizens, but without 
accepting or even acknowledging any of the obligations that citizenship 
in a polity normally implies... Without a real political community in 
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which to learn, refine, and practice the ideals of justice and fairness, 
they may find these ideals to be meaningless abstractions.101
As wealth disparity and class-based segregation continue to be exacerbated, 
Americans will find it harder and harder to find instances of the inclusive 
associational life that makes up the backbone of republican-democratic practices.
Robert Putnam's monumental Bowling Alone furthers this pessimistic outlook 
on American public life by investigating levels of social capital, one of the 
advantages of associational life enumerated earlier. Putnam connects social capital 
with a laundry list of benefits, including education, child welfare, safety, production, 
economic prosperity, health, happiness, and, most importantly for our purposes, 
democratic political power.  Building off of Tocqueville's thoughts on association, as 102
well as Dewey's own "conundrum[,]...how to reconcile modern, large-scale, 
technologically advanced society with the exigencies of democracy," Putnam argues 
that social capital is a fundamental aspect of successful democratic practice for a 
number of reasons, including the ability to amplify and multiply individual voices, 
cultivate human capital, rein in extremism, communicate political information, and 
even motivate tax compliance.  Despite its enormous value, he finds social capital 103
incredibly lacking, arguing that the demands of work, growing suburbanization, 
amount of time watching television, and generational shifts have made us all less-
likely to associate with others in our community.  Aware both that "one cannot 104
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jump-start republican citizenship without direct, face-to-face participation" and 
"Citizenship is not a spectator sport," Putnam argues that, without an adequately 
interconnected community, "We remain, in short, reasonably well-informed 
spectators of public affairs, but many fewer of us actually partake in the game."105
In the absence of a more pervasive sense of civic virtue, Theda Skocpol 
describes how the nature of associational life itself has changed. Since the mid-20th 
century, "mobilizing fellow citizens into dues paying, interactive associations that met 
regularly no longer made sense for elites, who could instead run professionally 
managed organizations able to gain immediate access to government and the 
national media."  In other words, mass communication has come to replace the 106
mass meeting, effectively excising the ordinary citizen out of process. Their role is 
now passive, if not directed. She writes, 
Where once cross-class voluntary federations held sway, national 
public life is now dominated by professionally managed advocacy 
groups without chapters or members. And at the state and local levels 
'voluntary groups' are, more often than not, non-profit institutions 
through which paid employees deliver services and coordinate 
occasional volunteer projects.  107
In this way, public life itself has become privatized. Rather than providing an 
opportunity to actively influence politics, civil and civic associations have so 
thoroughly transformed as to foreclose the opportunities that made them 
democratically valuable in the first place. Even if citizens wanted to get involved in 
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public life, they would find that the associational climate celebrated by Tocqueville no 
longer exists. 
This account of a largely inactive, privately-oriented citizenry further squares 
poorly with agonistic models of democracy, themselves indebted to a republican 
emphasis on an active public life. Whether considering Bill Connolly's call for the 
'democratiziation' of previously undemocratic spaces or Chantal Mouffe's hope for a 
more inclusive, radically democratic space, both hinge upon the availability of 
citizens willing to dedicate themselves to such ends.  Even classical republican 108
accounts, such as Philip Pettit's contestatory democracy, which place considerably 
more emphasis on our capacity for limiting arbitrary state interference (or 
domination) than realizing ourselves politically, suffer without civic virtue.  109
Ultimately, our ability to challenge the decisions of the state and defend ourselves 
against domination depends upon the widespread presence of norms of civility, what 
Pettit describes as both "habits of civic virtue or good citizenship" and social 
capital.  Without it, not only will citizens be unable to foster the political practices 110
able to effectively contest the state, but our community, marked by civic isolation and 
distrust, will itself be inhospitable for the realization of republican freedom.  When 111
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community members are by and large anonymous to one another, the 'intangible 
hand' Pettit invokes to cultivate norms through social pressure cannot function; we 
do not know one another enough to care what they think of us.  Pettit himself notes 112
that trust, mutual reliance, and associational activity can paradoxically only be 
generated by earlier, productive iterations.  Without the initial experiences that 113
predispose us to an active public life, Pettit seems to be at a loss as to how we can 
promote the requisite level of civic virtue. 
As Tocqueville had feared (and Dewey and Arendt remarked of their own 
times), Americans do not demonstrate the sufficient levels of civic virtue as to make 
them active, competent, or purposeful participants in their own political destiny. 
Activists, lobbyists, and other public figures may themselves exhibit a strong 
commitment to public life, but it's unclear whether this commitment emerges out of a 
sincere sense of civic virtue or, rather, a desire to satisfy private aims. Even if their 
participation is appropriately motivated, involvement in public life, as a whole, 
remains sparse, challenging the notion that it can function as a vehicle for either 
popular sovereignty or political equality. Americans, generally speaking, do not 
embrace associational life in a way approximative of the republican-democratic idea. 
Neither represented nor active in public life, they still require a mechanism for 
democratic practice.
 Pettit, Republicanism, 253-7.112
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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Though ordinary citizens lack both electoral representation and civic virtue, 
deliberative democrats hold that we may yet achieve a sufficient measure of popular 
sovereignty and political equality through the availability of an inclusive, fair, and 
public political discourse. How is this possible? When public officials and their critics 
deliberate with one another in a manner oriented toward mutual understanding (as 
opposed to the realization of strategic aims), they have to offer sincere justifications 
for their positions. In doing so, they create a context in which they're responsible for 
explaining their justifications, as well as addressing further criticisms. In this sense, 
political actors become beholden to 'public reason'; they cannot simply do as they 
please, but are only able to make decisions that they can broadly defend as 
'reasonable'. This check on political decision-making then functions as a form of 
popular sovereignty, allowing citizens to evaluate both the kinds of justifications 
political actors offer and deliberative conditions under which they're presented.  114
Through this process of 'reason-giving', citizens are treated "not merely as objects of 
legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take part 
in the governance of their own society."  As Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 115
argue, these sorts of deliberative practices can foster a number of other societal 
benefits as well, including a willingness to correct policy mistakes, greater mutual 
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respect between opposing groups, a sense of civic virtue, and even increased 
political legitimacy.116
The deliberative perspective further differs from the previous two democratic 
frameworks in the way it conceives of the individuals’ involvement in political activity. 
Whereas the liberal model assumes that the citizen will be personally represented 
and the republican model holds that the citizen will actively participate in public life, 
the deliberative model is decidedly less subject-centered. As Habermas explains,
Discourse theory drops all those motifs employed by the philosophy of 
consciousness that lead one either to ascribe the citizens' practice of 
self-determination to a macrosocial subject or to refer the anonymous 
rule of law to competing individual subjects... Discourse theory reckons 
with the higher-level subjectivity of processes of reaching 
understanding that take place through democratic procedures or in the 
communicative networks of public spheres.117
In other words, the democratic actor is not the individual citizen, but the process of 
deliberation itself. As such, it's not essential that the citizen herself actually 
participates in deliberative practices; what matters is whether those who do 
participate do so in a manner that the citizen finds acceptable. As opposed to 
Dewey, who privileged the face-to-face experience of the town hall meeting, 
deliberative democrats contend that this process can play out impersonally, through 
its publication and broadcast. As long as deliberative conditions are such that 
citizens feel confident that the reasons given by political actors are sufficiently 
reasonable, they need not personally be involved; they exercise sovereignty by 
virtue of the limits deliberative criteria places on political decision-making. To the 
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degree this deliberative process is both fair and inclusive, addressing all relevant 
concerns and not just those of a particular group, it further satisfies the demands of 
political equality.
It is precisely this turn away from the individual that might explain deliberative 
democratic theory's recent popularity; as Gutmann and Thompson point out, "No 
subject has been more discussed in political theory in the last two decades than 
deliberative democracy."  By focusing on the broader norms relevant to political 118
decision-making, deliberativists can make a case for democracy without relying on 
the citizenry's ability to achieve a sufficient level of either representation or civic 
virtue. Democracy no longer becomes a question of individual participation, but 
instead a way in which decision-making practices address the population at large, 
treating citizens as if they are decision-makers despite a real lack in political 
standing. In this sense, deliberative democracy constitutes a kind of hypothetical 
democracy, one which assumes that, under ideal conditions, the same decisions 
would be reached with or without more widespread participation. Yet, this all still 
depends on the availability of an adequate political discourse and a population 
committed to its conditions.   
To what extent is an inclusive, fair, dynamic, and justificatory political 
discourse available to us? In an age of unparalleled communicative freedom, our 
political discourse appears fragmentary and, as James Fishkin would say, 
unrefined.  Instead of taking advantage of our technological advances in order to 119
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achieve greater degrees of mutual understanding, we tend to engage in self-
selecting partisan discourses, often called 'echo-chambers,' that only exacerbate our 
feelings of antagonism. These polarized discourses create a context in which the 
news media persistently fails to cultivate the kind of political discussion which holds 
leaders accountable for the justifications they offer for our decisions. There are of 
course incredibly erudite discussions on politics happening among academics, 
writers, and policy experts, but these deliberations have a limited audience, most of 
whom tend to be self-selecting, wealthy, and highly educated; moreover, these 
discourses consistently fail to generate the kind of political force required to actually 
hold leaders accountable for their decisions, even when unanimous in their 
condemnation. When taking deliberative democracy as a regulative ideal, we are so 
far removed from satisfying its criteria that our context cannot help but appear 
irretrievably lost. 
Robert Entman's work gives us some insight into how the state of our news 
media systematically imperils our political discourse. While deliberative democracy 
requires an open 'marketplace of ideas,' in which strong and often complicated 
arguments are given the unbiased attention they deserve, audiences consistently 
tend to neither understand nor care for this kind of journalism.  This lack of public 120
interest creates a "vicious circle" in which, "With limited demand for first-rate 
journalism, most news organizations cannot afford to supply it, and because they do 
not supply it, most Americans have no practical source of the information necessary 
 Robert Entman, Democracy Without Citizens (New York: Oxford UP, 1989), 17.120
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to become politically sophisticated."  For economic and practical reasons, news 121
media outlets tend to uniquely rely and focus on elites; as such, our stories are much 
more individual-focused than idea-focused.  122
Not only does this make our political discourse exclusive, limiting its 
discursive perspective to a particular socio-economic class of elected officials and 
community leaders, but it also affects the way we understand the news. Instead of 
seeing it as an opportunity to evaluate the justifications that inform our political 
activity, our stories are often constructed with a focus on personal conflict. For 
example, we may see a story about the president's conflict with congress, but with 
little attention to the arguments offered by each side; for those of us paying attention, 
our appreciation of politics becomes strategic, not substantive. Where, according to 
Habermas, the norms of communicative reason should reign, we find the return of a 
rational-purposive logic of electability, one which we gleefully and knowingly indulge 
in at the expense of a real conversation about our political decision-making. We 
have become what David Riesman calls "inside dopesters," those who have long 
given up any hope for having an impact on politics and now pay attention, not in 
order to participate, but merely to be considered informed by others.   123
Moreover, since our leaders do not have to rigorously defend their ideas in a 
robust political discourse, they can worry less about justifying an argument and more 
about marketing it. Able to enlist the efforts of professional firms to test and refine 
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ideas (and even personas) through polling and focus-grouping, our elected officials 
and community leaders can hone simplified, appealing arguments designed, not to 
withstand critical scrutiny, but to be catchy, emotive, or sexy. As Fishkin points out, 
echoing Arendt's sentiments nearly half a century prior, "As our political process is 
colonized by the persuasion industry, as our public dialogue is voiced increasingly in 
advertising, our system has undertaken a long journey from Madison to Madison 
Avenue."  Under such conditions, where the winning argument is not always the 124
best but the best marketed, Fishkin also highlights that elites and well-organized 
interests are better positioned to realize their political preferences than ordinary 
citizens without comparable resources.
As evidenced in Entman's work, one major problem of our news media 
system is that we, the audience, incentivize it to simplify its content. In other words, 
part of the reason our political discourse is so bad is because we want it that way; 
we aren't willing to tolerate much political news, and what we will tolerate has to 
conform to certain standards of narrative and entertainment that otherwise deprive it 
of its deliberative value. As Markus Prior notes, in our post-broadcast media 
environment, in which multiple cable channels and the internet provide greater 
choices for viewership than ever before, this issue is only exacerbated. Whereas 
limited media options had the prior effect of educating audiences about politics 
whether they were motivated to do so or not, increased choice in media 
consumption allows individuals who would have previously watched the nightly news 
to watch something else instead. "Cable television and the Internet have 
 Fishkin, When the People Speak, 6. See Arendt, On Revolution, 268.124
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transformed 'politics by default' into politics by choice. By their own choice, 
entertainment fans learn less about politics than they used to and vote less often."  125
As a result, contemporary hopes for deliberative democracy have to grapple with a 
self-selecting, voluntary form of political inequality, whereby a sizable portion of the 
population consistently chooses to ignore, rather than engage with, our politics.
Additionally, this expansive media environment also facilitates increased 
partisan polarization. When we self-select our news media, we tend to choose 
programs that confirm the biases we already have and not pay attention to those we 
disagree with. As such, we tend not to engage in sincere attempts to understand one 
another through justificatory arguments, but only reinforce our own perspectives and 
demonize the other side. As Cass Sunstein has pointed out, this self-selection can 
result in increased political polarization, itself mutually reinforcing toward a 
fragmentary public discourse.  In other words, the more we isolate ourselves from 126
opposing perspectives, the more we doubt the legitimacy of those perspectives, 
leading to further isolation; in this regard, the internet proves to be even more 
problematic than television. As we continue to become more polarized, we not only 
respect each other less, sometimes to violent extremes, but we lose the shared 
discursive grounds for future agreements as well. As Dewey argues, a public 
requires common symbols in order to communicate with itself; as we continue to 
participate in self-selecting partisan discourses, we fail to generate the kinds of 
narratives and metaphors for shared experiences that can collectively bind us and 
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allow us to adjudicate between competing political claims.  Our senses of justice, 127
equality, freedom, and what constitutes a casus belli will continue to be divorced, 
maintaining a political discourse in which different parties just speak past one 
another.
In this elite-driven, fragmentary, and polarized discursive context, it's difficult 
to imagine how our political leadership can be held accountable for offering bad or 
dishonest justifications for our political decisions. There is perhaps no better 
example of this discursive impotence than the one Gutmann and Thompson choose 
to begin a recent work with: the Second Iraq War. They offer the somewhat 
optimistic viewpoint that 
the deliberation that did occur laid the foundation for a more sustained 
and more informative debate after the U.S. military victory than would 
have otherwise taken place. Because the administration had given 
reasons (such as the threat of the weapons of mass destruction) for 
taking action, critics had more basis to continue to dispute the original 
decision, and to challenge the administration's judgment. The imperfect 
deliberation that preceded the war prepared the ground for the less 
imperfect deliberation that followed.128
In short, the fact that there was some reason-giving prior to the invasion created a 
more hospitable context for deliberation later. What should strike us is not that the 
Bush administration was willing to offer provisional justifications for going to war, but 
that, upon discovering how elaborately misleading these justifications were, not a 
single official was held responsible. This demonstrates not the appearance and 
effect of deliberation, but ultimately its inconsequentiality; the reasons our leaders 
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offer need not be well-argued, consistent, or even true, they just need to be reasons. 
In such a poor discursive context, we may deliberate about politics, but our politics 
are not deliberative. 
Like the republican calling for more associational activity or the liberal hoping 
to get money out of politics, there are a number of deliberative democrats who are 
optimistic that some virtue, incentive, or procedure will take hold that can helps us 
realize a more deliberative politics. At present, however, it would be inaccurate to 
paint ordinary citizens as deliberatively-situated to the extent that we can call our 
political context democratic. Our political discourse is rarely deliberative and seems 
to be rather politically insignificant when it is. As such, we remain at a loss as to how 
our political discourse can work as a democratic political mechanism, how our 
present news media context in any way politically empowers ordinary citizens. 
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
Neither liberal, republican, nor deliberative theory is able to account for the 
persistent obstacles, both internal and external, that prevent ordinary citizens from 
democratically exercising political influence in our contemporary context. However, 
despite this lack of influence, citizens are still involved in political activity. They can 
elect their representatives, but these same representatives seem to realize the 
preferences of the wealthy over their own. They can join and form associations, but 
ultimately decide against it; even at times when they do get involved, citizens often 
find that the associations able to exercise the most influence are inhospitable toward 
democratic practice. Finally, though political news and commentary are readily 
available, they collectively fail to amount to a discursive practice able to hold leaders 
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accountable to public reason and realize democratic norms. As we'll explore more 
thoroughly in chapter three, this persistent, looming ambiguity concerning the 
citizen's role within political activity constitutes one of the defining characteristics of 
post-democracy. Yet, before turning our attention to the conceptual consequences of 
that ambiguity, this chapter will conclude with a brief description of the role occupied 
by non-elites.
Baldly put, political participation by ordinary citizens is by-and-large 
instrumental; elites only involve ordinary citizens to the extent that their participation 
can facilitate the realization of elite preferences. This is not to suggest that elite 
preferences are always at odds with those of ordinary citizens, that the latter's 
involvement is inherently manipulated in such a way that non-elites are always 
acting against their own interests, but that their involvement is influential only to the 
degree that elites make use of it. Without elite support or cooption, citizens are 
almost never able to exercise any significant level of political influence on their own; 
the instances where this does occur prove rare and ephemeral, if not fugitive.  129
Overall, ordinary citizens function as a political resource, one which elites can draw 
upon when engaging with other elites. 
This should hardly sound shocking to anyone who has long studied 
democratic institutions. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba pointed out over fifty years 
ago that the American citizen is not politically active, but at best "potentially" so, 
noting that it is precisely our inactivity that facilitates elite rule.  E. E. 130
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Schattschneider's The Semisovereign People, offers perhaps the best account of the 
way in which elites mobilize ordinary citizens at particular moments to pursue their 
interests. He famously describes political activity as a street fight.  While the fight 131
may begin between two individuals (i.e., elites), they may choose to involve 
members of the audience in order to change the dynamic of the conflict. By involving 
some onlookers and excluding others, the fighters can strategically influence the 
outcome. As Schattschneider puts it, "Private conflicts are taken into public arenas 
precisely because someone wants to make certain that the power ratio among the 
private interests most immediately involved shall not prevail."  If, for instance, a 132
political actor feels she is unable to prevent a land development project from being 
approved by the city council, she may invite environmental groups to get involved. 
Her opponent may then invite even more citizens into the fray with promises of new 
job opportunities. In this fashion, a conflict can expand to include more and more 
participants. Yet, the influence exercised by these new participants is entirely 
dependent on the elites at the helm; their involvement itself is contingent upon the 
way in which elites frame and publicize the issue. As such, the ordinary citizen's 
relation to political activity is limited, passive, and, above all, perfunctory, an 
ostensibly mechanical response to signals given by political elites.
Recent work by Steven Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, as well as 
Steven Schier, further supports Schattschneider's analysis. In their book, 
Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America, Rosenstone and Hansen 
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explain the process of 'mobilization' whereby elites rally particular segments of the 
population in order to achieve their goals. Though citizens ultimately decide whether 
to get involved based upon their levels of interest and ability, elites create the 
context for their involvement based upon whom they choose to mobilize and 
when.  Schier further describes this as a practice of 'activation', arguing that this 133
process only gives the illusion of mass participation. He explains that, "Washington 
operatives use strategic activation of their people as an example of direct rule by the 
people, conflating a faction of the public mobilized by an elite with majority opinion. 
This is not misleading if their people in the aggregate resemble the people. They 
usually do not."  Instead, consistent with observations offered by Reich, 134
Schattschneider, and Rosenstone and Hansen, he finds that those most often called 
to participate are those with the time and resources to do so, as well as interests 
compatible with other political elites: the wealthy.  This leads Schier to harshly 135
observe that "America's era of activation is ultimately an era of self-delusion. We 
trumpet popular participation, yet we have raised the costs of participation and 
reward those who overcome these costs by activating fragments of the public."  136
Rather, as Skocpol notes "The most privileged Americans can now organize and 
contend largely among themselves, without regularly engaging the majority of 
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citizens."  Consequently, Skocpol concludes that "early-twenty-first-century 137
Americans live in a diminished democracy, in a much less participatory and more 
oligarchically managed civic world."138
As Schattschneider points out, these conditions trouble the contemporary 
viability of democratic theory as it now stands. He writes, 
The idea that the people are involved in politics by the contagion of 
conflict does not resemble the classical definition of democracy as 
"government by the people." The difference between the idea of 
popular "involvement" in conflict and the idea that people actually 
"govern" is great enough to invite a re-examination of the classical 
theory of democracy.139
He further adds that this theoretical labor "might even help us get rid of the 
impossible imperatives that haunt the literature of the subject and give everyone a 
sense of guilt."  In concluding, Schattschneider argues that the best solution is to 140
adopt a new definition of democracy, one which, like Schumpeter's, emphasizes elite 
competition and minimizes the contributions of ordinary citizens. While it may lend 
itself to a conceptual clarity desperately needed in the social sciences, as argued in 
the previous chapter, this redefinition offers little to the ordinary citizen seeking to 
orient herself politically. Specifically, it fails to grapple with the fact that one is 
situated in a political culture that still promotes popular sovereignty and political 
equality above all other values despite a persistent failure to realize either. In short, it 
refuses to come to terms with a political system at odds with its ideological 
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foundation. The act of redefinition merely saws off the legs of the table without giving 
any thought to whether it can still support what is placed upon it. When it's intended 
to uphold our conceptions of legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and culpability, 
this becomes exceedingly problematic. Instead of satisfying ourselves with a more 
accurate appreciation of what 'democracy' really is, we need a new way of orienting 
ourselves toward politics that can give us a better sense of the value we derive from 
our relation to it. Accordingly, we are in need of a post-democratic approach.  
 71
III. Democratic Obstacles to Post-Democratic Theory
What constitutes a post-democratic approach? First introduced by Jacques Ranciere 
in 1995, the term did not start to gain serious scholarly attention until 2004, which 
saw the publication of Crouch's book-length treatment of the concept, entitled simply 
Post-Democracy, and a short piece by Richard Rorty in the London Review of 
Books.  Since then, a host of other thinkers, including Jurgen Habermas, have 141
started to employ, and at times interrogate, the term.  Even still, sustained 142
discussions of what we mean when we say “post-democracy” remained almost 
exclusively limited to Europe until as late as 2015, which saw the first workshop on 
post-democracy in North America at Brown University.143
In this chapter, I will defend a new interpretation of post-democracy, one 
which directly explores how ordinary citizens experience post-democratic life by 
elaborating on both the conditions of post-democratic political subjectivity and 
conceptual consequences of adopting a post-democratic orientation toward politics. 
After briefly showing how this account improves upon the approach to political 
subjectivity offered by democratic realism, I will move to a discussion of the self-
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reflexive concerns peculiar to post-democracy; specifically, the way in which a post-
democratic orientation invites a re-assessment of one’s relationship with political 
authority and activity by disrupting previous, democratic assumptions about 
legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and culpability. Finally, I will turn to the 
competing conceptions of post-democracy offered by Ranciere, Crouch, Rorty, and 
Habermas. By showing how all four accounts remain wedded to a democratic 
orientation toward politics, I will demonstrate the ways in which my interpretation 
fundamentally breaks with how we’ve previously conceptualized post-democracy; 
namely, by arguing that a serious appreciation of what post-democracy entails 
necessarily leads one to embrace a therapeutic approach to both political thought 
and involvement. 
WHAT IS POST-DEMOCRACY?
At its most literal, post-democracy means that a particular society has moved 
beyond democracy. In this broad sense, post-democracy would apply to any society 
which previously embraced some form of democratic political practice, ranging from 
life in Athens under the rule of the Thirty Tyrants to Germany following the collapse 
of the Weimar Republic, as well as including any society which had, at some point, 
engaged in democratic experimentation. Post-democracy, if understood as such, 
would be a fairly empty designation, as it would hardly say anything substantial 
about that society’s ongoing relationship with democratic politics. Instead, such an 
interpretation would lump together those societies for which democracy was but a 
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passing flirtation with those for which the idea still looms large in its discourse and/or 
memory; in short, its collective political unconscious. 
Rather, that one would even think to call a society “post-democratic” implies 
that democratic principles — popular sovereignty and political equality — continue to 
play a significant role in that society’s political imaginary. Yet, what would qualify as 
significant? Is it sufficient to have a party or movement which espouses democratic 
values, even if  it is in a context that is overwhelmingly hostile to them? A collective 
fondness for a democratic golden age, memorialized through clandestine acts of 
resistance or public, state-sanctioned holidays? While the satisfaction of such 
criteria would certainly imply some level of democratic influence, conceptualizing 
post-democracy in this way prevents it from saying anything essential about a given 
society. To consider a society “post-democratic” simply because it admits of some 
relationship to democratic principles  would qualify societies otherwise characterized 
as fascist, theocratic, or, simply tyrannical, in turn, diluting the term’s conceptual 
purchase. 
If it is to be more than an ascriptive afterthought, post-democracy must be 
used to describe a fundamental feature of a given society. Thus, post-democracy 
names a society in which democratic principles exert an authoritative or decisive 
influence over the collective political imaginary; one in which democratic ways of 
thinking and speaking are hegemonic or, at the very least, co-original with some 
other dominant set of values (e.g., liberalism, socialism, etc.). These are societies in 
which political claims are not only made but accepted on the strength of democratic 
justifications; those in which one encounters a near-universal assent to democratic 
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values, even if some conceptions of democracy embraced by that society are far 
from universalist (e.g., limitations on suffrage, who constitutes the demos, etc.). The 
key is whether a society predominantly couches its defense of political preferences 
and procedures in democratic language.
However, it is difficult to imagine a society so conceptually committed to 
democracy while, at the same time, self-consciously non-democratic. Such a society 
would either be perpetually on the verge of revolution or so collectively disillusioned 
as to have fully given up on itself, now wearily accepting illegitimate rule as the 
established political convention. In particular, the Helots and the Eastern Bloc come 
to mind. However, these societies tend to be either the product of foreign occupation 
or tyrannical rule; those societies for which, as Bernard Williams puts it, the “Basic 
Legitimation Demand” is not met.  In other words, those societies in which those in 144
power fail to offer any justification for their rule outside of their practical monopoly on 
violence. To extend the designation of “post-democratic” to these instances would be 
to, again, needlessly stretch the term, making it synonymous with “oppressed,” 
“subjugated,” or “conquered” and ultimately redundant. Moreover, it has the potential 
to lead us to conflate the call for self-determination with the call for democratic 
sovereignty. 
Therefore, a society is post-democratic when its political practices — despite 
being generally understood as democratic — fail to realize either popular 
sovereignty or political equality. In short, a society mistakenly convinced of its own 
democratic credentials. This immediately raises the question of who gets to decide 
 Bernard Williams, “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory,” In the Beginning 144
Was the Deed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2007), 4-5.
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whether such an attribution is mistaken. In principle, the judgment could be made by 
anyone, whether an outside observer or an inhabitant, but this is not to suggest that 
its criteria are entirely subjective. For instance, we may take issue with someone 
describing her society as post-democratic if it is solely because she dislikes a recent 
policy decision or the outcome of an otherwise democratic procedure. Rather, it 
helps if one is able to empirically show the specific ways in which a given society’s 
political practices fail to achieve either popular sovereignty or political equality; if one 
can, for instance, point to practices that favor the rich or arbitrarily exclude particular 
groups of people.  This then leads to the question of who gets to decide on the 145
relevant practices, whether a society should be judged according to republican, 
deliberative, or liberal criteria (or some other entirely different formulation, though, 
most likely, a messy, ambiguous amalgamation of several traditions). Here, the 
inhabitant would seem to have a privileged perspective on what those criteria should 
be, but this hardly means that she has the final word on whether they are satisfied. 
Two additional features of this definition must be made explicit. First, rather 
than assuming that post-democracy must be preceded by either a maximally or 
genuinely democratic moment, this definition exclusively attends to the interplay 
between a self-professed democratic culture and its non-democratic political 
practices, eschewing judgment, in either direction, as to whether our political 
practices were ever sufficiently democratic in the first place. In this sense, the 
distinction offered by James Martel in his short piece, "Are we 'post-democratic' - or 
 As was done, for instance, in Chapter Two.145
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have we not (yet) been democratic at all?” would be irrelevant.  This interpretation 146
is uninterested in the reality of a democratic past, only the influence it exercises — 
whether through the weight of its memory or the force of its imagining — over our 
shared cultural norms. 
Second, within any society, the belief that it is post-democratic is necessarily 
held by only a negligible minority. What distinguishes the experience of post-
democracy from other forms of non-democratic (i.e., authoritarian rule) is the sense 
that democracy has failed in a cultural context that otherwise refuses to seriously 
consider this possibility. In other words, it requires a persistent, democratic culture 
which maintains that the state can be, or is already sufficiently democratic, even 
when confronting the reality of a post-democratic political context. Attempts to 
suggest otherwise (including this one) are dismissed as defeatist or, when confused 
with a critique of democracy itself, virulently derided. 
As such, post-democracy names a hazy period of collective political 
misrecognition. If a society, as a whole, were to come to the explicit, collective 
realization that democracy has failed, it would no longer be post-democracy, but 
something different, entirely dependent on which norms eventually inform the 
subject's understanding of her relationship to political activity and authority (e.g., 
theocratic, technocratic, despotic, etc.). While this is certainly a possibility, it is hardly 
a foregone conclusion. Rather, it may just as easily be the case that the vast majority 
of citizens will respond to increasing evidence of their own political insignificance 
with even greater levels of cognitive dissonance, by either diluting their own 
 See James Martel, "Are we 'post-democratic' - or have we not (yet) been 146
democratic at all?" Juncture 22.3 (2015): 210-15.
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understanding of democratic practice to fit present circumstances or doubling down 
on the imminent possibility of a democracy-to-come. In this case, a democratic 
culture could persist alongside non-democratic political conditions for some time, 
perhaps indefinitely.147
Still, while inherently non-democratic, it is important to emphasize the ways in 
which (pseudo-)political practices still contribute to a peculiar political dynamic 
unique to post-democracy. Despite being unable to function as a means of either 
popular sovereignty or political equality, elections, referendums, and other instances 
of mass involvement do have significant consequences for sovereign decision-
making. In this sense, post-democracy does not describe an unqualified form of 
authoritarian rule, but one which empowers elites based upon their ability to 
decipher and manipulate broader public trends — neither rational nor self-
determining — for their own ends. Those able to achieve their political preferences 
are those best able to build a constituency, not by convincing citizens with well-
formulated preferences of their own to side with them, but by surgically crafting one 
from the evolving cacophony of desires, prejudices, hopes, and fears that constitutes 
the broader public. They may remain faithful to this constituency or simply discard it 
after it has served its purpose (e.g., securing an electoral victory); in either case, the 
ability to conjure up 'popular' support by means of opinion polling, data modeling, 
and advertising campaigns remains absolutely essential. Post-democratic elites are, 
 If one takes Jacques Ranciere's position, it always has. See below in “Competing 147
Conceptions of Post-Democracy”.
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as Crouch puts it, "something more resembling shopkeepers than rulers, anxiously 
seeking to discover what their 'customers' want in order to stay in business."  148
However, even this may be giving the public too much credit; most consumers 
at least have a vague idea about the product they're purchasing. We might better 
characterize post-democratic elites as entrepreneurs, speculators, or even social 
engineers; unlike the shopkeeper, subject to the preferences of an agent that, at 
least in some sense, knows what it wants, political elites act upon a habitually 
passive and, at best, reactive public, basing their actions, not upon what the public 
tells them directly, but from what they can learn about its behavior. Subsequently, 
post-democratic political practice is largely a matter of manipulating variables, not 
persuading individuals. 
We should further note, however, that post-democracy does not imply the 
impossibility of non-elite political influence, only just that it remains extraordinary. 
There will always be those who cannot be characterized as 'elite' in any sense but 
still find a way to contribute to political decision-making (e.g., dedicated activists). 
Yet, this hardly gives us reason to designate a political context democratic, nor 
should it allow us to ignore the ways in which political decisions are still 
overwhelmingly made in accordance with elite preferences. Moreover, when we 
recognize just how many of these 'democratic' gains are quickly diluted or effaced by 
an elite opposition, they tend to become largely symbolic, rather than substantive, 
victories. Without a sufficient level of political equality, the achievements of a few 
otherwise ordinary citizens are perfectly consistent with post-democracy, acting both 
 Crouch, Post-Democracy, 21. 148
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as the 'exceptions which prove the rule' as well as contributing to the mythos that 
sustains post-democracy itself. 
WHY POST-DEMOCRACY?
Still, the realization that one’s polity fails to live up to democratic norms is not exactly 
novel. So why the need for a entirely new term? Why not simply settle for neoliberal, 
which already connotes limited political participation under late capitalism, or post-
political, which emphasizes the subtle foreclosure of meaningful political conflict by 
elite consensus? To begin, neoliberal fails to evoke the enormity of adequately 
grappling with the unavailability of democratic practice, instead approaching 
widespread civic passivity and domination by financial elites with the emotional 
detachment — feigned or otherwise — of Riesman’s infamous “inside-dopster.”  149
Moreover, while neoliberalism might name one manifestation of post-democracy, it 
hardly exhausts them. As for post-political, though also not mutually exclusive with 
post-democracy, it does not account for elite disagreements that have historically 
yielded radical or profound political changes, despite being non-democratic in origin. 
Post-democracy signals the absence of democratic practice, not the cessation of 
politics.
The strongest contender for an alternative comes from democratic realism or, 
more specifically, calling oneself a democratic realist rather than describing one’s 
 David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2001), 180-184. As 149
Riesman writes, "Concerned with being 'right,' fearing to be taken in, or to be thought 
guilty of wishful thinking (which he equates with any introduction of humaneness into 
his judgments), the inside-dopester deprives himself of one of the best yardsticks he 
could use actively to control his experience, namely his own reactions as a sensitive 
participant in the political life of his time” (The Lonely Crowd, 182-3).
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own society as post-democratic. Admittedly, the post-democratic account of 
democratic possibility largely relies on the elite theories of democracy offered by 
Schumpeter, Schattschneider, and others, but differs in two major respects: 
specifically, the way in which it attends to both the gap between democratic theory 
and political practice and the consequences of said gap for ordinary citizens. 
First, while democratic realists treat the 'problem of democracy' as a 
conceptual misunderstanding, maintaining, with E. E. Schattschneider, that "we are 
in trouble because we are confused about what is supposed to happen in a 
democracy," most post-democratic theorists, save Ranciere, recognize this 'problem' 
as a practical failing, instead focusing on the ways in which superficially democratic 
practices contribute to the manifestation of non-democratic forms of sovereignty.  150
In this sense, the bulk of post-democratic theory remains faithful to a classical, rather 
than procedural (in the Schumpetarian sense) understanding of democracy.  It 151
may be that so-called democracies have never actually been 'governments by the 
people', but post-democratic theory allows us to recognize this point without ignoring 
the substantial role played by democratic values in our collective political imaginary; 
in short, without treating popular sovereignty and political equality as if they can 
simply be exchanged for a more 'accurate' or realistic set of values (e.g., 
technocratic expertise, non-violent transfers of power, or even the minimal dignity of 
a plebiscite).
 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's view of Democracy 150
in America (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1960), 133.
 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: 151
Ruskin House, 1954), ch. XXI-XXII.
 81
Second, because post-democratic theory acknowledges the persistent 
ideological significance of democratic values, it explicitly attends to the affective 
repercussions of our failure to realize them. In other words, it directs our attention to 
the ways in which a deeper awareness of elite domination should trouble the political 
self-conceptions and dispositions of otherwise democratically-oriented citizens. 
Democratic realists, by and large, neglect to consider this point; rather, they seem to 
presuppose that ordinary citizens are simply too indifferent to care. As Gabriel 
Almond and Sydney Verba put it, "because politics has little importance for them, 
few citizens are motivated to think about their influence or their political activities."  152
Schattschneider further explains, "People reconcile their democratic faith and their 
undemocratic behavior by remaining comfortably unaware of the inconsistency of 
theory and practice."  In fact, on Almond and Verba's account, it is this indifference 153
that ultimately facilitates elite domination in the first place; they write, "The inactivity 
of the ordinary man and his inability to influence decisions help provide the power 
that governmental elites need if they are to make decisions."  As such, it is 154
presumed that the subjective effects of elite domination are minimal; if citizens were 
really inclined to think critically about their relationship to political activity, the 
argument goes, they would have never allowed themselves to be so relegated in the 
first place. Alternatively, post-democratic theory recognizes, on the one hand, that 
inactivity is not necessarily a sign of a indifference and, on the other, that even if a 
 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 152
Publications, 1989), 348.
 Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, 109.153
 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 346.154
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majority of citizens are indifferent, the conditions are such as to still warrant a more 
sustained examination.
POLITICAL SELF-UNDERSTANDING IN THE SHADOW OF POST-DEMOCRACY
What does it mean to be a post-democratic subject? In posing this question, we 
move from a democratic orientation, focused primarily on democracy's absence, to a 
post-democratic one, attentive to the greater implications of a post-democratic 
present. If post-democracy results from the perceived failure of political practices to 
live up to democratic norms, a post-democratic political orientation is one which 
internalizes that perception, treating the political negligibility of ordinary citizens, not 
as a wake-up call or as a reminder of democracy's imperfections, but as a brute fact. 
This is not to suggest that democratic principles would cease to have meaning, that 
it would somehow lose all value, but that it no longer makes sense to conceive of a 
political context chiefly, much less exclusively, through a democratic lens; that 
appeals to 'democracy' only appear unintelligible, ironic, or mystifying. Moreover, it is 
to take seriously the possibility, more likely than not, that democratic political 
conditions will not return, assuming they ever existed in the first place. 
In this sense, whereas post-democracy describes a particular situation, a 
post-democratic orientation constitutes the attitudinal disposition unique to that 
situation, one which grapples seriously with the absence of democratic political 
practices. As such, it is entirely possible to consider one’s context post-democratic 
without being oriented toward post-democracy. For instance, an individual might 
maintain a democratic orientation toward post-democracy, preferring instead to 
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concentrate on ways of (re-)vitalizing democratic practice. We could imagine 
individuals adopting liberal, fascist, or anarchist orientations toward post-democracy 
as well, in some cases, treating post-democracy itself as a largely insignificant 
feature of contemporary politics.  155
However, to the extent that post-democracy depends on a persistent 
hegemonic democratic political imaginary, we would imagine that most people 
confronting the issue of post-democracy harbor democratic political commitments. 
For the otherwise committed democrat, adopting a post-democratic orientation, 
unsettles a host of concerns previously resolved through democratic theory's criterial 
reliance on widespread political participation. In particular, the question of state 
legitimacy, one's membership in a political community, one's responsibility toward 
the state, and one's culpability for its crimes, all of which are essential for 
understanding oneself in relation to political activity and authority. 
Take, to begin, the question of political legitimacy. Unable to democratically 
legitimate the state, the post-democratic subject is left to either find new legitimating 
criteria or face up to the fact that she is governed by a sovereign power that lacks 
legitimacy. For those pursuing the first option, liberalism is the most likely substitute. 
In exchange for the freedom of both speech and contract and the rights to property 
and due process, a fair number of individuals would probably be fine with giving up 
on the hope of exercising political influence. Yet, this must be a liberalism that does 
not rely on any sort of democratic guarantee or remedy; a liberalism, contra Shklar, 
 For example, the fascist and the anarchist might both see post-democracy as 155
simply a stage of democratic decay, symptomatic of the need, on the one hand, for 
authoritarian leadership or, on the other, giving up on the project of sovereignty 
altogether.
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divorced from democracy.  There are undoubtedly other mechanisms for promoting 156
a liberal polity, whether through the efforts of a virtuous aristocracy, benevolent 
despot, or philosopher king, or, as is increasingly evident, a modus vivendi between 
oligarchs, that may actually prove more effective than democracy at maintaining 
liberal norms. Still, post-democracy’s propensity for spectacle, demagogues, and the 
politicization of private life may just as quickly turn to threaten liberal norms; clearly, 
in numerous instances, it already has. 
There are, of course, other criteria one could use to legitimate the post-
democratic state. While one could hypothetically appeal to any consideration as 
authoritative, some more popular options might include a Hobbesian cessation of 
violence, a paternalistic consideration of a population's well-being (e.g., the 
enforcement of health codes, environmental and consumer protections, etc.), or an 
ability to foster economic prosperity. Two somewhat less contingent measures 
include identifying with the state based upon certain existential criteria (e.g., one’s 
ethnicity, religion, or, circularly, one's nationality or the intrinsic authority of the state's 
founders or its sacred texts). Yet, regardless of which criteria the post-democratic 
citizen finds compelling, it means admitting that state legitimacy no longer depends 
upon the ability to govern oneself.  It is not a matter of choosing, but of accepting 157
the choices made by others.
 See Judith Shklar, "Liberalism of Fear" Political Thought and Political Thinkers 156
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
 The one exception would be those who do still influence political decision-157
making; they may still legitimate the state based upon their own participation, but not 
upon the idea of collective participation.
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The other possibility, of course, is to recognize the state as lacking any claim 
to legitimacy. Just because the criteria of popular sovereignty and political equality 
are not satisfied does not mean that one must give up on them. Yet, this means 
having to seriously wrestle with the realization that the state's use of violence may 
be morally indistinguishable from unjust or criminal acts in a society that otherwise 
respects that authority. This process may be more difficult than one at first realizes. 
Perhaps it is possible to shrug off a speeding ticket with an easy dismissal or sort of 
noblesse oblige, but it seems more difficult to do so after being subject to property 
seizure, harassment by law enforcement, incarceration, or the loss of a loved one at 
the hands of the state. And while some may occasionally make the Thoreauvian 
gesture of defiance, even he regularly paid his taxes.  
What, then, of the question of membership? What relation does the individual 
have to the post-democratic state? Strictly speaking, post-democratic conditions 
dictate that the vast majority of citizens are excluded from any sort of political 
community, properly understood; unable to exercise any sort of significant political 
influence, they can at best imagine themselves as part of a national community, 
largely, if not exclusively, based on their status as citizens. For many, this may be 
enough. Yet, it is important to remember that this is an association based on a legal 
status; without the possibility for democratic political action, their membership in a 
national community would be purely passive. They would not constitute a 'we', but 
merely an 'us', united solely by the shared experience of being governed.
This can further give the impression that one's membership in a national 
community is ultimately insignificant. Unable to look to her neighbors as partners in a 
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collective political project, an individual may begin to feel detached from her 
neighbors, at least in the sense of having any kind of shared political destiny. In a 
profound sense, post-democracy illuminates the political isolation of the governed. 
This feeling is only exacerbated by the awareness that one is surrounded by self-
understood democratic citizens. Not only does this make one feel powerless over 
sovereign decision-making, aware that the opportunities afforded her for political 
involvement are entirely in the service of elite preferences, but, like Nietzsche's 
madman, one finds oneself in a community completely unprepared to consider the 
greater consequences of their predicament.  She asks, "What have we done? How 158
can we atone? How can we endure?" and is met with confused stares and silence, 
further alienating her from her fellow citizens.
Further, an individual must also grapple with her sense of responsibility to the 
state — in particular, whether she ought to follow the law or volunteer her service — 
as well as any feelings of culpability for its transgressions. Both would largely 
depend upon one's conception of legitimacy, though not entirely. One might not 
consider the state legitimate, but still avoid breaking the law or dodging military 
service in order to escape punishment or protect the safety of one's family. Yet, this 
does not seem to suggest a direct responsibility to the state as much as a 
responsibility to oneself and others that can best be realized by acting in accordance 
with the state's wishes. In contrast, one might feel absolved of any responsibility to 
the state, feeling justified not only in avoiding all forms of service but even in 
breaking the law, assuming it furthers one's interests and does not put one at 
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (New York: Vintage, 1974 [1882]), 181-2.158
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significant risk of being punished. Thus, an individual might feel comfortable 
cheating on her taxes, defrauding state institutions, or committing perjury. Moral 
obligations may keep her from indiscriminately raping and pillaging, but she would 
lack the sort of political obligation that would keep her from taking advantage of the 
state at every possible opportunity.
The question of culpability, however, is harder to resolve; one may decide to 
disregard one's alleged political responsibilities, but it is much more difficult to shrug 
off the sense that one lacks responsibility for the crimes committed in one’s name.  159
A persistent, pervasive democratic rhetoric can make one feel as if one is 
nevertheless to blame for all of the destructive policy decisions, military incursions, 
and instances of police misconduct in which one played no part. Even lacking all 
political power, an individual may feel as if she let these crimes happen and, as 
such, must either atone or find some way of proving to herself and others that she 
did all in her power to prevent it. The post-war critique of 'ordinary Germans' has left 
many of us with the sense that we are always to blame for our government's actions, 
but also leads us to forget that serious efforts to confront the state during the worst 
of times often exhaust themselves in symbolic acts of martyrdom. As it is for each of 
the other considerations as well, whether a deeper feeling of culpability is either 
productive or escapable will ultimately be distinct for each individual.
The sort of gloomy, pessimistic outlook conjured up by a post-democratic 
orientation raises the question of why anyone would voluntarily adopt such a 
perspective at all. Why not simply maintain a democratic orientation and choose to 
 On this topic, see Eric Anthony Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of 159
Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012).
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focus on the opportunities for democratic renewal, no matter how minimal or trivial, 
available at present? 
There will, of course, be some for whom this is the best option, the "once 
more unto the breach, dear friends" types who cannot fathom the idea of giving up 
on the greater, historical project of democratic sovereignty. Yet, for all but those who 
require this sort of optimism, a post-democratic orientation can allow for a way of 
productively engaging with a widespread condition of political insignificance that, at 
some level, those paying attention have recognized for some time. For the vast 
majority of individuals unable to influence political decision-making, a post-
democratic orientation more comprehensively attends to the consequences of their 
political insignificance. By first admitting her powerlessness over a non-democratic 
present, an individual can begin to think through the practical ways in which she can 
respond to it. In this sense, it offers a means of dealing with the profound 
disorientation that results from post-democratic life, the confusion and anxiety that 
accompanies the conflict between a broader cultural consensus over the value of 
democratic political practice, as well as the private recognition that all attempts, at 
present, to realize democratic values have proven to be hollow.
Having offered my own interpretation of post-democracy and elaborated on 
the sorts of reflexive concerns pertaining to one’s own political status that it evokes, 
its now necessary to show how this represents an improvement over (or, at the very 
least, a departure from) previous interpretations of the concept.
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COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF POST-DEMOCRACY
Despite holding very different and, at times, even opposing conceptions of 
democratic practice, Ranciere, Crouch, Rorty, and Habermas have all taken to 
describing our contemporary political moment as ‘post-democratic’, finding 
themselves in agreement that democratic theory must be supplemented by an 
awareness of the remote conditions of contemporary democratic possibility. Yet, 
each of these thinkers also considers the concept solely in light of their commitment 
to democratic practice, choosing to exclusively focus on how citizens can resist, if 
not challenge, their present circumstances. Andre Willis perfectly captures this 
predisposition when summarizing the collective findings of his recent workshop on 
post-democracy, writing, "if the concept of post-democracy could be of any use then 
it would have to expand democratic possibilities from below and shore up 
democratic institutions from above, while working towards more socioeconomic 
equality."160
While many of us (myself included) are highly sympathetic toward these 
goals, it is difficult to ignore the ways in which post-democratic conditions trouble — 
if not thwart — the possibility of a renewed democratic future. By focusing 
exclusively on the absence of democratic practice, rather than attending to the 
experience of post-democratic life itself, Ranciere, Crouch, Rorty, and Habermas 
miss an opportunity comprehensively address the experience of political subjectivity 
unique to post-democracy. In this sense, they exemplify how an overriding fidelity to 
democratic politics can present an obstacle to a genuinely post-democratic theory of 
 Andre Willis, "Considering post-democracy" Juncture 22.3 (2015): 201-202, 202.160
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politics. After first briefly describing each thinker’s approach to the concept, I will 
illustrate the ways in which the democratic assumptions that underlie their respective 
accounts limit their ability to offer productive prescriptions to the specific challenges 
post-democracy engenders. 
Ranciere's initial use of the term is directly linked with what he — alongside 
Slavoj Zizek, Chantal Mouffe, Alain Badiou and others — describes as "the 
disappearance of politics" or, more generally, post-politics.  While genuinely 161
political activity refers to real, irreducible disagreements between different factions, 
post-politics refers to the superficial achievement of a general consensus over 
liberal-democratic norms and capitalist modes of economic organization, what 
Badiou names "capitalo-parliamentarianism." This false consensus then forecloses 
the possibility for politics properly understood, replacing it with a series of 
management techniques oriented toward the "administration of social affairs" and 
reducing political activity to "a multiplicity of 'sub-political' struggles about a variety of 
'life issues'" previously considered private concerns.  There may still be instances 162
in which certain conflicts emerge, often violently, that cannot be ignored, what 
Mouffe calls the 'return of the repressed', but these moments tend to be exceptional 
and quickly contained. 
 Ranciere, Disagreements, 102. See also Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject (New 161
York: Verso Press, 1999); Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (New York: 
Verso Press, 2000); Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil 
(New York: Verson Press, 2001); Erik Swyngedouw, "Interrogating Post-
Democratization: Reclaiming Egalitarian Political Spaces" Political Geography 30.7 
(2011): 370-380.
 Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, 430; Chantal Mouffe, On The Political (New York: 162
Routledge Press, 2005), 50.
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Thus, Ranciere employs post-democracy "to denote the paradox that, in the 
name of democracy, emphasizes the consensual practice of effacing the forms of 
democratic action." In other words, it names the replacement of authentic democratic 
action by "the organization of bodies as a community and the management of 
places, powers, and functions." True democracy, by contrast, never seeks to order 
the world but only disrupt it.  By presenting "the total of 'public opinion' as identical 163
to the body of the people," post-democracy consistently confronts the demos with a 
simulacrum of itself, creating a context in which "everything is on show and where 
there is thus no longer any place for appearance."  Thus, it forecloses the 164
possibility of the demos's emergence. As such, "Postdemocracy is the government 
practice and conceptual legitimization of a democracy after the demos, a democracy 
that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is 
thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combination of 
social energies and interests."  It is, in short, the conflation of democracy with the 165
state or, as Ranciere would put it, the political with the police order.  166
While Crouch similarly identifies post-democracy with the rise of post-politics, 
his position is decidedly less radical than Ranciere's. Rather than completely 
 Ranciere, Disagreement, 99-102.163
 Ranciere, Disagreement, 103.164
 Ranciere, Disagreement, 102.165
 Ranciere, Disagreement, 28-9. Strangely enough, this brings Ranciere's position 166
closer to that of the democratic realists in that they both consider the contemporary 
'problem of democracy' to be conceptual rather than practical. While the democratic 
realists believe we expect too much from democratic practice, Ranciere argues that, 
in conflating democracy with the state, we expect too little.
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dismissing all institutionalized political procedures as antithetical to democracy, 
Crouch considers the state a possible vehicle for democratic action, assuming 
citizens are able to make use of it. Thus, post-democracy does not signify the state's 
attempt to prevent democratic possibility, but the practical inability of the demos to 
effectively use the state as a means of governing itself. When we look to the mid-
twentieth century, Crouch argues, we see workers' unions and other popular 
associations able to limit the power of economic elites and realize their collective 
preferences through electoral means.  Yet, following the democratic vitality of the 167
post-war years, 
Elites soon learned how to manage and manipulate. People became 
disillusioned, bored, or preoccupied with the business of everyday life. 
The growing complexity of issues after the major initial achievements 
of reform made it increasingly difficult to take up informed positions, to 
make intelligent comment, or even to know what 'side' one was on. 
Participation in political organizations declined almost everywhere, and 
eventually even the minimal act of voting was beset by apathy.168
Hastened by the rising power of transnational corporations, a fleeting sense of class 
consciousness, the professionalization of party politics, and privatization of public 
services, popular demobilization then allowed elites to once again assert their power 
with minimal constraint, culminating in global deregulation of financial markets during 
the last decades of the 20th century. 
In this sense, Crouch's post-democracy is further differentiated from 
Ranciere's by Crouch's positing of a specific historical dimension; while Ranciere's 
post-democracy results from any attempt to formalize democratic procedures, 
 Crouch, Post-Democracy, 7-8.167
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Crouch believes that post-democracy necessarily follows a period of genuine 
democratic practice. Thus, Crouch proposes that
the idea of post-democracy helps us describe situations when 
boredom, frustration and disillusion have settled in after a democratic 
moment; when powerful minority interests have become far more 
active than the mass of ordinary people in making the political system 
work for them; where political elites have learned how to manage and 
manipulate popular demands; where people have to be persuaded to 
vote by top-down publicity campaigns.169
Further, because Crouch still recognizes the potential for democratic action within 
the state, he goes into considerably more detail as to how elites are able to subvert 
its democratic potential.  
[W]hile elections certainly exist and can change governments, public 
electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival 
teams of professionals expert in the techniques of persuasion, and 
considering a small range of issues selected by those teams. The 
mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, 
responding only to the signals given to them. Behind this spectacle of 
the electoral game, politics is really shaped in private interaction 
between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly 
represent business interests.170
Hence, post-democratic political practice depends upon mass participation, even if 
only in a purely instrumental sense. Without some defensible level of voter turnout 
and a sustained public discourse (no matter how irrational or trivial it may be), these 
political practices would be exposed as entirely superficial instead of just severely 
lopsided, making it impossible to maintain the veneer of democracy that 
distinguishes post-democracy from other forms of elite domination. Post-democracy 
may preclude democratic citizenship, but it still requires willing participants. Thus, 
 Crouch, Post-Democracy, 20.169
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Crouch describes how elites continue to foster mass involvement by politicizing a 
host of minor or technical concerns, contributing to a form of 'hyper-democracy' that 
actually works to sustain post-democratic conditions. 
Where there is very little real disagreement among parties over major 
policy directions (a fundamental characteristic of post-democracy), 
politicians have to start exploring every little avenue they can in order 
to claim that they have found a difference from their opponents — 
anything from each other's personal morality to the desirability of 
particular medical treatments, numbers of police on the streets, or 
ways of teaching children to read. Excessive politicization, or hyper-
democracy, is therefore paradoxically an aspect of post-democracy.171
Here, Crouch's conception moves closer to Ranciere's, both emphasizing, as 
previously noted, the proliferation of post-political or 'life-style' concerns under post-
democracy. 
Rorty gives us yet another interpretation of post-democracy, one more closely 
aligned with Crouch's historical model than Ranciere's immanent critique of the 
'democratic' state.  Yet, instead of attending to domination by economic elites as 172
the root cause of post-democracy, Rorty cites the growing threat to democracy 
posed by the national security state. Writing in the wake of the September 11th 
attacks, as well as those in Madrid in 2004, he argues that 
If terrorists do get their hands on nuclear weapons... It will be a fact 
that all the democracies will have to place themselves on a permanent 
war footing. The measures their governments will consider... are likely 
to bring about the end of many of the socio-political institutions that 
emerged in Europe and North America in the two centuries since the 
 Colin Crouch, The Knowledge Corrupters (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016), 147.171
 Curiously enough, the decision to entitle Rorty's essay "Post-Democracy" was 172
made by the editors of the London Review of Books; Rorty never uses the term 
himself. Still, he seems to have agreed with the decision, offering us a latent 
understanding of the concept. See Danny Postel, "Last Words from Richard Rorty" 
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bourgeois revolutions. They may return the West to something like 
feudalism... In short, a return to something like the Ancien Regime, 
with the national security establishment of each country playing the 
role of the court of Versailles.   173
Rorty goes on to suggest that this transition would "gradually reduce the 
effectiveness of the various institutions that have made it possible to influence the 
actions of democratic governments," leading to "neither military dictatorship nor 
Orwellian totalitarianism, but rather a relatively benevolent despotism, imposed by 
what would gradually become a hereditary nomenklatura."  "After a few 174
generations," Rorty laments, "utopian fantasies of an open society might be 
cherished only by a few readers of old books."  175
In contrast with Crouch and Rorty, Habermas turns to 'post-democracy' to 
describe a broad condition of political detachment rather than a particular form of 
domination, whether by economic elites or a state security apparatus; focusing on 
the general lack of a European political consciousness, Habermas argues that 
"political elites and the media..." have been "reluctant to win over the populations to 
a common European future."  Instead of helping to construct a European demos 176
"on the persuasive power of good arguments," they've taken to "pandering to the 
populism which they themselves have cultivated by obfuscating a complex and 
unpopular topic."  As a result, a "dangerous asymmetry has developed... between 177
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the democratic participation of the peoples in what their governments 'obtain' for 
them on the, as they see it, far-off Brussels stage and the indifference, even apathy, 
of EU citizens regarding the decisions of their parliament in Strasbourg," in turn, 
rendering the EU "an arrangement for exercising a kind of post-democratic, 
bureaucratic rule."  178
DEMOCRATIZING POST-DEMOCRACY?
What, then, is the recommended course of action? Crouch, to his credit, remains 
cautious, noting that the changes associated with post-democracy "are so powerful 
and widespread that it is impossible to see any major reversal of them."  Still, he 179
does stress that some "actions to try to shift contemporary politics partly away from 
the inexorable drift towards post-democracy are possible."  Upon closer 180
examination, however, Crouch's prescriptions necessitate a concerned citizenry 
whose absence is itself the root cause of the problem he hopes to solve. Specifically, 
Crouch argues that we must attend to the "growing dominance of the corporate elite" 
and reform our political practices to encourage greater participation through, for 
instance, the establishment of citizens' assemblies.  Yet, he is also quick to admit 181
that these sorts of reforms seem to presuppose the kind of popular political power 
post-democracy lacks, noting that the "governmental and part policy-making 
 Habermas, Crisis, viii, 48.178
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machinery, even of left-of-centre parties, has itself become endogenous to the 
problem of the power of the corporate elite.”182
Thus, instead of "appealing to the political class itself to improve the quality of 
our democracy," he concentrates on "what we ourselves need to do to have 
[egalitarian] issues placed on the real political agenda in the first place."  Here, 183
Crouch is not so much interested in re-democratizing post-democracy, but making 
the most out of post-democracy. He begins by asserting that ordinary citizens need 
to pay attention to and support new movements. The "vigorous, chaotic, noisy 
context of movements and groups," Crouch writes, is essential for our "future 
democratic vitality."  Yet, a problem emerges when considering how best to 184
support these movements. As Crouch points out,
On the one hand, it would seem that in post-democratic society we can 
no longer take for granted the commitment of particular parties to 
particular causes. This would lead to the conclusion that we should 
turn our backs on the party fight and devote our energies to cause 
organizations... On the other hand we have also seen that the 
fragmentation of political action into a mass of causes and lobbies 
provides systematic advantages to the rich..."185
As a result, the concerned citizen is left with the choice to either "conspire further in 
the triumph of post-democracy" by supporting lobbying organizations or "to cling to 
the old model of the monolithic party" and "sink into nostalgia for an irretrievable 
past."  186
 Crouch, Post-Democracy, 110.182
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In the end, Crouch advocates for essentially doing both. While professional 
lobbying may contribute to the growth of post-democracy, he considers it essential 
for pursuing egalitarian aims; "[e]ven if the causes supported by egalitarians are 
always weaker there than those of the large corporation, they are weaker still if they 
stay out of the lobby."  Because it remains the most effective organization for mass 187
mobilization and participation, he argues that citizens must find a way to push 
parties back in the right direction — toward the public good — through withholding 
support at crucial times.  As such, citizens need to work "critically and 188
conditionally" through the party in order to ensure its continued existence in a way 
that can facilitate further democratic political participation.189
Although unable to directly challenge post-democracy, Crouch hopes that 
these piecemeal measures may eventually contribute to an active citizenry itself able 
to realize political reform and end elite political domination. However, the challenge 
of post-democracy is not that concerned citizens lack an effective strategy for 
exerting political influence; it is that citizens are not sufficiently concerned in the first 
place or, rather, whatever concern they experience fails to encourage the sustained 
commitment to political activity ultimately necessary for democratic practice. As 
such, it is unclear whom he hopes to advise. Even if some private citizens do stay 
informed about new and emerging political movements and possibilities, the vast 
majority of them are not in a position to utilize this information in a way that could 
 Crouch, Post-Democracy, 122.187
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productively influence sovereign decision-making. The professionalized, top-down 
nature of the modern party and cause organization tempers their involvement from 
the start, reducing citizens exclusively to donors and voters, limiting any meaningful 
form of political participation. Withholding votes or campaign contributions may send 
a signal if done strategically and in mass, but even these collective actions require a 
level of political organization that cannot be assumed under post-democratic 
conditions. Simply put, post-democracy lacks the robust citizenry able to make use 
of these tactics in the first place.
The recommendations advanced by Rorty and Habermas appear equally 
infeasible, if not more so. In order to combat the growing deference to questions of 
national security, Rorty skeptically suggests that citizens should attempt to promote 
governmental transparency; "[t]he only thing I can think of that might make a 
difference is a willingness to challenge the culture of government secrecy," 
specifically "in the areas of nuclear weaponry and intelligence-gathering."  He 190
adds, "[t]hey could also demand that their governments join efforts to update the 
laws of war, and to create something like a code of international criminal justice."  191
Still, Rorty is hardly optimistic; the same popular inefficacy that haunts Crouch's 
prescriptions renders Rorty's demands equally unrealistic. He admits as much when, 
in concluding his essay, he points out 
[in] a worst-case scenario, historians will someday have to explain why 
the golden age of Western democracy... lasted only about two hundred 
years. The saddest pages in their books are likely to be those in which 
they describe how the citizens of the democracies, by their craven 
 Rorty, "Post-Democracy," 11.190
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acquiescence in governmental secrecy, helped bring the disaster on 
themselves.192
Here Rorty characterizes ordinary citizens as actively inviting post-democracy, giving 
us even less reason to pin any hopes for democratic renewal on the demos itself. 
In directly engaging with the underlying problem of popular detachment, 
Habermas focuses on the need to develop a widely-shared European political 
consciousness, pointing out that "the more that national populations realize, and the 
media help them to realize, how profoundly the decisions of the European Union 
pervade their daily lives, the more their interest in making use of their democratic 
rights also as EU citizens will increase."  Instead of pushing for ordinary citizens to 193
accomplish this on their own, however, he argues that this broader European 
political orientation will ultimately depend upon the efforts of European elites. In a 
section entitled "The hesitation of the political elites at the threshold to transnational 
democracy," Habermas argues that they "must abandon their accustomed 
combination of public relations and incrementalism steered by experts and brace 
themselves for a risky, and above all inspired, struggle within the broad public."  194
"Paradoxically," however, this would mean that elites 
would have to strive for something in the common European weal that 
runs counter to their own interest in maintaining power. For, in the long 
run, the scope for action at the national level would become narrower 
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and the importance of the appearances of national potentates on the 
political stage would diminish.195
In other words, the broader political awareness Habermas holds to be essential for 
overcoming post-democracy depends upon elites voluntarily divesting themselves of 
political power.  Rather, when looking to the recent Brexit and the broader 196
Eurosceptic movement, it seems much more likely that enough elites will continue to 
exploit feelings of antipathy toward the EU for their own political and economic 
advantage, shunning the greater prospect of a genuinely European democracy.
In contrast with Crouch, Rorty, and Habermas, Ranciere's distinct 
understanding of democracy as a disruption of sovereign power, rather than its 
popular appropriation, leads him to describe post-democracy, not as something to be 
overcome, but as a set of conditions to be consistently challenged. The state exists, 
Ranciere argues, to prevent the possibility of genuine (i.e., democratic) politics; the 
goal, then, is to be open to emerging instances of political action. 
We will not claim, as the 'restorers' do, that politics 'simply' has to find 
its own principle again to get back its vitality. Politics, in its specificity, is 
rare. It is always local and occasional. Its actual eclipse is perfectly real 
and no political science exists that could map its future... How some 
new politics could break the circle of cheerful consensuality and denial 
of humanity is scarcely foreseeable or decidable right now.197
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Erik Swyngedouw further builds upon Ranciere's work to offer a series of 
prescriptions oriented toward facilitating this sort of political disruption, what he calls 
"[t]raversing elite fantasies," which 
requires the intellectual and political courage to imagine the collective 
production of space, the inauguration of new political trajectories of 
living life in common, and, most importantly, the courage to choose, to 
take sides, to declare fidelity to the egalibertarian practices already 
pre-figured in some of the evental place-moments that mark 
contemporary insurgencies.198
Lest we subscribe to the "end of history" thesis, these disruptions are inevitable and, 
hence, will allow some means of contesting post-democracy. Still, to employ Sheldon 
Wolin's phrasing, they are inherently fugitive, leaving us, for the most part, 
persistently stuck within the confines of post-democracy.  Even Ranciere himself 199
seems skeptical, ending Disagreements by observing that "there are good reasons 
for thinking that [a new politics of the subject] will not be able to get around the 
overblown promises of identity... or the hyperbole that summons thought to a more 
original globalization or to a more radical experience of the inhumanity of the 
human."  In other words, that it is just as likely that radical, disruptive political 200
action will continue to be overdetermined by a logic of group essentialism that 
frustrates the production of new, possibly emancipatory claims to universality. As 
such, the best ordinary citizens can hope for are brief moments of contestation that 
seem to exhaust themselves in their expression; otherwise, post-democracy will very 
much continue to remain the order of the day.
 Swyngedouw, "Interrogating," 378.198
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The invitation to treat post-democracy as an opportunity to re-discover or 
invent new forms of democratic participation probably strikes many of us as deeply 
compelling, perhaps even obligatory. Some might further consider the decision to 
disregard this invitation as cowardly, repugnant, or even unforgivable. Yet, it is 
difficult to ignore just how chimerical the possibility of productively — much less 
successfully — contesting post-democracy appears. Even those who have taken up 
the charge do so with such an air of pessimism that it makes their prescriptions 
come off as desperate, if not exclusively intended to ward off a growing sense of 
despondency. At present, it is unclear what, if anything, ordinary citizens can do to 
impede the post-democratic exercise of sovereign power. 
What the experience of post-democracy requires, then, is a shift in focus, a 
move away from the set of questions grounded in a democratic orientation, those 
pertaining to political judgment (i.e., what a society should do politically), and toward 
questions concerning one’s own political subjectivity (i.e., what should one’s 
relationship to political authority and activity should be). In particular, it invites us to 
wonder how one might best endure post-democratic rule, which may be the only 
form of sovereignty one ever knows. In this sense, its guiding aim would be 
therapeutic. In the next chapter, I will explore what it would mean to embrace a 
therapeutic approach to political philosophy and why such an approach is uniquely 
appropriate to post-democracy.
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IV. Post-Democratic Political Philosophy
As discussed in Chapter Three, maintaining a democratic orientation toward post-
democracy requires underestimating (or in some cases, ignoring) the very real 
obstacles to democratic political practice it presents. Subsequently, not only does 
such an approach end up yielding often self-consciously impracticable political 
prescriptions, it further encourages individuals to ignore the ways in which post-
democratic conditions trouble the model of political subjectivity assumed by 
democratic thought. No longer a participant in sovereign decision-making, the post-
democratic subject remains in need of a new way of conceptualizing her relationship 
to political authority and activity; in short, a political logic better able to inform her 
interpretations of political legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and culpability.
Yet, it is paramount that this approach does not fall back into a democratic 
orientation; specifically, by assuming that the motivation for re-imagining one’s 
political subjectivity should be, either once again or for the first time, to eventually 
exercise political influence. Rather, one must choose to think through post-
democracy on its own terms in order, not to evade it, but to reconcile oneself with it. 
As such, the post-democratic approach to political philosophy primarily seeks to 
elaborate a 'guide for the governed', an account of political activity and authority 
relevant for Aristotle's mechanic, the nominal citizen who lacks political standing.  201
This is not in hopes of legitimating post-democratic sovereignty or producing more 
obedient subjects, which would seem to be more relevant to the art of governing 
than the condition of being governed, but of better understanding the post-
Aristotle, Politics (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998), 1277b-1278a.201
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democratic experience, clarifying one's feelings toward it, and responding in such a 
way that mitigates the frustration, anxiety, and alienation that accompanies the 
awareness of a non-democratic political existence. In short, to find a way to live with 
it. 
In this chapter, I will defend a uniquely post-democratic interpretation of 
political philosophy, one which foregrounds its ability to help the bewildered 
democratic subject better recognize and work through the confusions and 
complications engendered by the politico-cultural contradictions of post-democratic 
life. In this sense, the practice of political philosophy assumes an essentially 
therapeutic character. After first exploring why post-democracy invites such an 
interpretation, I will elaborate on what I mean by a therapeutic approach to political 
philosophy: an approach which prioritizes the well-being of the ruled over the 
concerns unique to ruling. I will conclude by contrasting the post-democratic 
interpretation of political philosophy developed here with another recent response to 
“second-class citizenship,” Jeffrey Green’s Epicurean defense of extrapoliticism.  202
Ultimately, by showing how Green’s democratic orientation limits the value of his 
prescriptions, I will elucidate why therapeutically engaging with post-democracy 
requires adopting a post-democratic model of subjectivity (presented in chapter five) 
as one’s own. 
FEAR AND LOATHING UNDER POST-DEMOCRACY
 See Jeffrey Green, The Shadow of Unfairness: A Plebeian Theory of Liberal 202
Democracy (New York: Oxford UP, 2016), ch. 5. 
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To be a democratic citizen is to think as a political actor, to think of oneself as able to 
actively and intentionally influence sovereign decision-making. Thus, politics is not 
simply a question of how one is governed, but of how one governs oneself, of how a 
given community, a “we,” exercises its collective autonomy. As Joanna Cook et al. 
point out, this
by necessity makes the way in which that sovereignty is realized — 
and thus the subject's relationship to others and to 'the political' — 
stand out as an explicit object of reflection and anxiety. This is further 
compounded by democracy's promise that the subject has the capacity 
to change the political, should she wish. 'What am I for the political?' 
and 'What is the political for me?' are thus questions that continually 
recur for the inhabitant of a democratic system, unlike those living in 
more feudal or patrimonial systems, where, although such reflection is 
of course possible, the particular forms of political subjectivity involved 
deflect sustained reflection away from the constructed notions of the 
political.203
Thus, the democratic citizen, in addition to adopting a particular disposition toward 
politics, is predisposed to think of herself as inherently political, to consider her 
political status existentially significant. Her relationship to politics, in other words, is 
not something superfluous or tangential to her sense of self, but constitutive of it.
Of course, not all self-understood democratic citizens feel as deep an 
attachment to politics; it is not difficult to find those who profess to cherish 
democratic practice, yet fail to give actual political activity a second thought. We 
might call these individuals Humean citizens.  David Hume, the 18th century 204
 Joanna Cook, Nicholas J. Long, and Henrietta Moore, "Introduction: When 203
Democracy 'Goes Wrong'," The State We're In: Reflecting on Democracy's Troubles 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 7-8.
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philosopher, famously critiqued the early modern social contract tradition on the 
basis that citizens do not base their attachment to the state on any actual or ongoing 
contract between them, but on the ways of life to which they are habituated.  “Time 205
and custom give authority to all forms of government, and all successions of 
princes,” he argues, “and that power, which at first was founded only on injustice and 
violence, become in time legal and obligatory.”  For the Humean citizen, the 206
absence of democratic political practice proves to be insignificant because what’s 
salient is not the ability to exercise political influence, but the societal practices to 
which she is accustomed. Her relationship to political authority and activity is not 
predicated on a particular political self-understanding, but on a cultural one. Hence, 
rather than ruminate on the consequences of post-democratic sovereignty, she 
would find “no maxim… more conformable, both to prudence and morals, than to 
submit quietly to the government which we find established in the country where we 
happen to live…”.207
While we can certainly imagine the Humean citizen responding indifferently to 
post-democracy, doing so would still require either an ironic disposition toward 
politics or an extreme level of compartmentalization. On the one hand, she could 
continue to embrace the democratic imaginary with which she’s familiar, doing so 
with full knowledge that it remains radically counter to her political reality. Yet, in a 
 David Hume, “Of the source of allegiance,” A Treatise of Human Nature in 205
Political Writings (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 51-59.
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 108
context that puts such a pervasive emphasis on political identity, this sort of 
detachment can make one appear insincere, if not disingenuous. For instance, it 
would require only discussing politics disingenuously or, if voting, to only do so 
sarcastically. The post-democratic subject is so regularly treated as if she were a 
democratic citizen that it would make any sort of consistent, ironic response into a 
kind of endless satire at the expense of those around her. On the other hand, she 
could just try to ignore it and go on, as best as she can, pretending that she lives in a 
democracy. Still, the success of such a response would depend on both her capacity 
for self-deception and the extent to which her political preferences are shared with 
those in power (thus able to sustain the fantasy of her own political empowerment). 
Rather, I contend that a democratic political imaginary is so tied to post-
democratic life as to make it impossible to disentangle the real exercise of political 
power from social custom. In other words, post-democratic subjects are habituated 
to thinking of themselves as influencing sovereign decision-making, even if they’ve 
never actually done so. In fact, it is precisely this ubiquitous “call to politics” that 
makes the prospect of post-democracy so traumatic. It consistently reminds the 
individual that the failure to realize popular sovereignty and political equality is, 
rather than something to be nonchalantly sloughed off, precisely that: a failure. 
Moreover, it is not merely a societal failing, but her own. As a democratic citizen, she 
should be able to exercise political influence, to prevent the corruption of democratic 
practice, or, at the very least, to right the ship when corruption becomes evident. Yet, 
the open persistence of a non-democratic status quo highlights her inability to do so, 
revealing her general political negligibility. The myriad of ways in which she 
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continues to be addressed as a democratic citizen, invited to take responsibility for 
conditions and decisions she’s unable to affect, only exacerbates her feelings of 
defeat and disappointment. She is, in short, reminded daily of her powerlessness. 
How, then, should we imagine the initial experience of post-democratic 
subjectivity, of internalizing democracy’s absence while enveloped in a culture that 
tirelessly evokes and celebrates its presence? Despite such experiences being 
inherently unique, conditioned by other politically-relevant factors (e.g., gender, race, 
class, sexuality, etc.) that may, often unpredictably, soften or intensify one’s 
response to post-democracy, we can identify three broad consequences of adopting 
a post-democratic orientation: frustration, anxiety, and alienation. 
Habituated to thinking of herself as a democratic citizen, we should expect the 
post-democratic subject to become frustrated over her inability to influence political 
outcomes or, subsequently, to realize democratic ideals. The consistent discursive 
emphasis on democratic values and the availability of mechanisms that should, 
ostensibly, allow for their realization (e.g., free elections, free speech, right to 
organize, etc.) only serve to compound these feelings, impeding the subject’s ability 
to ‘move on’ from the mirage of democratic possibility. While unpleasant in itself, the 
greater consequences of this frustration, however, will inevitably depend on the way 
she conceptualizes its roots. If she blames the state, capitalism, the wealthy, or 
another external, empowered institution or group, real or imagined, for rendering her 
politically insignificant, this has the potential to breed deep feelings of institutional 
distrust or resentment, perhaps even the sense that she is being persecuted. If she 
instead (or additionally) finds fault with her fellow citizens, holding their ignorance or 
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apathy responsible for their collective failure, this may lead to a more general feeling 
of antipathy toward her society, even her neighbors. Additionally, she may direct her 
blame inward, at her own inability to effect political change, and become 
disappointed in, if not ashamed of, herself.
While the post-democratic subject experiences frustration over her failure to 
be a political actor, she further suffers anxiety over what appears to be an uncertain 
future,  one in which she lacks any influence over sovereign decision-making. 
Though the democratic citizen may become anxious over a particular political 
decision or election, it remains tempered by the sense that they continue to have a 
‘seat at the table’; as such, the demos always has the ability to intervene before (or, 
at the very least, once) the state does anything truly terrible. Yet, under post-
democracy, that assumption is no longer tenable. Rather, it requires the post-
democratic subject to confront the fact that the state is not beholden to her at all, 
either as an individual or a member of the demos. While there are still some checks 
on state power (e.g., elite influence, ‘the bureaucracy’, etc.), these checks are still 
radically divorced from her, acting in their own interest; at best, all she can hope for 
is that their interests overlap. All of this contributes to a deep-seated disquiet 
concerning sovereign power. And while post-democratic sovereignty hardly 
guarantees that something horrible will happen, it does leave the individual with the 
impression that she would be unable to prevent it, leading her to feel distressed, 
insecure, and trapped.
Ultimately, this combination of frustration and anxiety contributes to the sense 
that one is alienated, not only from political activity, but from one’s fellow citizens as 
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well. On face, the recognition that one lacks political influence distances the post-
democratic subject from both sovereign power and the various institutions connected 
to it. No longer able to see them as an extension of her will or, at the very least, 
subject to it, she may come to see the power held by those institutions as arbitrary 
and illegitimate, estranging her from the forces that structure and condition her daily 
existence. Furthermore, a post-democratic orientation can separate her from her 
neighbors as well. On one level, she can no longer imagine a connection with others 
based on their shared participation in political activity; they have ceased to be ‘fellow 
citizens’. On another, living amongst a population seemingly blind to their own 
political status, continuing to revel in the fantasy of democratic practice, can leave 
her feeling even more isolated. The consistent talk of democratic participation and 
civic responsibility, whether in public discourse or private conversation, has the 
potential to disaffect her further, turning her into a sort of Cassandra figure 
surrounded by blithe Trojans (except, of course, that the post-democratic subject’s 
claim is not prophetic, but manifest). All of this serves to isolate the self-aware post-
democratic subject, leaving her both politically and epistemically alone.
None of this paints a post-democratic orientation in a particularly flattering 
light. Excluding those instances in which a post-democratic regime explicitly 
threatens individual liberty or shows contempt for expertise, it would be much easier 
to approach post-democracy from a liberal or technocratic perspective, indifferent to 
the absence of democratic practice. This indifference, however, may be harder to 
cultivate than one realizes. In addition to growing up in a culture that ubiquitously 
celebrates democratic values, many self-aware post-democratic subjects continue to 
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embrace democratic principles, despite being pessimistic about their realization. In 
short, one does not simply give up on democracy. Thus, while one must decide to 
adopt a post-democratic orientation, the democratic sympathies underlying that 
decision are not always a matter of choice. Whether the post-democratic subject 
chooses to engage with her feelings of frustration, anxiety, and alienation directly, by 
throwing herself into democratic activism, or by trying her best not to think about it, 
these feelings will continue to affect her until she works through them. Thus, what 
the post-democratic subject needs is therapy.
PHILOSOPHY AS THERAPY
The idea of philosophy as a form of therapy is at least as old as Socrates, who 
interpreted the aim of philosophy as making "your first and chief concern... the 
highest welfare of your souls.”  Following Socrates, it has been associated with 208
figures as diverse as the Stoics, Augustine, Boethius, Montaigne, Rousseau, 
Emerson, Thoreau, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Cavell.  209
Broadly speaking, what distinguishes this loose assemblage of thinkers as a 
philosophical tradition is the way they consider both 'the philosophical problem' as a 
source of deep, often existential worry and, subsequently, the practice of philosophy 
 Plato, “Apology” Four Texts on Socrates (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1998), 30a-b.208
 See Michael Ure, Nietzsche's Therapy: self cultivation in the middle works 209
(Lanhham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008); Robert E. Sanchez and Robert D. 
Stolorow, "Psyches Therapeia: Therapeutic dimensions in Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein" Comparative and Continental Philosophy 5.1 (2013): 67-80; Alice 
Crary and Rupert Read, The New Wittgenstein (New York: Routledge, 2000); & 
Andrew Norris, Becoming Who We Are (New York: Oxford UP, 2017).
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as a means of responding to that worry, specifically by addressing its conditions of 
possibility.  
For the most part, people philosophize because they love or enjoy the 
practice, not because the problem at hand distresses them to the point they feel as if 
they need to. For instance, the majority of people who purposely read Descartes do 
so out of an interest in epistemology or early modern thought, not because they're 
experiencing a crisis brought on by a deep concern with the nature of reality. Though 
there are certainly exceptions, even (or perhaps especially) those who practice 
philosophy for a living are more consistently motivated by a general passion for 
reading, writing, and teaching the subject rather than an anxious fixation on a 
particular problem or set of problems. 
Still, there are instances in which one turns to philosophy out of a sort of 
desperation, a feeling that the world has become unfamiliar or unstable in a way that 
makes it difficult to continue on as one previously had. These are moments when an 
individual undergoes a profound realization that disrupts her prior ideas about both 
the world and her relationship to it, leaving her bewildered, unsettled, and unsure of 
how to respond. Socrates experiences this upon receiving Chaerephon's news that 
the Oracle of Delphi proclaimed no one wiser than he; Boethius, upon becoming 
aware of his impending execution; Kierkegaard, upon recognizing the irreconcilability 
of modern life with Christian virtue; Nietzsche, upon realizing the greater implications 
of the loss of God; and Emerson, by the feelings of grief and detachment following 
the death of his son. Without some sort of resolution, these problems can estrange 
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one from the world one inhabits, often leading to feelings of disquiet, dread, even the 
wholesale rejection of the world, i.e., nihilism.
A therapeutic approach to philosophy, then, aims to alleviate such feelings by 
restoring a sense of familiarity with the world; specifically, by finding a way to 
successfully process the philosophical problem in a way that enables the individual 
to move beyond it. This involves adopting a new framework that facilitates a 
successful reconciliation with the world in a way that one's problems come to be 
seen as less vexing or arresting, or even ill-considered, as if they had just not been 
judged in the right light. James Peterman, writing on Wittgenstein's own form of 
philosophical therapy, describes this as "bringing about a proper attitude toward the 
world" or "being in agreement with the world.”  As Wittgenstein himself explains,210
the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely 
disappear. The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off 
philosophizing when I want to. — The one that gives philosophy peace, 
so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in 
question.211
Thus, the aim of philosophical therapy is not to solve the problem, at least in the 
sense that one solves a math problem or a crossword puzzle, but to dissolve the 
problem, to make the problem no longer appear problematic; analogously, to no 
longer consider the crossword puzzle worth doing.
 James Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy (Albany, NY: State University of New 210
York Press, 1992), xiii, 29.
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Malden, MA: Blackwell 211
Publishing, 2009), §133.
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We see this in Cavell’s response to the problem of other minds, of whether 
one can ever truly know another to be like oneself. Through a philosophical 
engagement that allows him to see it as an issue, not of epistemic certainty, but of 
attunement, of withholding oneself, Cavell's interpretation of the problem radically 
shifts. He writes, “But all this makes it seem that the philosophical problem of 
knowledge is something I impose on these matters; that I am the philosophical 
problem. I am. It is in me that the circuit of communication is cut; I am the stone on 
which the wheel breaks.”  This allows Cavell to show that “it is we who have fallen 212
away from the world and the other. And we have done so by trying to force them to 
come to us, by making the world and the others as such objects of knowledge. The 
truth of skepticism is that of our self-alienation, not of our ignorance.”  Still in 213
dissolving the problem of other minds, Cavell recognizes the challenge of collectively 
realizing a shared community, but this problem, unlike that of philosophical 
skepticism, admits of a solution; for Cavell, it is our willingness to be responsive to 
one another (the post-democrat, who, in contrast with Cavell, has come to accept 
that the “eventual human community” will be either politically irrelevant or, in his 
words, “nowhere,” must look for another).214
Further, it is essential to recognize that the therapeutic value resulting from 
philosophical practice comes not from any new framework per se, but the process 
one takes to practically internalize that framework. In Freudian psychoanalysis, this 
 Stanley Cavell, The Claim to Reason (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 83.212
 Andrew Norris, Becoming Who We Are (New York: Oxford UP, 2017), 84.213
 Stanley Cavell, This New, yet Unapproachable America (Chicago: The University 214
of Chicago Press, 2013), 74, 108. 
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process   is called working-through, “the process by which a person transforms a 
relatively theoretical insight into their unconscious motivations into a practical 
understanding of how they permeate aspects of their lives.”  Much in the same 215
way one cannot simply decide to no longer feel anxious, this new, salutary 
understanding must be learned through exploring both the conceptual and practical 
consequences engendered by this paradigm shift and adapting one's life 
accordingly. As Peterman emphasizes, "It means living that truth, being at home in it. 
So to solve philosophical problems requires that one live those solutions. It requires 
not simply being aware of the truth but also changing one's life. In this context it 
requires a deep and difficult alteration in one's mode of thinking and expressing 
oneself."  Thus, one suffering an existential crisis cannot simply pick up a copy of 216
Being and Time, read it cover to cover, and expect to feel better. Rather, one must 
work to actively embrace new perspectives on mortality, affectivity, and worldliness 
that further lead to practical changes in one's life, often in ways that one could not 
have previously expected. In order to reconcile himself with the pronouncement of 
the Oracle, Socrates becomes the 'gadfly' that attempts to wake the city of Athens; in 
responding to the absence of God in modern life, Kierkegaard attempts to become a 
new kind of Christian subject, whereas Nietzsche tries to exorcise the idea of God 
completely.
In this sense, philosophical practice, like any other sort of therapy, 
necessitates some degree of active self-transformation. What is first considered 
 Jonathan Lear, Freud (New York: Routledge, 2005), 258.215
 Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy, 28.216
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merely in the abstract must be made concrete through a willingness to modify one's 
life in light of what one now perceives as true, good, or right. Thus, it is best to 
understand a therapeutic approach to philosophy as an ethical project, one which 
seeks to realize a human good — the well-being of the individual — through the 
cultivation of a new ethos better suited to the world in which one finds oneself. 
Ideally, the philosophical text functions as a guide for recognizing the problematic 
assumptions one may have about the world, as well as offering a means of 
developing a new framework with which to replace them. Still, this is much easier 
said than done. Even in making a serious effort to philosophically reorient oneself, 
one may not always be successful, but instead be unable to find a way of being "in 
agreement the world" while also being agreeable to oneself. Like all other forms of 
therapy, there are no guarantees that one's problems will be resolved or even 
abated.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS THERAPY
How, then, should we conceptualize a therapeutic approach to political philosophy? 
James Glass, in his account of Rousseau, suggests that "the doing of therapy for the 
political philosopher means to think of the therapeutic task as a political event, to 
assume that the 'sickness' of psyche lies intimately involved with the general 
degeneration of the culture itself.”  As with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s turn 217
to schizoanalysis, Glass’s account calls for a politicization of psychoanalysis in order 
 James Glass, "Political Philosophy as Therapy: Rousseau and the Pre-Social 217
Origins of Consciousness" Political Theory 4.2 (1976): 163-84, 181. See also 
Marshall Berman, "Liberal and Totalitarian Therapies in Rousseau: A Response to 
James M. Glass" Political Theory 4.2 (1976): 185-94.
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to transform psychoanalytic therapy itself into a form of political activity.  In 218
contrast, Gertrude Steuernagel, interprets the therapeutic approach as an invitation 
to integrate certain psychological insights into our normative accounts of politics. 
Writing on Marcuse and Jung, she observes 
To conceive of political philosophy as therapy means to be alive to the 
complex and often intricate demands of internal and external reality. It 
means being willing to fit the type of political recommendations to the 
reality we are confronted with rather than trying to impose a series of 
principles on a community or group of individuals.219
In other words, it is to attune one’s sense of political judgment with the nature of the 
human psyche, to psychologize political activity. 
Despite their differences, both Glass and Steuernagel subordinate the 
therapeutic task to the question of politics; therapy either becomes a means of 
ameliorating a corrupt society or instrumental for developing better prescriptions for 
doing so. In prioritizing the question of politics over 'the welfare of one's soul', Glass 
and Steuernagel's interpretations thus break with the greater tradition of philosophy 
as therapy. The issue is no longer that one is unfamiliar with the world and must find 
a new way of reconciling oneself with it, but instead that one is familiar with an evil or 
broken world and must find a way to change it. The goal then becomes cultivating 
the best disposition for bringing about a new or different kind of world; in short, to 
exercise political influence. While there is nothing wrong in principle with Glass and 
 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (Minneapolis, MN: University 218
of Minnesota Press, 1983) and A Thousand Plateaus (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987).
 Gertrude Steuernagel, Political Philosophy as Therapy: Marcuse Reconsidered 219
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 11-12.
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Steuernagel's conception of political therapy, it ultimately holds little appeal for the 
post-democratic subject, who is neither able to play the role of the politically-
motivated analyst or realize psychologically-informed political prescriptions. 
What is required, then, is a means of engaging in political therapy, a way of 
finding agreement with a political context out of joint with one's previous 
assumptions and expectations. There is some precedent for this sort of approach, 
found largely among the Romans. During the collapse of the Republic, a large swath 
of the ruling class similarly had to grapple with the unanticipated experience of 
political inconsequentiality, particularly during the more brutal periods of the Empire. 
As a result, Ciceroian appeals to save the Republic soon gave way to other, more 
self-reflexive responses to life under despotism. For instance, Seneca's De Otio 
defends resigning from political life if one either lives in an unjust commonwealth or 
simply has more important tasks, such as philosophy, to which to attend.  Tacitus’s 220
Agricola, detailing the life of his father-in-law, offers an account of how best to serve 
a violent, tyrannical Emperor without either getting oneself killed or compromising 
one's integrity.  Epictetus’s cosmopolitan model of citizenship, wherein one trains 221
oneself to ignore the authority of the citadel by focusing on one's greater relationship 
to the cosmos, attracted a widespread following throughout the empire.222
 Seneca, “On the Private Life” Moral and Political Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 220
UP, 1995), 165-180. 
 Tacitus, Agricola and Germany (New York: Oxford UP, 2009).221
 Epictetus, The Discourses of Epictetus (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1995), 222
especially § 24 & § 235.
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Michel Foucault famously describes the Romans as collectively responding to 
“a crisis of the subject, or rather crisis of subjectivation… a difficulty in the manner in 
which the individual could form himself as the ethical subject of his actions, and 
efforts to find in devotion to self that which could enable him to submit to rules and 
give a purpose to his existence.”  No longer able to assume the Senatorial powers 223
(or other positions of political influence) held by their fathers and grandfathers, they 
had to re-calibrate their political self-conceptions; however, because the Empire 
remained such a fundamental part of their lives, simple withdrawal was not a realistic 
option. Rather, one had to “elaborat[e] an ethics that enabled one to constitute 
oneself as an ethical subject with respect to these social, civic, and political 
activities, in the different forms they might take and at whatever distance one 
remained from them.”  Thus, even if, like Seneca, one ultimately decides upon 224
withdrawal, it must be a principled or reasoned withdrawal, one which responds to 
the prevailing assumption that one should always participate in political activity, 
despite its hazards. By providing some measure of direction and virtue in otherwise 
uncertain and/or wicked times, this sort of philosophically-guided self-reflection 
allowed individuals to, as the title alludes, care for themselves.
More recently, Jonathan Lear’s Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural 
Devastation gives us an exemplary account of this approach to political philosophy. 
In it, he describes how Plenty Coups, a chief of the Crow Nation, reimagines the 
practice of counting coup and, by extension, the warrior way of life native to the 
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self (New York: 223
Random House, 1986), 95.
 Foucault, Care of the Self, 94. 224
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Crow, in light of the United States Federal Government’s ban on intertribal warfare. 
Following the ban, as well as the extermination of the buffalo, the Crow lost the 
ability to engage in the activities essential to their identity as Crow. Consequently, 
nothing seemed to make sense or matter anymore; as Plenty Coups describes it, 
“After that, nothing happened.”   Taking the Crow’s perspective, Lear writes, 225
My problem is not simply that my way of life has come to an end. I no 
longer have concepts with which to understand myself or the world… I 
have no idea what is going on. This is not primarily a psychological 
problem. The concepts with which I would otherwise have understood 
myself — indeed, the concepts with which I would otherwise have 
shaped my identity — have gone out of existence.226
In other words, the Crow’s form of life became unintelligible, leaving them both 
disoriented and hopeless. 
In response, Plenty Coups provided a narrative, one which recounted a 
dream of a receptive Chickadee, that “gave the tribe imaginative tools with which to 
endure a conceptual onslaught.”  Despite having no idea what the future would 227
bring, the Crow resolved to adapt to whatever changes they would be forced to 
endure, to become who they needed to become in order to survive, even if that 
meant diluting or altering their traditions. As such, “they explicitly recognized in an 
official council that their buffalo-hunting way of life was coming to an end, and they 
decided to ally with the white man against their traditional enemies.”  Lear credits 228
 Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation 225
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006), 2.
 Lear, Radical Hope, 48-49.226
 Lear, Radical Hope, 78-79.227
 Lear, Radical Hope, 73.228
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decisions like these with ultimately leading to better outcomes than those 
experienced by other tribes less willing to accept their catastrophic predicament (i.e., 
the Sioux under Sitting Bull). 
Through his efforts, Plenty Coups embraced what Lear describes as a vision 
of radical hope. Broadly, radical hope is 
committed to the bare idea that something good will emerge. But it 
does so in recognition that one’s thick understandings of the good life 
are about to disappear. It thereby manifests a commitment to the idea 
that the goodness of the world transcends one’s limited and vulnerable 
attempts to understand it… Precisely because Plenty Coups sees that 
a traditional way of life is coming to an end, he is in a position to 
embrace a peculiar form of hopefulness. It is basically a hope for 
revival: for coming back to life in a form that is not yet intelligible.229
By accepting that the Crow’s way of life was no longer tenable, Plenty Coups gave 
the Crow people a way of moving forward. At that point, it was still unclear what that 
way forward would be, what Crow life would look like under profoundly different 
conditions, but, by encouraging the tribe to be receptive to a future that still admitted 
of some good,  he opened up the possibility for a future worth having. For Plenty 
Coups, this possibility depended upon a willingness to be receptive to an emergent 
good; specifically, by attuning oneself to a present that appears both strange and 
undesirable. While this sort of instrumental optimism hardly guarantees that one will 
find a better life, it can help to avoid a life marred by bewilderment and despair. 
 Lear, Radical Hope, 94-95.229
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THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO POST-DEMOCRATIC LIFE
In order to respond to the “crisis of subjectivation” besetting the post-democratic 
subject, a philosophical intervention into post-democratic life must be motivated by a 
similar appreciation of radical hope. Clearly, the devastation suffered by the Crow 
people differs dramatically from the loss experienced by the post-democratic subject; 
for instance, post-democratic subjects are not threatened with genocide. Yet, like the 
Crow, post-democratic subjects find themselves weathering a “conceptual 
onslaught” of their own, one in which democratic conceptions of the good are 
becoming increasingly irrelevant to their contemporary political experience. As such, 
they must find a way to reconcile themselves with a political context that — while 
both uncertain and unwelcome — they have few options but to endure. To do so, it 
becomes necessary to cultivate a new form of political subjectivity that not only 
acknowledges the brute fact of post-democracy, but facilitates a therapeutic 
engagement with it. In short, a political self-conception oriented toward working 
through the frustration, anxiety, and alienation inherent in post-democratic life.
Over the last decade, no one has made more productive strides in this 
direction than Jeffrey Green. Though not explicitly engaged with the concept of 
“post-democracy,” Green explores and addresses contemporary conditions of 
political inequality in a way that brilliantly illuminates the greater consequences of 
these conditions for non-elites. While his earlier work, The Eyes of The People, 
develops a theory of ocular democracy appropriate for a citizenry largely reduced to 
the role of spectator, his most recent work, The Shadow of Unfairness, gives us a 
broader account of plebeian democracy, one which describes the ubiquitous 
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experience of “second-class citizenship.”  In particular, Green attends to its more 230
affective repercussions, emphasizing how, “Given the scarcity of political offices and 
the lack of meaningful forms of active engagement, most citizens find themselves 
politically unheralded — a condition which, especially in liberal democracies with 
their official doctrines of equal political influence for the similarly talented and 
motivated, is likely to be, for many at least, a source of anxiety.”  This anxiety, in 231
combination with the indignation and reasonable envy felt toward the wealthy elites 
who govern, ultimately contributes to discontent; as Green writes, “there can be no 
expectation of an ordinary citizen’s political existence being a happy one.”  232
Thus, Green stresses the need for “ordinary, second-class citizens to find 
solace in the face of the shadow of unfairness”; specifically by, at times, adopting a 
“critical indifference toward active and engaged political life.”  In other words, 233
individuals shouldn’t feel obligated to always participate in politics and should feel 
comfortable occasionally taking a break. He grounds this indifference on 
an ancient, though largely forgotten, democratic tradition which 
associates the egalitarian mindset with the tendency to periodically not 
to care about politics — both in the sense of criticizing political life as 
disrespectful of human equality and, even more, in the sense of 
celebrating certain practices that draw on political ideals even as these 
are deployed in a non-political direction.234
 See Jeffrey Green, The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of 230
Spectatorship (New York: Oxford UP, 2010) and Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 
Ch. 2.
 Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 135.231
 Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 130.232
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This tradition, for Green, finds its fullest expression in the work of Epicurus, who 
taught “that in general a happy life is best secured outside of politics.”  This is in 235
part due to the distress generated by political activity itself, but also because 
egalitarian political principles are best realized in the activities and friendships found 
outside of formal political activity.  In other words, at least for the ordinary citizen, a 236
truly political life is lived outside of politics, by routinely treating others as equals. 
Hence, Green’s position is not apolitical or antipolitical, but extrapolitical, a way, not 
of avoiding or preventing politics, but of transcending them.237
As Green makes clear, however, this indifference is not intended to be 
permanent, “but only to prevent the discontent likely to characterize their [ordinary 
citizens’] political lives from extending beyond politics and unduly undermining their 
overall capacity for well-being and peace of mind.”  Because, an extrapolitical life 238
is meant to be lived in tandem with a political one, not replace it, the relief Green 
provides appears oriented towards, not second-class citizens, but political elites.  239
This is further demonstrated by the examples Green employs: those involving 
Achilles, Otanes (a Persian statesman), and Plato’s prototypical democratic.  240
Despite facing setbacks, all are regularly able to exercise a considerable degree of 
 Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 134.235
 Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 147.236
 Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 131.237
 Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 11.238
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 Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 150-161.240
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political influence. As Green consistently (and rightly) emphasizes, the vast majority 
of ordinary citizens are not simply disadvantaged, but politically irrelevant; thus, it 
remains unclear why they would need a way of momentarily transcending politics 
rather than a way of grappling with a perpetual exclusion from it. As such, Green’s 
account, while exemplary in its willingness to reckon with the greater implications of 
political inequality, does not provide an adequate response to a life of persistent 
political powerlessness.   
One could break with Green and imagine ordinary citizens finding some 
solace by fully committing to an extrapolitical life — a private life that seeks to realize 
political values (e.g., equality) through one’s personal relationships, actions, and 
habits — and adopting a lasting “critical indifference” toward political life properly 
understood. Yet, by subtly equating extrapolitical power with sovereign power, this 
would only encourage one to maintain the fantasy of a democratic political existence 
(by locating it outside of sovereign decision-making) and avoid actively confronting 
the real conditions of political powerlessness they face. Given the alternatives, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that Green ends his book by inviting the reader to have a drink, 
to “follow Horace when he embraces wine as something ‘to bestow fresh hopes, and 
powerful to wash away the bitterness of care’…”.  Given the state of things, we 241
may need more than one. 
Unless ordinary citizens are to simply anesthetize themselves, post-
democracy requires initiating a conversation about political insignificance in a way 
that moves beyond treating it simply as a disadvantage or drawback and instead 
 Green, The Shadow of Unfairness, 164.241
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recognizes it as the defining feature of one’s political existence. To this end, there is 
no thinker more helpful than Thomas Hobbes. While far from the only philosopher to 
discuss political powerlessness, Hobbes stands alone in his willingness to inhabit it 
fully, not in order to critique it as something inferior to a properly political life, but to 
sketch a robust, edifying account of an alienated political existence on its own terms. 
In the next chapter, I will develop a Hobbesian-inspired model of political subjectivity 
intended to help the post-democratic subject work through the frustration, anxiety, 
and alienation associated with post-democratic life; in short, a therapeutic reading of 
Hobbes intended for a post-democratic audience.
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V. Post-Democratic Political Subjectivity
In this chapter, I will articulate a distinctly Hobbesian approach to post-democracy, 
one intended to help individuals begin to alleviate the frustration, anxiety, and 
alienation that stems from post-democratic life. Specifically, by offering a somewhat 
unorthodox reading of Hobbesian servitude, I will develop a model of post-
democratic political subjectivity that can provide a foundation for grappling with and, 
ideally, working through an awareness of one’s own political powerlessness. After 
first illustrating how post-democracy constitutes a species of political domination, I 
will introduce Hobbes’s account of servitude by way of contrasting it with his account 
of subjecthood. In doing so, I will show how the Hobbesian subject’s self-
understanding encourages an unfounded optimism toward sovereignty — one which 
mirrors the democratic citizen’s own — while the servant’s better prepares 
individuals for an explicit and, hence, productive engagement with the more 
distressing consequences of post-democratic sovereignty. I will then explore how the 
servant’s perspective can inform a post-democratic political logic that addresses 
questions of legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and culpability. I will end by 
stressing the need for a practical realization of one’s post-democratic identity as part 
of the therapeutic process, one which I will further elaborate in Chapter Six.
POST-DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DOMINATION
What does it mean to be dominated? Drawing upon both Max Weber and William 
Connolly, Philip Pettit explains that "One agent dominates another if and only if they 
have a certain power over that other, in particular power of interference on an 
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arbitrary basis."  In order to suggest that the post-democratic subject should 242
consider herself dominated by the state, it is necessary to show that the state 
constitutes an agent with the power to interfere with her on an arbitrary basis. To be 
an agent, Pettit explains, the entity must be able to act intentionally; agents of 
domination "cannot just be a system or network or whatever," but must either "be a 
personal or corporate or collective agent."  Understanding the state as a series of 243
interrelated institutions, it clearly has the potential to function as both a corporate 
and collective agent with the capability to dominate others. A post-democratic 
orientation further allows us to interpret the state as  beholden to various elite 
interests, even if they are, at times, in conflict with one another. 
While the state's capacity to interfere with its citizens is self-evident, the idea 
that it acts on an arbitrary basis when doing so demands further demonstration. As 
Pettit explains,
What is required for non-arbitrary state power... is that the power be 
exercised in a way that tracks, not the power-holder's personal welfare 
or world-view, but rather the welfare and world-view of the public. The 
acts of interference perpetrated by the state must be triggered by the 
shared interests of those affected under an interpretation of what those 
interests require that is shared, at least at the procedural level, by 
those affected.244
In other words, a sovereign power acts arbitrarily when it ignores the collective 
needs and beliefs of those it governs. It could be argued that, even when political 
power is largely a matter of elite competition, elected officials, by design, must 
 Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford UP, 2010), 52.242
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appeal to the interests and opinions of their constituencies, and thus necessarily 
track "the welfare and world-view of the public." 
Yet, this assumes, first, that these elected officials are responsive to the 
actual concerns of their constituencies, as opposed to engaging in fear-mongering; 
second, that the interests or ideas championed are not "sectional or factional in 
character," or worse, simply intended to exploit their constituency's divisiveness over 
minor issues; and, third, that these interests and ideas eventually play a role in 
influencing sovereign decision-making instead of merely remaining empty rhetoric.  245
Under post-democratic conditions, it is not at all clear that these assumptions can be 
made. Furthermore, if one is committed to a genuinely democratic political logic, it is 
not enough for sovereign power to instrumentally track the public's interests for the 
purposes of re-election; rather, the state must act as an extension of an active 
public. Otherwise, it would be disingenuous to characterize sovereign decision-
making as being triggered by a shared interpretation of what those interests require 
(i.e., consideration through a democratic practice), instead of simply a series of 
periodic opportunities for elite competition.    
Yet, Pettit does emphasize that the question of political domination, though a 
matter of interpretation, is not "essentially value-laden."  Rather, 246
the identification of a certain sort of state action as arbitrary and 
dominating is an essentially political matter; it is not something on 
which theorists can decide in the calmness of their studies... what has 
to be established is whether people really are dominated, not whether 
domination is visible from within some privileged evaluative standpoint. 
As the facts of the matter, including facts about local culture and 
 Pettit, Republicanism, 56.245
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context, determine whether a certain act counts as interference, so the 
facts of the matter determine whether a certain act of interference 
counts as arbitrary.247
Thus, the question of domination cannot be decided from a third-person perspective, 
but only by those actually experiencing the interference in question. 
This consideration is further troubled by the observation, expounded upon in 
chapter two, that most individuals living under post-democratic conditions either do 
not recognize their political practices as insufficiently democratic or, if they do, 
maintain the belief that such malfunctions are only temporary or irregular. Obviously, 
if an individual believes that the state is democratic enough, then even if she is 
demonstrably misinformed or uninterested in an accurate characterization of her 
relationship with sovereignty, she will not experience post-democratic sovereignty as 
a form of domination, much in the same way those who refuse to accept the idea 
that smoking is dangerous will not experience the act of smoking as a form of self-
harm. Yet, to the extent that the democratic values of popular sovereignty and 
political equality are considered important -- as they tend to be in political contexts 
enamored with democratic discourse -- and the individual cares enough to 
investigate whether these values are being realized through political practice, post-
democratic sovereignty would certainly appear as a form of domination. Even if, 
through embracing democratic realism, one were to assume that all of the value 
placed on popular sovereignty and political equality is 'just talk', granting a measure 
of cognitive dissonance that would allow most to feel as if they were not dominated, 
 Pettit, Republicanism, 56-7.247
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such an arrangement would still constitute an experience of domination for the 
democratic 'true believers'. 
Still, it is important to note that just because post-democratic sovereignty acts 
arbitrarily does not mean it will not occasionally or even regularly act in a manner 
consistent with one's interests. In other words, the fact that one is dominated hardly 
means that one will find fault with the way in which sovereign power interferes in 
their lives; one may even find greater fault in the state's unwillingness to interfere 
further (e.g., by not passing laws to prevent other, non-governmental forms of 
domination). As such, unless one is singularly concerned with democratic political 
possibility, domination does not necessary lead to dissatisfaction, only to the de 
facto inability to influence how one is governed. What remains essential for a post-
democratic orientation is that the alignment of one's personal preferences with elite 
interests is seen as neither causal nor correlative, but coincidental, making it both 
contingent and unpredictable.248
To all but the most committed authoritarians, it would be odd not to find post-
democratic domination, at the very least, undesirable. Still, just as one does not deal 
with an illness by ignoring it, an aversion to domination should not keep the post-
democratic subject from considering how it structures her relationship with 
sovereignty. In order, then, to develop a more robust picture of post-democratic 
sovereignty, it is essential to turn to the foremost modern theorist of political 
domination: Thomas Hobbes
 While, in the absence of democratic political procedures, it is clear why the 248
relationship is not causal, the conditions are under which public opinion is measured, 
both in the way polls can manipulate issue salience and one's recorded opinion on 
an issue, make any claims concerning correlation highly suspect.
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HOBBESIAN INROADS INTO POST-DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Despite the fact that he describes sovereignty as an absolute right to dominion, 
some may have reservations with treating Hobbes as a theorist of domination, in 
particular because Hobbes's account of subjecthood breaks decisively with Pettit's 
emphasis on arbitrary interference.  As even the most casual readers of Hobbes 249
are aware, subjects come together to form a covenant to authorize the sovereign's 
absolute power "for their peace and common defence."  This follows from 250
Hobbes's argument that sovereign power is only effective when it is both 
overwhelming and unrestricted, able to make use of all of the commonwealth's 
resources, including its inhabitants, as it sees fit; anything less would inhibit the 
sovereign's ability to protect individuals against a violent, untimely death, 
undermining the ostensible purpose of the commonwealth in the first place. To the 
extent that the sovereign intentionally and exclusively pursues this aim, sovereign 
authority would not be experienced as a form of domination, but rather as a kind of 
mediated autonomy in which the sovereign non-arbitrarily tracks the "welfare and 
world-view" of those governed by ensuring their safety and security. For this reason, 
the Hobbesian subject constitutes a less-than-perfect model for post-democratic 
political subjectivity. 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XVI.4249
 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.XVII, 109.250
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Yet, readers of Hobbes are often quick to forget that he offers not one, but two 
distinct models of political subjectivity.  Across his three major works of systematic 251
political thought (The Elements of the Law, On the Citizen, and Leviathan), Hobbes 
consistently differentiates between the subject and the servant. While the former 
democratically institutes an artificial commonwealth with other subjects, forming a 
covenant "of every man with every man," the servant joins the natural 
commonwealth when conquered by another, submitting in order that the servant may 
"avoid the present stroke of death... that so long as his life and the liberty of his body 
is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure."  While 252
scholars are typically quick to privilege the former, anyone with a basic awareness of 
world history would be well aware that most states are founded on the basis of 
violence, not universal consent. As Hume explains, 
Were you to preach, in most parts of the world, that political 
connexions are found altogether on voluntary consent or a mutual 
promise, the magistrate would soon imprison you, as seditious, for 
loosening the ties of obedience; if your friends did not before shut you 
up as delirious, for advancing such absurdities... Almost all the 
governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any 
record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or 
conquest, or both, without any pretense of a fair consent or voluntary 
subjection of people.253
 Technically, one could make the case that he actually offers three models of 251
political subjectivity, but it is questionable as to whether the "child" is inherently 
political or, rather, a private form of dominion. 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XVII.13, XX.10252
 David Hume, "Of the Original Contract" in Political Writings (Indianapolis, IN: 253
Hackett Publishing, 1994), 167-8.
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By describing the commonwealth born of violence as "natural," Hobbes can 
reasonably be interpreted as having a similar view. Thus, despite the often exclusive 
attention given to the subject, Hobbes's readership seems to be primarily made up of 
servants. 
Moreover, Hobbes's account of servitude offers a model of political 
subjectivity that more readily fits with Pettit's understanding of domination as a form 
of arbitrary interference. Though the servant covenants with the sovereign as well, 
technically authorizing all future exercises of sovereign power, the conditions under 
which she does so so radically distinguish her from the subject as to illuminate the 
flimsy, if not wholly imaginary, connection between sovereign authority and the 
servant's "welfare and world-view." Because she covenants only to avoid the 
immediate threat of death or imprisonment, the sovereign's authority rests, not on 
the servant's ongoing interest in security (as it does for the subject), but her desire to 
avoid the loss of her life or freedom in one particular instance. Future sovereign 
decisions, which may have nothing at all to do with the servant's well-being (much 
less world-view), would only be seen as non-arbitrary because the servant, at one 
time, had no other choice but to submit. Unless we're similarly willing to recognize 
the rightful authority of the kidnapper or other violent criminals, it is difficult to classify 
servitude as anything other than domination. 
Furthermore, in equating the servant and subject in terms of political status, 
Hobbes illuminates the extent to which the subject's awareness of her domination is 
a function of belief rather than actual sovereign decision-making; in short, it is not a 
matter of how the sovereign interferes, but of the way in which the non-sovereign 
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individual interprets that interference. If, for instance, the subject no longer 
recognizes the sovereign's actions as being in the service of her safety and security, 
then the subject, regardless of the covenant made, would experience the sovereign's 
authority as a form of domination. As David Gauthier points out, "If we regard the 
subject similarly [to the servant]... then Hobbes's account begins to assume a 
totalitarian dimension... Indeed he invites the rejoinder, urged strongly by Locke, that 
the sovereign is the enemy of the subjects, and an enemy given the strength to 
overpower and destroy them by their own act in creating him."  What, then, 254
ultimately distinguishes subject from servant is the former's faith that this simply is 
not the case, while the latter never had any reason to imagine that it would be 
otherwise.
These competing interpretations of sovereign authority thus lead the servant 
and subject to develop two distinct dispositions toward political authority and activity. 
In a nutshell, though the Hobbesian subject's participation in the founding allows her 
to imagine herself as the author of her own domination, treating the commonwealth 
as an instrument in the service of her self-preservation, the servant operates under 
no such illusions. Having been forcibly incorporated into the commonwealth, the 
servant is unable to recognize her domination as either an extension of her will or 
necessarily being in her best interest, except, of course, her immediate interest in 
avoiding death or imprisonment. This leads the servant to adopt a set of inferences 
 David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1969), 116-7. 254
Gauthier later goes on to argue that, for this very reason, Hobbes made a mistake in 
politically equating the two. Yet, it could just as easily be that the theory of 
authorization Gauthier wants to ascribe to Hobbes is just a distraction from Hobbes's 
deeper point concerning the domination inherent in political life.
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that are fundamentally distinct from those held by the Hobbesian subject; in 
particular, while the latter holds that the individual's relationship to sovereignty is 
intentional, shared, mediated by community, and guaranteed by consent, the former 
considers it accidental, solitary, unmediated, and guaranteed by violence. As such, 
while the Hobbesian subject exhibits a fundamentally hopeful disposition vis-a-vis 
political activity and authority, the Hobbesian servant's disposition is primarily 
informed by an underlying fear of sovereign power. Insofar as Hobbes emphasizes 
that "the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both 
[commonwealths]," this should lead us to be weary of embracing the subject's 
hopeful disposition when unable to share her faith concerning the sovereign's 
intentions.255
In this sense, the relationship between the Hobbesian servant and subject 
mirrors the contrast between the self-understood democratic citizen and post-
democratic subject under post-democratic conditions. Whereas the democratic 
citizen maintains the belief that political practices continue to satisfy or, at least, 
approximate democratic criteria, the post-democratic subject recognizes her inability 
to realize either popular sovereignty or political equality. As such, Hobbes's account 
of servitude not only provides a model of political subjectivity better able to inform an 
understanding of post-democratic political life, but further illustrates the way it 
productively departs from an overly stubborn democratic orientation toward politics. 
In other words, their shared awareness of domination gives the post-democratic 
subject good reason to discard the fantasy of a sovereign power either responsive to 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XX.3255
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her preferences or invested in her wellbeing, instead favoring a sober confrontation 
with the bleak realities of post-democratic life. After further developing this claim by 
diving deeper into dispositional implications of each of Hobbes's models of political 
subjectivity, this chapter will conclude by showing the way in which an account of 
Hobbesian servitude can inform a distinctly post-democratic approach to questions 
of legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and culpability.
  
COMPETING DISPOSITIONS TOWARD SOVEREIGNTY
How, then, does the servant's political self-understanding lead to a different 
disposition toward sovereign power from that of the subject? What first distinguishes 
the servant from the subject is the degree to which they each consciously decide to 
join the commonwealth. For the subject or, rather, subject-to-be, the formation of the 
commonwealth follows from her realization that a life well lived is impossible under 
an indefinite state of war, which only offers the "continual fear and danger of violent 
death" and an existence famously described as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short."  In order to escape these miserable conditions, she gathers her neighbors 256
and convinces them that their only hope for security lies in their willingness to 
collectively give up their natural rights and agree to submit to a single sovereign 
power, who "may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think 
expedient, for their peace and common defence."  The artificial commonwealth 257
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XIII.9256
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XVII.13257
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thus appears as a novel, self-generated solution to the threats posed by an anarchic 
world.
For the servant, however, the natural commonwealth results, not from a 
conscious effort on her part, but from her abduction by another. After being taken 
prisoner, her captor offers to spare her life and allow her to keep her corporeal liberty 
on the condition that she recognizes the captor's absolute authority over her, 
explicitly promising to obey all commands and "not to run away, nor do violence" to 
her newfound master.  If she refuses, her captor may either kill or imprison her, 258
reducing her, in Hobbes's technical sense of the term, to a slave.  Thus, whereas 259
the subject's choice to join the commonwealth is intentional, the servant's is 
accidental, contingent upon both her capture and the subsequent opportunity given 
to remain both free and alive. As such, the natural commonwealth presents itself, not 
as the resolution of a perennial problem, but as the best possible outcome following 
a series of unfortunate events.  260
Overall, this contributes to quite a different perspective on the servant's 
relationship to sovereignty. In not being the product of her design, but something 
forced upon her, the commonwealth will always be alien to her; though she belongs 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XX.10258
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XX.12259
 One could argue, as Jean Hampton does, that regardless of how one joins the 260
commonwealth, it ultimately represents an improvement over continuing to live 
under a state of war. Yet, it is hardly a given that the servant's violent subjugation will 
appear as such to her, who may have failed to find fault in her anarchic context or, 
even if she did not, preferred it to life under a sovereign power. See Jean Hampton, 
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988), 172.
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to it, the commonwealth is not hers. As a result, she remains acutely aware that her 
contribution to the commonwealth is inessential, that its existence is distinct from her 
own. Additionally, the servant is consistently reminded that, had she only evaded 
capture, her situation could have been different. For the Hobbesian subject, there is 
always the possibility that she could have decided to remain under a state of war, 
but the fact that she actively chose to form the artificial commonwealth would seem 
to paint the outcome as a logical, if not an inevitable one. The natural 
commonwealth, rather, takes the form of an aberration, a product, not of ingenuity or 
destiny, but of a misstep. In light of these considerations, the servant considers the 
sovereign neither necessary nor as an extension of herself, but as an extrinsic, 
inescapable burden that she has no choice but to obey.
The servant's experience of domination is further differentiated from that of 
the Hobbesian subject in that it is solitary, depriving her of a greater political 
community. While the subject, who forms a multilateral covenant with all other 
subjects, hardly maintains the sort of political friendships celebrated in Aristotle and 
Cicero, the covenants made with her neighbors not only facilitated the past exercise 
of political influence, specifically in naming the sovereign, but serve as a persistent 
reminder that the covenanters are both collectively responsible for the 
commonwealth and directly responsible to one another. They are, politically 
speaking, in it together. As such, the subject can look to other subjects and 
recognize a shared commitment, one which not only binds them in a way distinct 
from the relationship they may share as friends or even fellow human beings, but 
also one to which they can appeal when holding one another accountable for both 
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maintaining the commonwealth and obeying sovereign commands. For instance, the 
subject should feel justified in requiring her fellow subjects to enlist in military service 
or to chastise them for breaking the law; their failure to do so constitutes, not the 
violation of an abstract obligation to the state, but a disregard for the explicit 
agreement made with their fellow subjects. Even when the commonwealth is 
dissolving, there must be a collective recognition of the sovereign’s failure to protect 
them.
The servant, however, never makes a pact with other servants. Upon capture, 
she covenants exclusively with the sovereign, leaving her politically isolated. This is 
not to say, of course, that the servant remains completely alone; we would fully 
expect her to interact socially, economically, etc. with others. Yet, in neither being 
preceded by nor aspiring to the exercise of influence over sovereign decision-
making, these relationships would be inherently apolitical. In contrast to the 
covenant the subject shares with his fellow subjects, the servant can only look to 
other servants as having made a commitment similar to her own. They are not 
responsible to each other, but only to the sovereign, and subsequently they can 
distinguish between crimes against the commonwealth and crimes against one 
another. In other words, the servant's decision to cheat on her taxes or avoid military 
service is not necessarily anyone else's concern; another servant may still call upon 
the sovereign to dispense justice, but this follows from that servant's allegiance to 
the commonwealth, not any direct claim the servant has against the initial offender. 
All of this makes it unclear whether servants can even properly be described as 
being united rather than merely lumped together. Their parallel experiences might 
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lead to a greater affinity for one another, a sort of 'imagined community' in Benedict 
Anderson's sense, but without the immediate political relationships to one another 
that distinguish the artificial commonwealth, all servants share politically is their 
obedience to a common sovereign.261
In addition to depriving her of a greater political community, the servant's 
direct covenant with the sovereign renders their relationship unmediated. This again 
stands in contrast with the subject who, at least initially, does not engage with the 
sovereign at all;  she only comes to recognize sovereign power through the 
covenant she makes with her fellow subjects, which mediates her relationship to 
sovereignty as a whole. As a result, the artificial commonwealth takes on the 
appearance, not of sovereign power, but of the political community that instituted it. 
Nowhere is this more evident than the frontispiece which adorns the 1651 edition of 
Leviathan, which famously depicts the sovereign as constituted by "the multitude so 
united."  This metaphor both reflects and helps cultivate the sense that the 262
commonwealth is, at its core, the unity of its members, encouraging the subject to 
recognize it as an extension of a collective will shared with her neighbors. By 
overlaying this image of a constitutive community of subjects over the absolute 
authority exercised by sovereign power, the artificial commonwealth is able to more 
easily facilitate the subject's identification with it. 
The natural commonwealth, however, fails to take on the identity of a greater 
political community precisely because, for the servant, that community never 
 See Benedict Anderson, The Imagined Community (London: Verso, 1991).261
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existed. Instead, the servant's solitary, violent subjugation leads her to interpret the 
commonwealth as an expression, not of a collective desire for peace and security, 
but of sovereign might. Without the image of a political community to mediate her 
relationship with sovereignty, the state appears simply as the state apparatus, the 
sovereign institutions that govern her (e.g., the police, military, administrative 
bureaucracies, etc.). As such, the sovereign is less able to masquerade as an 
extension of the community which, at least on the subject's account, it is intended to 
serve, allowing the servant to more easily distinguish the actions and interests of 
sovereign power from her own. Just as the accidental quality of her relationship to 
sovereignty encourages the servant to see it as something alien, the inability to 
substitute a representation of one's community for the commonwealth itself further 
cements the idea that it is something distinct from not only herself, but her neighbors 
as well. As such, the constitutive relationship suggested by Leviathan's frontispiece 
would, at best, seem confusing. Rather, from the servant's perspective, the more 
likely interpretation would not be that sovereign power originates from the 
commonwealth's inhabitants, but that the sovereign, like the giant Polyphemus that 
terrorized Odysseus and his crew, has merely consumed them. In this sense, the 
sovereign would appear much closer to the monstrous sea creature from which 
Hobbes takes the name 'Leviathan' in the first place.
Finally, the servant accepts that her relationship with sovereignty is both 
founded and sustained principally by the sovereign's threat of and capacity for 
violence. The subject, while recognizing this aspect of sovereignty as well, does so 
to a lesser degree, instead framing her experience of domination as one to which 
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she has deliberately consented. Some may still wish to take the hardline Hobbesian 
position and argue that, because both commonwealths are founded, in the last 
instance, upon covenants, the natural commonwealth is just as much grounded 
upon consent as the artificial commonwealth. Yet, such a position would fail to 
recognize how the contextual differences between the two would color the 
covenants made. Having actively willed the artificial commonwealth into existence, 
the subject can treat the possibility of sovereign violence as a distant one, perhaps 
imperative for holding others to their word, but ultimately unnecessary for 
guaranteeing her obedience. Moreover, without any prior exposure to sovereign 
violence, the subject may be able to remain comfortably unaware that it could ever 
actually be used against her. Like the pollyannaish individual shocked by the state's 
indiscriminate or unwarranted use of force, the thought may never have even 
occurred to her. 
The servant has no such luxury. Sovereign violence is not tangential to her 
relationship to the commonwealth, but a precondition for it, making it difficult to ever 
disassociate the two. The natural commonwealth, in other words, can never shake 
the connotation made explicit by its other title: the commonwealth by acquisition.  263
As such, the sovereign no longer appears as an entrusted guardian, but, much like 
the mafioso offering 'protection', as both paradoxically the greatest threat to the 
servant's well-being and the only means of her self-preservation. This, in turn, 
renders the servant's consent a secondary consideration, itself derived from her 
initial experience of 'being acquired', leaving the act of consent, not a signal of her 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XVII.15263
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investment in the commonwealth, but solely an expedient way of avoiding further 
imprisonment or death. Thus, for the servant, the fact that she has consented hardly 
seems to matter; what primarily shapes her perception of the commonwealth is the 
persistent, underlying possibility of enduring sovereign violence once more. 
DEMOCRATIC HOPE AND POST-DEMOCRATIC FEAR 
Though their contrasting experiences would lead us to assume that the Hobbesian 
subject and servant would have radically different dispositions toward sovereignty, 
Hobbes, by the time he writes Leviathan, attempts to show that the two are actually 
more similar than we would otherwise expect. Despite all of their differences, he 
argues, they are both motivated by fear. Of the natural commonwealth, he writes,
this kind of dominion or sovereignty differeth from sovereignty by 
institution only in this, that men who choose their sovereign do so for 
fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute; but in this case 
they subject themselves to him they are afraid of. In both cases, they 
do it for fear...264
Leo Strauss offers an explanation as to why Hobbes may have been so invested in 
joining these seemingly disparate experiences together. Specifically, he interprets 
this move as Hobbes's as a part of his effort to "more systematically" reconcile "the 
involuntary as well as voluntary nature of subjection" for the purposes of silencing 
his democratic critics, who would inevitably favor the artificial commonwealth.  In 265
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XX.2264
 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis 265
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 67. Notable, in The Elements of the 
Law, Hobbes explicitly associates the artificial commonwealth with a democratic 
foundation; see Part II, Chap. 2, Sec. 1. 
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order "to show that democracy can do nothing better than transform itself into an 
absolute monarchy... he sought a common motive for the founding of the artificial as 
well as of the natural State," one which he found "in the fear of violent death, which 
had originally, as it seems, connected only with the natural State."  In short, if both 266
commonwealths are the products of fear, there's no reason to prefer a democratic 
founding to a coercive one.
However, this exclusive emphasis on fear represents a substantive break with 
his earlier characterization of the two commonwealths. Previously, Strauss explains, 
his openness toward democratic ideas led him to more definitely distinguish between 
the two, maintaining that "the motive which leads to the natural State is fear..." while 
"the motive that leads to the artificial State is hope or trust."  This distinction is 267
most apparent in his first systematic work of political philosophy, The Elements of the 
Law, where he explains that, 
he that subjecteth himself uncompelled, thinketh there is good reason 
he should be better used, than he that doth it upon compulsion; and 
coming in freely, calleth himself, though in subjection, a FREEMAN; 
whereby it appeareth that liberty is not any exemption from subjection 
and obedience to the sovereign power, but a state of better hope than 
theirs, that have been subjected by force or conquest.268
 Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 66.266
 Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 64.267
 Hobbes, The Elements of the Law, Part II, Chap. 4, Sec. 9. In De Cive, he also 268
argues that subjects "perform more honourable services within the commonwealth... 
and enjoy more luxuries," but his distinction here seems to reflect differences in 
economic rather than political status. See De Cive, Chap. 9, Sec. 9.
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Such a description, at odds with Hobbes's later account, seems much more in line 
with what we would expect from the subject and servant's respective entries into the 
commonwealth. Though the subject's decision to found the artificial commonwealth 
does rest upon her fear of others, the commonwealth itself represents a beacon of 
hope, a chance to extinguish that fear by placing one's faith in a sovereign power 
capable of guaranteeing her protection. The servant may have similar fears, but the 
natural commonwealth appears, not as means of overcoming them, but as their 
realization; it is, short of a violent death, the servant's worst nightmare come to 
fruition. As such, there seems to be good reason to consider the particular fears 
which motivate each party qualitatively distinct, to separate the subject's hypothetical 
fear of a third party from the servant's extant fear of sovereign power itself and, 
siding with the early Hobbes, distinguish between the two on the basis of hope and 
fear.   
Moreover, this dispositive distinction proves crucial for demonstrating how a 
post-democratic orientation departs from its democratic counterpart. Overall, the 
Hobbesian subject exemplifies how a democratic perspective can fundamentally 
mystify the experience of domination by encouraging the subject to see herself as its 
author and, subsequently, think of sovereign power as acting in her best interest, 
even without the ability to exercise any real influence over sovereign decision-
making. Transfixed by an initial democratic moment (i.e., the founding), the subject 
clings to the idea that she still somehow has some latent or tenuous control over her 
situation, giving her reason to be hopeful. She sees the state as an extension of 
herself, representative of a greater political community to which she belongs and 
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owing its very existence to her willingness to acknowledge its authority. In this 
sense, the democratic narrative that distinguishes her from the servant leaves the 
subject convinced that, despite all evidence to the contrary, the commonwealth is 
beholden to her, as if her experience of domination is a mere formality necessary to 
satisfy the logic of sovereignty but in now way reflective of the facts on the ground. 
The servant, like the self-aware post-democratic subject, knows better.  269
Based upon her particular understanding of her relationship to sovereign power, she 
is able to recognize that the Hobbesian subject's hope, like that of the self-
understood democratic citizen living under post-democratic conditions, lacks any 
and all foundation. Whether natural or artificial, the commonwealth is in no way 
obligated to the non-sovereign individual; though the sovereign may have a vested 
interest in her protection, both the level and character of this protection is decided 
exclusively by the sovereign.  As such, the subject and servant's shared 270
experience of domination neither has any substantive connection to their consent -- 
deliberate or otherwise -- nor any necessary relation to their preferences, whether 
understood more broadly (i.e., as they pertain to policy) or solely in terms of their 
 This, of course, raises the question as why I do not refer to the post-democratic 269
subject and a post-democratic servant. While perhaps more accurate, to use the 
term servant before introducing Hobbes’s account would have unnecessarily 
muddled up a discussion of an already intricate concept.
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XVIII.6-8. One may object here that the sovereign’s decision 270
to spare the servant’s life actually implies a direct contract between the two of them, 
one which requires the sovereign to protect the servant as long as the servant 
obeys. While I personally read Hobbes differently, if the sovereign did take on certain 
obligations when covenanting with the servant, it is questionable how the servant 
would ever enforce them. The sovereign’s failure to satisfy those obligations might 
then give the servant the right to revolt, but what good is a right without the capacity 
to effectively exercise it?
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personal security. Rather, it is simply a function of their inability to contest it. As it 
turns out, the essential difference between the two models of political subjectivity is 
not, as Hobbes himself makes clear, that the subject has real reason to hope; 
instead, it is that the subject confidently builds her own cage, while the servant finds 
one ready-made. 
Thus, the early Hobbes gives us insight into not only how the subject and 
servant differ in terms of their political dispositions, but also why the subject's 
hopeful self-conception ultimately contributes to an illusory understanding of her 
relationship with sovereignty, one which attempts to veil her domination with a thin 
cloak of self-determination. It is precisely for this reason that the post-democratic 
subject must take pains to break with a democratic model of political subjectivity. The 
democratic citizen, like the Hobbesian subject, is predisposed to think about her 
relationship to sovereignty in light of her active role in creating it; while the 
Hobbesian subject focuses exclusively on her participation in the founding, the 
democratic citizen sees herself as consistently exercising influence over sovereign 
decision-making through both formal and informal means. Under post-democratic 
conditions, however, this is a mistake. What Hobbes's account of the subject shows 
is that, even when an individual is explicitly aware of being dominated, the belief that 
she has an active role to play can muddle this awareness to the point that the 
individual becomes unable to draw the appropriate conclusions from it. In short, that 
the self-understood democratic citizen's token participation overshadows her real, 
non-democratic subjugation. 
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In order, therefore, to avoid the trappings of a democratic mythos, however 
subtle, the post-democratic subject should try to think like a Hobbesian servant. 
Specifically, this involves avoiding the impulse to imagine one's membership in the 
commonwealth as either deliberate or intentional, one's relationship to other citizens 
as politically-relevant, or sovereign power as either representative of or indebted to 
the greater community in which one lives. Rather, it means internalizing the 
realization that one has only an accidental, solitary relationship with a sovereign 
power both alien and violent. Above all else, it is to recognize that one has no real 
say over one's own domination by a sovereign power, consistently troubling any 
hope one might have had over its exercise.  This is not to imply that one must 271
always be afraid, ceaselessly anxious over the state's capacity for violence (though 
some historical targets of state violence have good reason to be), but that the state 
should always be feared as one would fear any other sort of unpredictable 
externality — such as a foreign occupation, a natural disaster, a plague, or divine 
intervention — able to severely disrupt or prematurely end one's life.
A POST-DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL LOGIC
Beyond generally contributing to a pessimistic outlook on sovereign power, what are 
the greater implications of recognizing the experience of domination as central for 
post-democratic political subjectivity? Insofar as it provides an instructive model of 
 This is not at all to suggest that sovereign power cannot have a positive impact 271
on the life of the post-democratic subject, only that this impact is so divorced from 
democratic practice as to make it unpredictable and wholly contingent; though it may 
be a cause for celebration, the realization of one's political preferences should not 
contribute to any sort of hope in post-democratic sovereignty itself.
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domination, how can an account of Hobbesian servitude help inform a post-
democratic approach to questions of legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and 
culpability? 
To begin with, the manner in which the servant consents to sovereign power 
leads us to believe that consent is more a matter of self-preservation than a 
judicious acknowledgment of the sovereign's legitimate authority; the servant agrees 
to recognize the sovereign as sovereign, not because of any of the sovereign's 
merits, but because the sovereign has a knife to her throat. Yet, for Hobbes, 
sovereign legitimacy depends exclusively on whether this consent has been 
obtained.  This leaves us with two options: to either consider the servant's consent 272
as inherently significant, despite the fact that it is given under duress, and thus 
preserve legitimacy's import, or to recognize the state's claim to legitimacy as 
essentially hollow, as demonstrating no more than the state's capacity to coerce. 
While Hobbes no doubt sought to convince us of the former by prioritizing his 
account of the subject's consent, which could, conceivably, ground the legitimacy of 
the sovereign, the fact that he ultimately equates the subject's consent with that of 
the servant should give us pause. Rather, his understanding of consent, at least in 
the servant's case, seems to paint legitimacy solely as indicative of the servant's 
desire to remain both free and alive.
Overall, the greater lesson seems to be that a more meaningful 
understanding of legitimacy (i.e., as an indicator of the sovereign's right to govern) 
has no place in a political context primarily defined by the experience of domination. 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XVIII.2, XX.11272
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In other words, legitimacy claims that appeal to something other than the state's 
overwhelming capacity for violence are politically inconsequential. This is not to say 
that such claims are, in themselves, insignificant or meaningless; the act of judging 
the state's legitimacy still allows the individual to clarify, at least to herself, what she 
considers to be important criteria for evaluating the state as well as how she feels 
about the state as a whole. Yet, whereas illegitimacy prompts the democratic citizen 
to engage in political activity, the post-democratic subject, aware of the severe 
limitations of her political agency, no longer treats the state's illegitimacy as an 
invitation to act. Unlike an authentically Hobbesian authoritarianism, a post-
democratic context still affords the individual opportunities to "act," prescribed means 
of involvement that fail to significantly influence sovereign decision-making, but the 
post-democratic subject, like the servant, still finds herself in a position where 
efficacious political participation is individually costly and statistically improbable. 
Thus, it does not seem to matter whether she finds the state legitimate or not; all that 
matters is whether the state is powerful enough to continue to ensure her 
domination. 
Moreover, the inability to hold sovereign power accountable to a higher 
standard of legitimacy troubles the idea that the post-democratic subject can expect 
anything from the state at all. For instance, we could imagine a post-democratic 
subject thinking, "though the state seems to be indefensibly illegitimate, at least I can 
count on the state to acknowledge my legal standing, maintain a growing economy, 
or protect me from a violent death." Yet, lacking in political agency, the post-
democratic subject is left without any sort of guarantee that the state will continue to 
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satisfy these sorts of expectations. At some point, either through threat of violence or 
loss of steam, the direct action considered democracy's failsafe will slow, and the 
formal mechanisms meant to correct the ship will only serve to circumscribe political 
possibility and confirm the post-democratic subject's sense of her own political 
impotence. The only reliable indicator of what can be expected depends upon the 
level of elite consensus the issue satisfies; how long any idea or policy can maintain 
that position remains an empirical question. At present (and thankfully), widespread 
legal personhood, economic growth, and peace seem to enjoy this status. Still, all 
the post-democratic subject can truly expect from the state -- whether directed by 
economic elites, populist demagogues, or a revolving door of factions all self-
identifying as the demos -- is that it will do all in its power to maintain its sovereignty. 
All else remains speculation.
Whereas the experience of domination diminishes the significance of 
legitimacy by rendering it moot, it effects a dramatic shift in the way in which the 
post-democratic subject conceptualizes her membership in the body politic. Under a 
democratic framework, membership is a question of participation; one is a member 
to the extent that one possesses the opportunity to influence sovereign decision-
making. A post-democratic framework, however, transforms the question of 
membership into one of subjugation; one is a member to the extent that one 
consents to being dominated.  Yet, in contrast with the Hobbesian subject, this 273
consent does not signal the post-democratic subject's active affirmation of the state. 
 For those able to wield political influence, however, membership would still be a 273
question of participation, not in a democratic process, but in the domination of 
others.
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Rather, like the servant, it reflects the conditions of domination she always-already 
endures, an artifact, not of her faith in sovereign power, but of her desire to avoid 
imprisonment or death. This would seem to imply that post-democratic membership 
is entirely a passive experience, simply involving one's submission to the state. At 
least politically, it does; but doing so then allows the post-democratic subject to more 
effectively navigate the complex socio-economic environment both fostered and 
contained by the exercise of sovereign power. 
According to Pettit, being dominated does not preclude the ability to make 
decisions; rather, all it highlights is the inability to contest the power of others to 
arbitrarily interfere with the decision-making process. As we tend to see in 
contemporary post-democratic political contexts, not all choices are determined for 
the non-sovereign individual in advance. If anything, the sort of economic policies 
that continue to sustain wealth disparities seem to depend on a form of domination 
far from total, instead allowing the post-democratic subject a wide range of choices. 
These would still be dominated choices, as elite preferences can still direct the state 
to interfere with them on an arbitrary basis, but they would be, at least in the 
immediate sense, un-coerced, hypothetically giving the individual the opportunity to 
act in her own interest.
As such, the post-democratic subject is not a slave (in Hobbes's sense of the 
term), bound in chains and unable to make any decisions for herself. Though she 
has no control over her political environment, she is still able to act within that 
environment, as well as exploit its particular features. The post-democratic subject 
can, in other words, still 'tend to her own garden', despite having to adhere to the 
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limits placed upon it (and her) by the state. For instance, Hobbes stresses that, 
though subjects and servants do not have an absolute right to property and must 
relinquish it when ordered to do so by the sovereign power, they can exercise 
property rights in relation to other non-sovereign individuals.  Similarly, the post-274
democratic subject, despite being dominated by the state, can still make use of 
aspects of her domination, not in a way that subverts or resists the overall 
domination she experiences, but in order to make the best of her situation.
Thus, while post-democratic membership might initially appear to solely be a 
cause for resignation, it also invites the post-democratic subject to embrace a purely 
instrumental understanding of her relationship with sovereignty. The state, in other 
words, rather than taking the form of a collective project, exists only as a tool 
wielded by those able to exercise political influence; for the post-democratic subject 
lacking such influence, the state constitutes a set of externally-imposed conditions. 
In contrast with some variants of liberalism, most notably Rawls's own, this 
instrumental approach to sovereignty relieves the post-democratic subject of the 
mistaken notion that the state constitutes a means by which she can realize her 
autonomy.  By purging herself of any sort of existential identification with the state, 275
the post-democratic subject remains better able to appreciate the state as something 
alien to her, consequently better preparing her to anticipate its fundamental 
unpredictability as well as lack of regard for either her preferences or well-being.
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XXIV.7; in his earlier work, The Elements of the Law, he 274
makes the point explicit for servants as well (Part II, Chap. 3, Sec. 4). 
 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1971), 275
513-520.
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Though unable to decide upon these conditions herself, the post-democratic 
subject can nevertheless attempt to utilize them in order to realize her own ends. 
This is not to suggest that the state will not, at times, frustrate the post-democratic 
subject's ability to decide upon personally significant private matters. Depending on 
the significance and repercussions of those foreclosed decisions, the state can 
certainly create situations that may prove unbearable. Still, the hope remains that 
other conditions will either serve to facilitate her ability to pursue her interests or will 
be exploitable enough, by means of a technicality or novel interpretation, to do so all 
the same. Of course, as these conditions will inevitably shift, the post-democratic 
subject must further be ready to consistently adapt herself accordingly. As such, the 
post-democratic subject finds herself playing a perpetual game of Frogger, 
ceaselessly dodging oncoming hazards while, in lieu of ever escaping them, 
searching for brief intervals of peace.  
 The post-democratic subject's responsibility to sovereign power follows from 
this logic of instrumentality. While a democratic political logic presupposes that the 
individual's responsibility stems from her status as a participant, a post-democratic 
logic recognizes a responsibility to the state solely on the basis of the individual's 
interest in preserving her life and freedom. In other words, she need only obey the 
law and/or serve the state (e.g., by enlisting in military service, reporting on the 
crimes of others, serving on a jury, etc.) to the extent that she considers doing 
necessary to either prevent the state's collapse or avoid running afoul of sovereign 
power. She may still decide to follow the law or engage in service out of certain 
ethical convictions, but, in such cases, she is only coincidentally satisfying any sort 
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of presumed political responsibility (e.g., she may refrain from murder, but not 
because she recognizes the state's authority to restrict her from doing so). 
As most readers are familiar, Hobbes endorses an extreme interpretation of 
this responsibility, arguing that almost any act of disobedience violates the 
individual's interest in maintaining her safety and security. Excluding those instances 
in which obeying the sovereign's command either explicitly involves self-harm or 
puts the individual in immediate danger (e.g., killing or maiming herself, confessing 
to a crime, engaging in military combat), any form of insubordination would seem to 
weaken the power of the sovereign, thereby troubling the sovereign's ability to 
provide for the individual's own peace and defense.  As such, the individual has an 276
overriding reason to obey even those commands that run counter to her other 
interests. 
Yet, this interpretation appears uniquely indebted to the Hobbesian subject's 
understanding of her relationship to sovereignty, making it questionable as to 
whether the servant and, by extension, the post-democratic subject should also 
understand themselves as having a similar degree of responsibility. Recall that, in 
covenanting with her fellow subjects to found the commonwealth, the subject sees 
the willingness, on the part of her neighbors and herself, to recognize the 
sovereign's authority as foundational for the exercise of sovereign power in general. 
Thus, the subject's disobedience not only challenges sovereign authority directly, but 
dissolves her contribution to the greater covenant deemed essential for sovereign 
authority in the first place. In this sense, it is not so much that the subject's 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, XXI.11-16.276
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disobedience could actually bring down the commonwealth, but that, in disobeying, 
the subject throws the basis of sovereign power into question in a way that may 
ultimately have nocuous effects. 
The servant's covenant, however, is hardly considered as essential for the 
commonwealth as a whole. Because the natural commonwealth is founded, not on a 
collective agreement, but on a multiplicity of bilateral covenants between the 
sovereign and individual servants, the dissolution of one or even a few of those 
covenants would not have nearly the same detrimental effects on sovereign power. 
In other words, whereas a neighbor's disobedience might have signaled to the 
Hobbesian subject that the covenant undergirding sovereign power was faltering, it 
suggests to the servant only that the neighbor has broken her particular covenant 
and, as such, would seem to have no effect on the sovereign's status from the 
servant's perspective. Moreover, the servant's understanding of sovereignty 
promotes the awareness that, while the covenant formalizes the sovereign's claim to 
authority, the real foundation of this claim is the sovereign's capacity for violence. 
Thus, disobedience, even when unpunished, does not pose nearly the same threat 
to sovereign power as a whole; only active instances of rebellion, in which private 
individuals attack the state directly, would challenge the servant's ability to rely on 
the sovereign for protection.
In drawing upon the model of the Hobbesian servant, the post-democratic 
subject inherits a more complicated interpretation of political responsibility than the 
Hobbesian subject. Rather than understanding herself as having a near-absolute 
duty to obey, she is responsible to sovereign power only to the extent that 
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disobedience would either invite some sort of violent or coercive reprisal or weaken 
the state to the point of ineffectiveness or collapse. Ultimately, the judgment as to the 
consequences of one's disobedience will be contextually dependent and 
probabilistic. Some crimes will go unnoticed; others will encourage the state to 
devote a substantial amount of time and resources to pursue and discipline the 
offender. Additionally, some individuals, by virtue of their class, race, gender, etc. will 
be in a better position to avoid punishment.  In contrast with a democratic political 277
logic, which, broadly speaking, only supports disobedience when it is construed as a 
form of political participation, non-violent, and used as a last resort, the post-
democratic subject has no such prima facie responsibility to first attempt to influence 
sovereign decision-making or refrain from violence; post-democratic domination puts 
the individual in a position where all she can do is distinguish between the laws she 
can follow and those she cannot and, taking into account the risks involved, act 
accordingly.
Finally, while democratic political participation implies a degree of culpability 
for the negative effects that may result from any given state policy or action, that the 
democratic citizen must shoulder, as Hans-Jorg Sigwart puts it, "one's part of the 
moral guilt that politics necessarily involves...", the post-democratic subject should 
consider herself relieved of any such guilt.  Lacking any influence over sovereign 278
power, she is neither in a position to contribute to political decision-making nor 
 This is hardly to suggest that these sorts of privileges should be celebrated, but 277
only to recognize the way in which they can and should factor into the post-
democratic subject's assessment of her ability to disregard sovereign command.
 Hans-Jorg Sigwart, "The Logic of Legitimacy: Ethics in Political Realism," The 278
Review of Politics 75: 407-432, 432.
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prevent the enactment of decisions already made; both her endorsements and 
condemnations are purely symbolic. As such, it is difficult to see how the post-
democratic subject could be held responsible for the unfortunate, tragic, or atrocious 
consequences, unintended or otherwise, often linked with political outcomes. This 
list includes "collateral damage" from military strikes, direct attacks on civilians, the 
barbarous treatment of the undocumented, discriminatory practices, mass 
incarceration, economic policies that exacerbate inequality, and environmental 
destruction. Like a passenger on a run-away train, the post-democratic subject has 
no ability to stop it from striking others, only the occasional, limited opportunity to 
warn those who may be in danger.
Hobbes, too, gives us good reason for disassociating the post-democratic 
subject from the moral implications of both sovereign decision-making and the act of 
obeying those decisions. To find fault with the non-sovereign individual in such 
instances would be to invite continuous political instability, brought on by regularly 
goading non-sovereign individual to challenge or resist the state based on their 
"private judgments" "of good and evil actions."  Subsequently, Hobbes not only 279
exempts non-sovereign individuals from any blame related to either the content of 
sovereign decisions or their repercussions, but absolves them from any guilt they 
may feel for actions they, personally, carry out in the sovereign's name. As Hobbes 
writes, "that whatsoever a subject... is compelled to [do] in obedience to his 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. XXIX, Sec. 6. See also Chap. XXIX, Sec. 7.279
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sovereign, and doth in it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his 
country, that action is not his, but his sovereign's..."  280
Yet, as Edwin Curley points out in his edition of Leviathan, what makes 
Hobbes's position here so striking is that it seems in conflict with Hobbes's more 
general position that the non-sovereign individual has always-already authorized all 
sovereign actions, including those he may privately find objectionable; in short, one 
cannot help but bear responsibility, not only when obeying sovereign commands, but 
for all of the sovereign's decisions.  This would then seem to imply a deep 281
reservoir of guilt traceable to that initial moment of consent. Still, the respective 
conditions distinguishing the Hobbesian subject's covenant from that of the servant 
are relevant here; in the subject's case, she could have avoided culpability by never 
covenanting with her neighbors in the first place; the servant only by embracing 
imprisonment or death. Though Hobbes appears somewhat inconsistent, if either's 
action warrants blame, the deliberate nature of the subject's covenant would seem 
more damning than the servant's decision to save her own skin. 
To the extent that the post-democratic subject similarly lacks any hand in the 
formation of sovereign power, but rather finds herself always-already dominated, 
leaving her with the option to either consent or suffer the consequences, it is difficult 
to saddle her with the sort of far-reaching liability more readily ascribed to the 
democratic citizen for choosing the former. This is not, however, to suggest that she 
has no choice but to look favorably upon all state policies and actions; only that she 
 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. XLII, Sec. 11.280
 Hobbes, Leviathan, 339 fn12.281
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need not consider them her own. For some, this sort of attitude may not sit well. The 
argument that post-democratic subjects should not feel guilty for decisions 
ostensibly made in their name challenges, not only the prevailing democratic 
tendency to stress the responsibility one has to govern (and, thus, govern well), but, 
moreover, the broader moral responsibilities one often feels toward others. Some 
may even go so far as to feel compelled to find fault with the servant's decision to 
consent in the first place, maintaining that right choice would be refusal, despite the 
consequences of doing so. Thus, especially among the many still harboring 
remnants of a democratic political logic, there will be those who feel uncomfortable 
— to say the least — with simply jettisoning the guilt they may feel over sovereign 
decisions that harm others or, further, the feeling that one has a duty to do 
something about it.
Yet, whether attempting to alleviate the guilt that stems from the poor 
decisions made in one’s name or the broader feelings of frustration, anxiety, and 
alienation characteristic of post-democratic life, abstractly theorizing one’s 
relationship to political authority and activity can only do so much. In addition to 
being thought, post-democracy must be lived. In other words, achieving any sort of 
lasting therapeutic benefit depends upon realizing one’s political subjectivity 
practically, going beyond treating one’s political self-conception as a mere thought 
experiment and using it to make sense of one’s lived experience. This requires 
critically interrogating and, if need be, addressing the narratives and concepts that 
frame one’s inevitable involvement in the superficially democratic political practices 
that pervade post-democratic life. In short, to continue to think of oneself post-
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democratically when most susceptible to understanding oneself otherwise: when 
expressing one’s preferences, voicing dissent, or discussing politics. In the next 
chapter, I will bring a post-democratic orientation to bear on these activities, which, 
despite being unable to influence sovereign decision-making, provide opportunities 
for both attuning oneself to the greater consequences of post-democratic 
sovereignty and discovering the unique (often intangible), applied insights that 




The insights gained through adopting a post-democratic political self-conception are 
only therapeutic to the extent that they are applied. This requires not only abstractly 
thinking of oneself as a post-democratic subject, but using this model of political 
subjectivity to make sense of one’s real, lived experience; particularly, one’s 
involvement in (pseudo-)political activities (e.g., voting, protest, deliberation, etc.), 
those related to, but ultimately insignificant for sovereign decision-making. Doing so 
enables the post-democratic subject to develop a more coherent understanding of 
her own political existence, one able to generate a sense of familiarity and, hence, 
provide some degree of relief under otherwise unsettling conditions. In this chapter, I 
will begin by briefly addressing two alternative approaches to (pseudo-)political 
activity under post-democracy before turning to my own, which takes such activities 
as opportunities to work through the frustration, anxiety, and alienation arising from 
post-democratic life. After first offering an account of an apocalyptic environmental 
group, the Dark Mountain Project, I will explore how their recent efforts can inform a 
post-democratic model of (pseudo-)political involvement. Finally, I will conclude by 
exploring the broader political implications of adopting a post-democratic self-
conception, ultimately characterizing it as a species of political realism oriented 
toward overcoming the prejudices of a democratic myopia.
THREE APPROACHES TO (PSEUDO-)POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Post-democratic sovereignty distinguishes itself from other forms of domination 
through its reliance on a democratic political imaginary, one which encourages 
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ordinary citizens to think of themselves as political actors despite their demonstrable 
lack of political influence. By consistently involving ordinary citizens in a myriad of 
negligible ways, all parties — elites, bureaucrats, and the governed — can behave 
as if the demos really speaks.
How, then, should the self-aware post-democratic subject react to this 
charade, to consistently being treated and addressed as if she really is a democratic 
citizen? One option would be to withdraw from (pseudo-)political life on principle, 
rejecting formal activities, like voting, as exploitative and/or patronizing and informal 
activities, like normatively discussing politics and expressing one’s political 
preferences, as pointless. This has the benefit of allowing one to distance oneself 
from political concerns, to ‘put them out of mind’ by ‘putting them out of sight’. 
Moreover, in doing so, one could find solace in the fact that one no longer 
contributes to the democratic imaginary that sustains post-democracy. If this refusal 
is recognized as it is intended, others may follow the example and withdraw as well, 
possibly even hastening the system’s transformation or collapse (though this seems, 
at present, highly unlikely).
Another option would be to compartmentalize the awareness of one’s own 
powerlessness and separate it from the way in which one thinks about involvement 
in (pseudo-)political activity. Thus, despite being abstractly cognizant of one’s 
political insignificance, one may continue to participate out of habit, social pressure, 
or some ambiguous sense of obligation. This, too, may be done in hopes of 
democratizing political practice; that, if one just keeps showing up, things will 
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eventually change for the better.  In the meantime, this position allows one to feel 282
as if something is being done, even if that something ends up being politically 
irrelevant.
The problem, however, with both of these responses concerns their latent 
reluctance to break with a democratic orientation. As such, they exclusively attend to 
democracy’s absence and not with the reality of a distinctly post-democratic present, 
preventing the post-democratic subject from dealing with the lived experience of 
domination at the root of her frustration, anxiety, and alienation. The latter response 
attempts to deny this new reality completely, preferring to ignore these feelings when 
they arise. Though this strategy may remain tenable as long as the party one 
identifies with is in power, it becomes more difficult when in the governing minority 
and more explicitly subject to sovereign decisions at odds with one’s own 
preferences. Withdrawal at least formally acknowledges a condition of political 
powerlessness, but it still tries to evade it through a symbolic separation, one which, 
by giving up any claim to political power, hopes to relieve the feeling of being 
dominated. In other words, withdrawal tries to bury frustration by championing 
alienation and alleviate anxiety by encouraging the disposition of a stoic observer, 
too wise to get caught up in the terrifying banalities of contemporary political life. 
That is unless, of course, these feelings are considered one’s cross to bear, the 
 Note that, despite sharing the same goal, this strategy and the one described 282
above are actively opposed to one another.
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wages of a collective inability to realize democratic values.  This distance could 283
provide some relief, but only at the price of a deeper isolation from one’s world.
There is, however, a third option. Rather than either unproductively fixating on 
the absence of democratic practice or actively ignoring it, one can try to address 
those feelings of frustration, anxiety, and alienation by, first, validating them, and 
second, shaping one’s engagement with (pseudo-)political activity in such a way that 
these concerns are at the forefront. 
How, then, can political involvement be therapeutic? Perhaps the best 
introduction is by way of example. From 2010 to 2013, the Dark Mountain Project, a 
network of environmental activists, writers, academics, and artists, held an annual 
event in the United Kingdom called “Uncivilization”. Rather than meeting to discuss 
what they could do to protect the environment, they instead gathered for a very 
different purpose. Through workshops, panels, performance art, and ritualized 
practice, they mourned the destruction of the Earth. As one of the group’s founders, 
Paul Kingsnorth, explains, activism had failed to slow, much less stop, the ongoing 
destruction of the planet, raising the question of whether such efforts were really 
worthwhile. 
Everything had gotten worse… You look at every trend that 
environmentalists like me have been trying to stop for 50 years, and 
 Cf. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia (New York: Verso, 2005), #5 “Sociability 283
itself is a participant in injustice, insofar as it pretends we can still talk with each 
other in a frozen world, and the flippant, chummy word contributes to the 
perpetuation of silence, insofar as the concessions to those being addressed debase 
the latter once more as speakers… For intellectuals, unswerving isolation is the only 
form in which they can vouchsafe a measure of solidarity. All of the playing along, all 
of the humanity of interaction and participation is the mere mask of the tacit 
acceptance of inhumanity. One should be united with the suffering of human beings: 
the smallest step to their joys is one towards the hardening of suffering.”
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every single thing had gotten worse. And I thought: I can’t do this 
anymore. I can’t sit here saying: ‘Yes, comrades, we must act! We 
only need one more push, and we’ll save the world!’ I don’t believe it. I 
don’t believe it! So what do I do?284
“Uncivilization” can be understood as one way of responding to this feeling of 
powerlessness, one which directly confronts its consequences by, as Naomi Klein 
observes, giving “people a forum in which to be honest about their sense of dread 
and loss.”  The festival and, more generally, Dark Mountain allow people the 285
chance to collectively address the question of
What do you do… when you accept that all of these changes are 
coming, things that you value are going to be lost, things that make 
you unhappy are going to happen, things that you wanted to achieve 
you can’t achieve, but you still have to live with it, and there’s still 
beauty, and there’s still meaning, and there are still things you can do 
to make the world less bad?  286
As Kingsnorth elaborates further, these aren’t “a series of questions that have any 
answers other than people’s personal answers to them. Selfishly it’s just a process 
I’m going through… It’s extremely narcissistic of me. Rather than just having a 
personal crisis, I’ve said: ‘Hey! Come share my crisis with me!’ ”287
 Daniel Smith "It's the End of the World as We Know It... And He Feels Fine." The 284
New York Times Magazine, April 17th, 2014.
 Daniel Smith "It's the End of the World as We Know It... And He Feels Fine." The 285
New York Times Magazine, April 17th, 2014.
 Daniel Smith "It's the End of the World as We Know It... And He Feels Fine." The 286
New York Times Magazine, April 17th, 2014.
 Daniel Smith "It's the End of the World as We Know It... And He Feels Fine." The 287
New York Times Magazine, April 17th, 2014.
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This ‘personal crisis’ experienced by Kingsnorth falls under the broader 
category of Foucault’s “crisis of subjectivation.”  Previously, Kingsnorth understood 288
himself as an environmental activist; as such, ‘environmentalism’ provided an ethical 
framework through which he could structure his sense of value.  In spreading 289
awareness about climate change or protesting overdevelopment, he could feel as if 
his life had greater meaning, giving him a sense of existential fulfillment. However, 
this self-conception depended on the modest assumption that his actions would 
have some level of impact; that, even if his efforts were ultimately Sisyphean, the 
boulder could be moved. When that assumption proved unfounded, Kingsnorth’s 
ethical framework became disrupted, leaving him feeling disoriented and distraught. 
The Dark Mountain Project, thus, can be understood as his attempt to work through 
those feelings by trying to discover a way to move forward, not by seeking out new 
forms of environmental activism, but by re-conceptualizing the ethical framework that 
previously informed his attachment to activism in the first place. In short, a way of 
reconciling one’s sense of self with an unfamiliar and/or perverted landscape. No 
longer able to see himself as a participant in political activity, Kingsnorth instead 
began to think of himself in a new light, as having a duty to bear witness to the 
Earth’s destruction and, subsequently, to grieve. In doing so, he embraced a new 
model of ethical subjectivity, one he was not only able to realize, but that further 
gave his existence a new sense of purpose (however grim that purpose may be).
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self (New York: 288
Vintage Books, 1988), 95. 
 Unless Kingsnorth was singularly committed to environmental change, we would 289
expect his sense of value to depend on other considerations (e.g., familial, 
professional, etc.) as well.  
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It is precisely this kind of ethical re-constitution that lies at the core of a 
therapeutic approach to (pseudo-)polit ical involvement: re-purposing 
(pseudo-)political activity as a way of transforming one’s understanding of oneself 
rather than the world at large. Instead of trying to realize a particular political 
outcome (i.e., greater environmental protections), Kingsnorth participated in a host 
of ostensibly political practices — writing manifestos, organizing gatherings, and 
spreading awareness — in order to develop a new self-understanding able to 
accommodate both his existential attachment to environmentalism and his political 
irrelevance. In other words, he took activities traditionally associated with sovereign 
decision-making and used them as a means of alleviating his own ‘personal crisis’. 
His deep connections with such practices allowed him to recognize the ways in 
which life can ‘go on’ despite the trauma of powerlessness. The realization of his 
own political insignificance didn’t have to radically transform his form of life (i.e., the 
activities in which he engaged), but only the meaning he gave to it; he could still 
write, speak, and associate with others — in short, act politically — even though he 
remained unable to influence environmental policy. This renewed sense of purpose 
helped him overcome his general sense of disorientation by freeing him to once 
again find himself in the activities that mattered most to him, only now with a 
newfound awareness of their real value. 
Furthermore, by validating the feelings of failure and despair resulting from a 
lack of political influence, a new self-understanding can help mitigate them. Much in 
the same way recognizing oneself as perpetually late or a klutz can lessen feelings 
of anxiety or frustration that may result from being tardy or clumsy, embracing one’s 
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own powerlessness can diminish the severity of feeling powerless.  It allows one to 
‘own’ the experience, to call it what it is, and to begin to develop strategies that could 
allow one to endure. Though perhaps unable to overcome these feelings — to feel, 
as it were, empowered and optimistic — individuals can find a way to live with them 
that relies on neither cognitive dissonance nor withdrawal, but rather on a sober 
confrontation with the conditions faced and a willingness to adapt accordingly. 
Moreover, to the extent that others are found that share this willingness (e.g., the 
Dark Mountain Project), one may find community in it as well.
While Kingsnorth was not confronting the experience of post-democracy per 
se, he was certainly responding to a version of it (i.e., lack of influence over 
environmental policy) and, more generally speaking, the feelings of frustration, 
anxiety, and alienation intrinsic to it. As such, his example illustrates why a 
therapeutic approach to political involvement should be considered uniquely 
appropriate for post-democratic life. Though most individuals are not as politically 
involved as Kingsnorth, to live in a modern, Western “democracy” is to be 
accustomed to the host of activities and expectations that make up the fabric of 
democratic life. In providing a way for individuals to process those sorts of feelings 
through the (pseudo-)political practices with which they are already familiar, a 
therapeutic approach allows them to engage with the more quotidian consequences 
of post-democratic sovereignty. In other words, to reconcile one’s lived experience 
within a ubiquitous democratic political imaginary with an awareness of one’s own 
domination; to figure out how to be a post-democratic subject in a world where one 
is consistently addressed as, and treated like, a democratic citizen. 
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POST-DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE
What would this look like? Let’s examine three possible post-democratic re-
appropriations of democratic “political” activities: the expression of political 
preference, dissent, and political discussion.
The expression of political preference is typically understood to be essential 
for — if not synonymous with — democratic political activity; popular sovereignty 
follows from the demos’s ability to direct sovereign decision-making by voicing 
considered opinions. Forms of expression include wearing political attire, sporting 
bumper stickers, posting yard signs, publishing one’s opinions (including on 
Facebook, Twitter, etc.), drafting/signing petitions, and, of course, voting. Yet, under 
post-democratic conditions, the expressed preferences of ordinary citizens end up 
falling upon deaf ears or, in the case of voting, remain constrained by elite 
preferences, effectively inhibiting the citizen’s ability to independently influence 
sovereign decision-making. 
What, then, should we make of these activities? From a democratic 
perspective, engaging in such activities would seem pointless; if voting doesn’t allow 
ordinary citizens to exercise any sort of meaningful political influence, it isn’t at all 
clear why someone should take the time to do so. From a post-democratic 
perspective, however, these sorts of activities can take on a new significance, one 
no longer tied to the exercise of political influence, but to self-realization. By 
providing ordinary citizens an opportunity to actualize their political identities, identify 
with genuine political actors, and find solidarity with friends, neighbors, and 
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countless anonymous others (both online and in person), the expression of political 
preference can provide real therapeutic benefits under post-democratic conditions; 
in particular, by alleviating feelings of alienation and anxiety.
Through her participation in culturally significant practices like voting or 
wearing a t-shirt with a political slogan or symbol, an individual can realize herself as 
a particular kind of subject. For example, voting for environmental protections gives 
her the chance to actualize herself as an environmentalist; similarly, wearing an anti-
racist t-shirt lets one assume the identity of an anti-racist. It is a way of becoming 
who one is in spite of one’s political powerlessness. All in all, the relationship 
between identity and activity in these instances is largely arbitrary; one need not 
vote to consider oneself an environmentalist, nor wear the right clothing in order to 
be against racism. Still, as in any sort of ritualized practice, the activity takes on the 
significance with which we impute it. One may consider oneself a Christian without 
having been baptized, but the practice certainly has the effect of making one feel 
“official,” as well as communicating that identity to others. 
By allowing the individual to realize a particular kind of identity, the expression 
of political preference further lets the individual identify with a particular political 
movement, faction, or leader. This is not to say that the ordinary citizen is able to 
influence sovereign decision-making herself in any significant sense, that she 
assumes the role of a political actor. Rather, it is simply that she’s able to declare her 
sympathies and, in doing so, establish a remote connection with those actually 
engaging in political activity. Here, the comparison to being a sports fan is 
illuminating. When a supporter wears a jersey or roots for her team, she does not 
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actively influence the outcome of the game. She remains merely a spectator. Yet, the 
act of wearing the jersey or cheering allows her to identify with the team, to express 
an existential connection with the team’s efforts, and to become emotionally invested 
in the team’s victory or defeat. Additionally, it enables her to establish connections 
with other fans. While hardly replicating the experience of being on the pitch (or even 
the sidelines), it lets one feel as if they are part of the effort. In this sense, post-
democratic political expression amounts to a form of vicarious participation, one that 
allows ordinary citizens to establish an imagined bond with genuine political actors. 
Finally, it gives ordinary citizens the opportunity to feel in solidarity with other 
non-elites who share their views. From a democratic perspective, this sense of 
solidarity is instrumentally valuable to the degree that it correlates with increased 
levels of political participation. From a post-democratic perspective, however, the 
value lies in helping to alleviate feelings of alienation that stem from a general lack of 
political community. To wear a political t-shirt, write about politics online, or even vote 
should be considered a way, not of actually influencing politics, but of signaling to 
others that they are not alone.  It is the practical equivalent of asking “Do you see 290
what I see?”, which, in turn, can help relieve the sense that one’s judgment or 
worldview is hopelessly distorted or detached. In the absence of Arendtian public 
spaces and Habermasian deliberative practices, it offers a way of connecting with 
others that, despite not being political, helps us to feel less isolated and, 
subsequently, less uneasy.
 While voting is typically done in secret, its culmination in a count functions as an 290
amalgamated expression. Thus, even if one knows one’s side will lose, it’s important 
to signal to those who share your preferences that they are not alone.
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Dissent, particularly when voiced collectively, constitutes a special case of 
political expression. Because dissent typically concerns something that either has or 
will happen soon, it focuses one’s attention on a particular political event or decision 
rather than the general field of political possibility as such. In doing so, it concretizes 
the post-democratic appreciation of political insignificance. Whereas the post-
democratic subject abstractly knows that she’s unable to influence politics, dissent 
highlights the specific repercussions (e.g., the new war, the new law, the failed 
response, etc.) of not being able to do so. By confronting her with the consequences 
of her powerlessness, it gives the individual an opportunity to truly recognize herself 
as a failed democratic citizen, demonstrating how her dissatisfaction, incredulity, or 
outrage are exhausted in their expression. 
In doing so, dissent becomes an opportunity, not to reverse a course of action 
or to speak truth to power, but to mourn.  This is intended in two senses. First, in a 291
way made explicit by the Dark Mountain Project, it allows the individual to mourn a 
particular decision or response. In this sense, it provides an emotional outlet to vent 
one’s sense of loss, as well as the frustrations and anxiety that surround it. Second, 
it gives individuals the chance to mourn their general sense of powerlessness, the 
 Recently, a number of thinkers including Judith Butler, David Wallace McIvor, and 291
Simon Stow have turned their attention to the political significance of mourning, 
conceptualizing it as an activity with the power to heal and redefine community 
relationships. See Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and 
Violence (New York: Verso Press, 2004); David McIvor, Mourning in America: Race 
and the Politics of Loss (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2016); and Simon Stow, American 
Mourning: Tragedy, Democracy, and Resilience (New York: Cambridge UP, 2016). To 
the extent these activities are able to achieve these goals, they could also constitute 
political activities; however, to the extent that their ability to influence sovereign 
decision-making may be overstated, they would still constitute a form of 
(pseudo-)political activity.
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experience of post-democratic political subjectivity as a whole; to mourn either a 
democracy lost or one never adequately realized. Through this process, individuals 
can begin to explore the affective consequences of their domination, the troubling 
feelings that result from an inability to live up to democratic ideals that not only 
pervade one’s society, but also have personal or even existential significance.
Engaging in political discussion constitutes a further move in this direction, 
but with the additional advantage of allowing individuals to reckon with the everyday 
consequences of their political insignificance. This breaks dramatically with a 
democratic understanding of political discussion, which characterizes it either as a 
preliminary step to forming a considered preference (that one will then attempt to 
realize) or as a form of political activity in itself. Rather than focusing on what “We” 
ought to do when making sovereign decisions, a post-democratic approach to 
political discussion treats it as an opportunity to consider what it means to lack 
democratic political practice. In other words, for ordinary citizens to intersubjectively 
explore the experience of political powerlessness. 
On a practical level, such discussions allow individuals to share strategies for 
responding to the political decisions made by others. In short, to develop ways of 
enduring or resisting sovereign power. For instance, in the event a law is passed that 
allows for individuals to carry concealed firearms, those concerned can work to 
identify public places less likely to attract armed individuals; if the state decides to 
ramp up the enforcement of immigration policies, individuals can discuss ways to 
help shield their neighbors from harassment and exile, like, for instance, not calling 
the police to the scene of an accident if an undocumented individual is involved. This 
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is not to suggest that all sovereign decisions will admit possibilities for resistance; 
some, especially budgetary or foreign policy decisions, will leave individuals no 
choice but to abide. Even still, individuals can talk about ways of making such 
decisions easier to bear, either through painting them in a different light or finding 
ways to ignore them.
Moreover, through regularly having these sorts of discussions, ordinary 
citizens can cultivate a more practical orientation toward the lived experience of 
post-democratic political subjectivity. In other words, they can develop a deeper 
appreciation of the more quotidian consequences of political powerlessness. Rather 
than simply raising questions of legitimacy, membership, etc. in the abstract, 
discussing political concerns from a post-democratic perspective allows them to take 
on a fullness only possible when individuals actively think through the real 
implications of those considerations in conversation with one another. For instance, 
it is one thing to privately question state legitimacy, it is another to hash out what that 
means for one’s functional relationship with particular institutions like the police, the 
courts, and other state institutions in a way that is not merely hypothetical, but 
applied. Similarly, while one may be able to dispassionately maintain a lack of 
culpability for state actions in general, one may have a more complicated emotional 
response when discussing the specific consequences of those actions with others, 
one that draws her attention to the more intractable remnants of her former 
democratic orientation.
By developing a more robust practical orientation toward the experience of 
political domination, ordinary citizens can better familiarize themselves with — and 
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habituate themselves to — the more subtle contours of post-democratic life. This 
process should help them begin to alter their perspective in such a way that tempers 
the frustration and anxiety associated with political insignificance; specifically, by 
becoming used to it. While political discussion serves to combat alienation as well, 
reminding individuals that they are not alone in their powerlessness, its chief value 
lies in normalizing this condition, transforming it from a profound and distressing 
failure to, quite literally, ‘politics as usual’. In doing so, it makes one’s inability to 
influence sovereign decision-making a bit less disconcerting, in turn, transforming 
moments that would previously provoke frustration into those that are more or less 
expected. By helping the post-democratic subject feel less disoriented and, 
subsequently, more ‘at home’, it reigns in the level of uncertainty and unease that 
contribute to said feelings, enabling her to better cope with the peculiar experience 
of political powerlessness that distinguishes post-democratic life.
THE POLITICS OF POST-DEMOCRACY
This approach does, however, raise the question: what are the political implications 
of treating (pseudo-)political activity as a therapeutic practice? In other words, where 
does  prioritizing one’s own well-being over the exercise of political influence leave 
one politically? While a post-democratic model of political subjectivity may initially 
appear as an apologia for authoritarianism, it actually describes a fairly complicated 
attachment to democratic values — one akin to mourning — that can’t simply be 
reduced to a reactionary dismissal. In concluding my dissertation, I will discuss the 
ways in which a post-democratic orientation provides a way of thinking about politics 
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that reveal the limitations inherent in simply focusing on one’s political preferences, 
instead encouraging us to marry preference with context in order to paint a fuller 
picture of one’s relationship with political authority and activity. In this sense, it is 
best understood as part of the broader, contemporary realist turn in political theory, 
commonly associated with Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss. Moreover, 
through reimagining legitimacy, membership, responsibility, and culpability in light of 
pervasive political domination, a post-democratic orientation offers a more fertile 
and, hence, progressive approach than its democratic counterpart to both political 
and (pseudo-)political activity. 
What, then, are the political ramifications of adopting a post-democratic 
political self-conception? Categorizing a post-democratic orientation on a political 
spectrum, whether employing the traditional left-right spectrum or more nuanced, 
two-dimensional models (e.g., the Political Compass, Nolan Chart, Pournelle Chart, 
etc.), presents a challenge. This is primarily because the only substantive political 
preferences implied by a post-democratic orientation are one’s sympathies for 
popular sovereignty and political equality; otherwise, it has no bearing on one’s 
greater political preferences. Thus, one could just as easily be a rightwing post-
democrat as a leftwing post-democrat, libertarian or statist, liberal or traditionalist, 
etc. One could even be an identitarian — white nationalist or otherwise — post-
democrat, depending on how one construes who  ought to constitute the demos that 
remains, at present, conspicuously absent. 
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Friedrich Hayek’s two-dimensional political spectrum gives us a bit more 
purchase.  In it, he distinguishes between one’s preference concerning the scope 292
of the sovereign decision-making, whether one is a liberal (limited scope) or a 
totalitarian (extended scope), and one’s preferred decision-making practice, whether 
one is a democrat (inclusive) or an authoritarian (exclusive). According to this model, 
the post-democratic subject, while open to being liberal or totalitarian, would express 
a clear preference for democratic decision-making practices, despite being 
pessimistic as to the possibility of their realization. Insofar as what is measured are 
political preferences, not political self-conceptions, such spectrums (including 
Hayek’s) remain of limited value.293
Still, one could argue that a post-democratic orientation, despite professing 
an ostensible respect for democratic values, still, ironically, commits one to an 
authoritarian position by encouraging a fatalistic political quietism. The idea is that 
conceptualizing oneself as politically powerless may, itself, contribute to one’s own 
powerlessness, ensuring post-democratic sovereignty through pervasive apathy. 
This would, first, be to assume that ordinary citizens could exercise political 
influence any less than they already do under post-democratic conditions. Moreover, 
this accusation grossly mischaracterizes the post-democratic approach to 
(pseudo-)political activity. Rather than prescribing political disengagement, it 
 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago 292
Press, 2011), 166.
 In fact, the very practice of asking large groups of people about their political 293
preferences would seem specific to a democratic orientation toward politics, one 
which assumes that it matters (politically, at least) whether ordinary citizens can 
describe themselves as having a coherent set political preferences. 
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counsels a therapeutic engagement that, in many ways, results in the same exercise 
of political influence as more “sincere” approaches to participation. In short, one’s 
actions remain the same, only their interpretations change. Whether one votes 
explicitly to consecrate an aspect of one’s identity or in the (vain) hope of influencing 
policy, there is no difference in political effect. Moreover, by highlighting the 
therapeutic value of such practices, it may actually encourage those who, perhaps 
due to their own political disaffection, have previously avoided them. 
However, one could further argue that a post-democratic orientation limits an 
individual’s potential commitment to political activity by encouraging them to think 
exclusively in terms of (pseudo-)political activity. For example, because the self-
aware post-democratic subject privileges the therapeutic value of protest, she may 
consciously abstain from involving herself further. This would perhaps prevent her 
from ever getting to a point where she is able to exercise a non-negligible degree of 
political influence.  On the one hand, this charge is warranted; treating 294
(pseudo-)political activity as a therapeutic practice troubles the ability to see it as a 
kind of training for real political activity. On the other hand, by highlighting the 
superficiality of many activities otherwise assumed to be politically relevant, a post-
democratic orientation forces us to reconsider what sorts of activities truly qualify as 
political. Subsequently, it also pushes would-be political actors to more seriously 
reflect on the value of certain activities, as well as whether they themselves are 
 For instance, Hahrie Han argues against the idea that political actors must be 294
politicized before participation, instead arguing that many become politicized through 
it. See Moved to Action: Motivation, Participation, and Inequality in American Politics 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2009). 
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willing to make the sorts of commitments necessary for having a chance to influence 
sovereign decision-making. 
Furthermore, by profoundly reconfiguring one’s assumptions about legitimacy, 
membership, responsibility, and culpability, it also frees genuine political actors from 
the constraints of democratic political norms, allowing them to embrace more 
creative forms of political action.  No longer concerned about state legitimacy and, 295
hence, the legitimacy of formal political practice, the post-democratic actor is free to 
manipulate such practices (e.g., discourse, elections, etc.), much in the same way 
elite political actors have for generations. The post-democratic subject’s instrumental 
conception of political membership and responsibility only further encourages this 
strategic openness to new and/or more Machiavellian ways of exercising political 
influence. Lastly, in distancing herself from sovereign decisions and the guilt and/or 
shame that accompany them, the post-democratic political actor relieves herself of 
any general political responsibility toward fixing the polis and remains free to focus 
only on those issues which she feels able to address. Thus, in the event she is able 
to exercise political influence, the post-democratic subject can do so radically 
unfettered. 
Whether addressing political actors or those who will, at best, only engage in 
(pseudo-)political activity, a post-democratic orientation toward political authority and 
activity dispenses with the fantasy of a democratic political community in favor of a 
deeper understanding of one’s own political environment. In this sense, it falls within 
 See also Jeffrey Green, “Learning How Not to Be Good: A Plebeian Perspective,” 295
in The Shadow of Unfairness: A Plebeian Theory of Liberal Democracy (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2016).
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the greater tradition of political realism, classically associated with Thucydides and 
Machiavelli, as well as more contemporary works by Bernard Williams, Raymond 
Geuss, and Jeffrey Green.  In fact, the post-democratic critique could easily be 296
read as a version of Williams’s broader charge against political moralism.  In it, 297
Williams argues against any conceptual model of politics which makes “the moral 
prior to the political” and thereby obscures what is uniquely political about political 
activity; in particular, its often amoral, if not immoral, dimensions.  Similarly, a post-298
democratic orientation encourages one to dispense with the moral presumptions of 
popular sovereignty and political equality and instead recognize the profound 
disparities in political influence that have and will continue to affect the exercise of 
sovereign power. For some, this may constitute a call for a more serious dedication 
to politics, one which recognizes that voting, protesting, or generating discussion is 
not enough. For most, however, it will enable them to better conceptualize their 
relationship with political authority and activity, ideally letting them work through the 
frustration, anxiety, and alienation pervasive in contemporary post-democratic 
societies. In either case, to remain wedded to a democratic orientation toward 
politics, oddly enough, constitutes a sort of conservatism, a dated value-commitment 
that impedes a more relevant approach to politics. Individuals must instead take the 
 See Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 296
UP, 2005); Raymond Geuss, Outside Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2005); 
Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2008); Geuss, A 
World Without Why (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014); Green, The Shadow of 
Unfairness. 
 Williams, “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory” in In the Beginning was the 297
Deed, 1-17.
 Williams, “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory,” 2.298
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radical step of recognizing their own fractured relationship to post-democratic 
sovereignty, inciting their political imagination anew. 
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